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Though frequently disadvantaged across a plethora of various institutions throughout 
history, noncitizens have become increasingly targeted with recent political rhetoric refocusing 
on immigration as a threat to homeland security.  The latent effects of this renewed political 
platform has been a heightened awareness of the “immigration threat” that has infiltrated the 
criminal justice system.   
Previous research has found that citizenship status is related to sentencing outcomes 
despite the identification of this variable as extralegal by the USSC, though research remains 
largely divided on the extent and manifestation of this disparity.  Furthermore, only a very few of 
these studies have examined potential mediating and moderating effects within noncitizens.  
Because political rhetoric emphasizes “illegal immigrants from Mexico,” ethnicity, country of 
origin, and documentation status are likely to influence sentencing outcomes.  This dissertation is 
the first known study to control for each of these potential mediators in the analysis of noncitizen 
federal sentencing disparities.   
Because the emphasis on foreign populations is not immutable but rather fluctuates 
according to the existing sociocultural context, aggregated sentencing data fails to acknowledge 
nuanced patterns of disadvantage, often masking disparities.  This study is among the first to 
examine the effects of citizenship status on federal sentencing outcomes over time and across 
districts and is the first study to do so while controlling for spatial autocorrelation.  Multilevel 
 
 
modeling techniques are employed to examine cases nested within sentencing districts.  A queen 
contiguity spatial weight matrix is included to control for geographic proximity.  Finally, a series 
of growth models are used to examine longitudinal patterns in sentencing outcomes across 
districts over time.   
The results of this study support the contention that noncitizens receive more severe 
sentencing outcomes across numerous outcomes including incarceration, prison alternatives for 
eligible offenders, sentence length, and departures.  Ethnicity, country of origin, and 
documentation status were also frequently found to be significant predictors of sentencing 
severity though fail to explain citizenship effects in their entirety.  Sentencing outcomes have 
fluctuated over time, with sentencing outcomes demonstrating increased severity.  Furthermore, 
variations in district caseloads and offender demographics demonstrate unique effects on 
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 “A nation that cannot control its borders is not a nation.” 
― Ronald Reagan 
 
IMMIGRATION IN A CRIME-CONTROL ERA 
 
Social and Political Apprehension over “the Immigration Problem” 
Attitudes toward immigration, as reflected in social and political discourse, have become 
severely polarizing.  According to the July 2014 Gallup poll, immigration is ranked as the 
greatest problem facing the United States, with nearly 17% of participants identifying this issue 
as the greatest concern facing America (Gallup, 2014b).  Apprehension over immigration has 
outranked government corruption, the economy, and unemployment, among several others, as 
the most important problem confronting Americans.  When asked whether the participant 
believes that the number of immigrants who move to the United States should be kept at the 
present level, increased, or decreased, only about 4% claim to have no opinion on the topic.  This 
number has decreased by nearly 80% since June of 1965 when nearly 20% of participants 
demonstrated no opinion on the topic (Gallup 2014a).   
Though society appears united in the importance placed on immigration, they diverge 
when addressing how best to respond to this matter.  Roughly 41% of respondents in 2014, an 
increase from 33% in 1965, believe that immigration levels should be reduced.  Only 22% 




about 33% of respondents are satisfied with the present level of immigrants.  This percentage has 
declined from 39% in 1965 (Gallup 2014a).  These attitudes vary according to education level, 
income, and race (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996), though demographic predictors may 
disappear when controlling for beliefs that immigration impacts employment and taxation (Citrin 
et al. 1997). 
Much of the fervor evident in societal attitudes toward immigration is both a product of, 
and trigger for, political rhetoric.  Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. 
Bush, and Barack Obama are merely a few of the presidents who have taken important 
immigration stances, several of whom established policies providing amnesty for immigrants 
meeting specific criteria.  Policies and political discourse are usually divided among political 
affiliations, with republicans often demonstrating tough immigration stances while democrats 
often favor less restrictive policies.  Currently, President Barack Obama has submitted an 
immigration bill that would provide amnesty for numerous undocumented immigrants meeting 
specific criteria.  This policy is under heavy scrutiny by society, the media, and fellow 
politicians.  According to data from the Pew Research Center, a higher percentage of respondents 
paid very close attention to President Barack Obama’s immigration policy than those who paid 
very close attention to the Ebola outbreak and the Islamic militant group named ISIS (Dost 
2014).  Those who oppose policies perceived as lenient toward undocumented immigrants, such 
as President Obama’s recent bill, often associate weak border control with terrorism and 
lawlessness, a message that is often incited by the media.  
While immigration concerns provide a platform for political leaders, the televised media 
exploit fear of crime and mistrust of immigrants in order to increase viewership by promoting 




transmission of attitudes and beliefs” (Logue 2009: 426) between the government/media and 
public.  Politicians use the media to disseminate ideologies which are consumed by the public.  
The media, however, must in turn provide entertainment in order for viewers to participate in the 
process.  Such entertainment is often proffered under the guise of provocative, inciting 
commentary.  For example, in 2006, Glenn Beck, an American television personality, was 
quoted as saying "[Mexico] has been overtaken by lawbreakers from the bottom to the top. And 
now, what you're protesting for is to have lawbreakers come here" (Dimond 2006).  Rhetoric 
such as this is merely an example of the myriad of anti-immigration messages being fed to the 
public.  These attitudes are likely to have lasting impacts on immigrants, proliferating xenophic, 
nativistic, and isolationist ideologies at the risk of marginalizing and stigmatizing noncitizens.   
Fear that this “dangerous” population is increasing may further stimulate negative 
attitudes toward noncitizens.  Roughly 1 in 5 marriages include a foreign-born spouse, though 
this varies according to region with higher proportions found in some states, such as Florida, 
Illinois, and Texas (Larsen and Walters 2013).  According to a report by Larsen and Walters 
(2013), the population of U.S. residents who were born outside of the country has increased from 
14.1 million to 40 million between 1980 and 2010.  As of 2011, 40.4 million immigrants are 
present in the United States.  Roughly 11.1 million of these immigrants are present without 
authorization, a number which has increased from 8.4 million in 2000 (Pew Research Center 
2011b).  About 65% of the increase in foreign-born residents consisted of those from Latin 
America and the Caribbean, while the rest are of Asian descent (Larsen and Walters 2013).  As 
of 2012, however, only 3.5% of the U.S. population consists of unauthorized immigrants, 
representing only 26% of the foreign born population (Passel and Cohn 2014).  American 




number of unauthorized noncitizens from Mexico has steadily declined since 2007 from almost 7 
million to a little over 5.8 million in 2012 (Pew Research Center 2014).  This imagery of mass 
immigration of undocumented, predominately Mexican, immigrants suggests that the 
immigration issue is uncontrollable and, therefore, greater than it actually is (Johnson 1996).  
These messages permeate societal dialogue which intensifies political fixation on the 
immigration problem, further exacerbating concerns while contributing to the cycle of anti-
immigrant attitudes.  It is this fear of crime and association of immigrants with crime that 
enhances public advocacy for homeland security and border control.   
 
The Intersectionality of Ethnicity and Citizenship 
Within the United States, Hispanic has become synonymous with immigrant; this term, 
however, is often misleading.  The label of Hispanic encapsulates a plurality of ethnicities and 
racial backgrounds, creating an identity that is actually an amalgamation of many.  Discussing 
shifts in the Hispanic population distorts the unique nuances of population changes within each 
ethnic group (Morín 2009).  Unfortunately, due to reporting limitations, the Hispanic grouping is 
often the only measurement available.  With this in mind, it does appear as though the vast 
majority of U.S. noncitizens are of Latino decent (Massey 2007; Musto 1999), and that this 
population does not appear to be declining anytime in the near future.  Feldmeyer and Ulmer 
(2011) identify the Hispanic population as the largest and “fastest growing racial/ethnic minority 
groups in the U.S.” (244).  As a result, Hispanic men and women represent about 15% of the 
population and are now the largest minority in this country (Johnson, Steward, Pickett and Gertz 
2011).  However, while U.S. policy was cracking down on undocumented Mexican immigration 




(Johnson 1996), suggesting the “immigration crisis” is actually one concerning race.  In light of 
findings such as these, Demleitner and Sands (2002) argue that examining racial distinctions 
between citizens and non-citizens is of particular importance.  Because political and media 
rhetoric have created an association between dangerousness and immigration status, society often 
relies upon these racial/ethnic labels in order to identify these “outsiders” via perceptual 
shorthand.   
The local populace not only creates a strong connection between race and immigration, it 
also often fails to acknowledge a distinction within common rhetoric between legal and illegal 
noncitizens as well as immigrant and temporary noncitizens.  Not all noncitizens are immigrants.  
Noncitizens may also include foreign students, tourists, business visitors, or green-card holders 
(Demleitner and Sands 2002).  According to Johnson (1996), terminology such as ‘alien’ 
incorporates multiple categories of noncitizens into one label that identifies an outgroup who can 
be denied the rights of citizens. 
 
Informal Responses to Noncitizens  
Immigration controversy has the potential to result in dire consequences for both legal 
and illegal noncitizens, some of which are already evident within the United States.  Immigrants, 
often Latinos, currently experience substantial economic, social, and political disadvantage.  For 
example, fear of repercussions for hiring undocumented workers has led many employers to 
avoid hiring Latino employees or those who appear Latino (Massey 2007).  On average, Latino 
employees receive less pay compared to white employees, suggesting that those who do hire 
foreign employees often participate in wage discrimination to compensate for the increased risk 




punitive action.  In doing so, employers reap the benefits of paying low wages without the legal 
liability of hiring an undocumented worker.  As a result of employment discrimination, poverty 
rates among Latino citizens and noncitizens are high, possibly exceeding those of African-
Americans (Massey 2007).  The children of immigrants are disproportionately more likely to 
drop out of school (Massey 2007).  Many of them do so to provide additional income for their 
families.  Latino citizens and non-citizens also suffer from housing discrimination via linguistic 
profiling.  If a potential buyer or renter sounds foreign to the seller, he or she may refuse an 
offer.  In doing so, this profiling has contributed to the hypersegregation of immigrants.   
Much of these injustices are exacerbated by formal and informal discourse identifying 
immigrants as an economic burden on the United States.  According to Johnson (1996), the 
Supreme Court claims that undocumented Mexicans increase economic and social problems 
(285).  As a result of rhetoric such as this, immigration is often discussed through an economic 
lens (Citrin et al 1997). Demleitner and Sands (2002) acknowledge that increases in immigration 
place a significant strain on resources, especially for Border States.  If negative attitudes were a 
direct response to actual strains placed on a community, however, then anti-immigrant attitudes 
should be highest among those most frequently in competition with noncitizens for employment.  
Research suggests that this is not the case.  Socioeconomic status is not a predictor of negative 
attitudes toward noncitizens (Citrin et al 1997).  Furthermore, anti-immigration attitudes are not 
limited to regions with higher percentages of noncitizen residents (Espenshade and Calhoun 
1993), suggesting that disproportionate numbers of immigrant job seekers is not related to 






Formal Responses to Noncitizens 
The U.S. government appears to parallel societal-level hostility toward immigrants under 
the guise of homeland security.  Border control along the Southern border has experienced an 
increase in funds and resources, the militarization of immigration control, and the reframing of 
immigration as a terrorism threat.  In fact, in response to the terrorist threat posed by immigrants, 
congress passed the USA PATRIOT act (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism act).  This policy, arguably, 
calls for the sacrifice of several basic human rights in order to increase homeland security.   
When federal border control policies are perceived to fail to alleviate the immigration 
problem, state and local lawmakers appear to address concerns at the local level.  As noted by 
Martín (2009), “…local governments have also sought to usurp federal authority over 
immigration policy by attempting to enact anti-immigrant laws” (169).  Several states, 
particularly those along the border, have proposed bills designed to enhance the ability of law 
enforcement to better identify immigrants and enforce stringent immigration policies at the risk 
of jeopardizing the freedom of non-citizens including: California’s 1994 Proposition 187, 
Arizona’s SB 1070, and Alabama’s HB 56, each of which were designed to enforce anti-illegal 
immigration policies.  Several of these bills failed, however.  The city of Hazleton, Pennsylvania 
is another example of the failure of overly strict immigration policies at a local level. This city 
attempted to enact ordinances which would ban immigrants from working and renting property.  
This law was struck down by federal court in 2007 (Martín 2009).   
Some have interpreted the failure of the laws to pass as evident that President Barack 
Obama is excessively lenient toward noncitizens (Passel and Cohn 2014).  Therefore, when 




unintentionally abused in order to control immigration through crime.  Supporters of achieving 
immigration control via the criminal justice system suggest that citizenship status should be a 
crucial consideration in punitive decision making.  One such advocate, Susana Martinez, the 
republican governor of New Mexico argues that “The criminal justice system should have the 
authority to determine the immigration status of all criminals, regardless of race or ethnicity, and 
report illegal immigrants who commit crimes to federal authorities” (Silver City Sun-News 
2011).  If federal authorities fail to satiate the perceived needs of the local jurisdiction, those in 
positions of authority may control immigration through de facto removal from society via 
incarceration.  Such actions may receive support due to a double stigmatization of offenders who 
are viewed as deviant for entering the country illegally as well as for the crime committed.  
These sanctions will not only remove unwelcome immigrants from society, but will also 
demonstrate to society that noncitizens are more dangerous and criminal than U.S. citizens 
(Demleitner and Sands 2002) while simultaneously sending a message to current and future 
immigrants that they are not welcome.    
As advocated by Governor Martinez, the criminal justice system appears to be 
increasingly involved in the sanctioning of immigrant offenders.  Punitive responses toward 
noncitizens are mirrored in the criminal justice system.  The bulk of immigration violation 
increases have occurred at the federal level (Demleitner and Sands 2002).  From 1994 to 2000, 
the number of defendants charged with immigration violations increased from 2500 to 12000 
(Demleitner and Sands 2002).  Immigration offenses increased from 5.1% of convictions in 1993 
to 13.7% in 1997 (Maxfield and Burchfield 2002).  Of the 396,096 individuals deported in 2011, 
about 216,698 (55%) were convicted of a crime (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 




more than doubled in the past five years.  Logue (2009) suggests that immigrants may receive 
more severe sentencing outcomes for these offenses as a result of a double stigmatization in the 
courtroom, one for delinquency/deviance and another for their ethnicity.   
Due to the symbolic function of the court, disproportionality in sentencing will likely 
validate pre-existing fear of immigrants.  As acknowledged by Eisenstein, Flemming, and 
Nardulli (1988) when referring to the role of the courts, “their decisions are authoritative because 
they are ‘legitimate,’ that is, they are actions of government backed by the ultimate right to 
employ force” (10).  Furthermore, imagery of mass immigration of undocumented Mexican 
immigrants has resulted in public perceptions that this issue is uncontrollable and greater than it 
actually is (Johnson 1996).  These examples of punitive immigration attitudes may be indicative 
of ‘fear of noncitizens,’ with many members of society often failing to distinguish between legal 
and illegal presence within immigration and criminal justice rhetoric.  As a result, such punitive 
reactions can be expected to extend to documented as well as undocumented immigrants.   
 
FIGHTING INEQUALITY IN THE COURTROOM 
In response to concerns over disproportionate sentencing, the Comprehensive Crime 
Control Act of 1984 created the Federal Sentencing Reform Act which established the United 
States Sentencing Commission (USSC) (Albonneti 2011; Kautt 2002; Paternoster 2011; Spohn 
2011).  The USSC enforces sentencing guidelines in federal courts via Federal sentencing 
guidelines created in 1987 (Albonetti 2011; Spohn 2011).  The USSC ultimately limited judicial 
discretion with the intent of extending conformity across districts via sentencing guidelines.  
According to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) of the Federal sentencing guidelines, certain characteristics of 




variables include the seriousness of the offense, criminal history, and aggravating circumstances, 
to name a few.  Other characteristics have been recognized as unrelated to criminal culpability, 
and should not be included in sentencing decisions.  These extralegal variables include 
characteristics such as race, gender, and education among others.   
According to USSC section 5H1.10, prosecutors and judges should not “use race and 
national origin as criteria in making sentencing decisions” (Demuth 2002: 272).  Furthermore, 
“judges may depart from the guidelines only on a finding that ‘there exists an aggravating or 
mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the 
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines’” (Cano and Spohn 2012: 309; 18 U.S.C. 
section 3553[b]).  However, the guidelines state that these variables, as well as several others 
including gender and education, should not be “ordinarily relevant” (Cano and Spohn 2012: 
309); but such language is clearly ambiguous.   
The United States Sentencing Commission (USSC) has yet to define the concept of 
“ordinarily relevant” (Demleitner and Sands 2002), leaving each jurisdiction to interpret this 
policy as it sees fit.  The inevitable outcome is differential interpretation of this concept.  In 
1986, the 7th circuit, permitted the use of citizenship-based decisions under the guise of 
deterrence in 1986 United States v. Gomez (Logue 2009).  The 1991 United States v. 
Onwuemene permitted the use of citizenship status in determining sentencing outcomes 
(Demleitner and Sands 2002; Logue 2009).  This decision was reversed, however, by the 8th 
circuit.  Such legal ambiguity was further subject to judicial discretion after the 2005 United 
States v. Booker, 2005 United States v. Fanfan, and 2007 Gall v. United States which permit 
judges to sentence outside of the guideline range (Albonetti 2011; Paternoster 2011; Spohn 




DeLone 2012).     
It is becoming increasingly evident that future research should examine sentencing 
disparities at the Federal level in response to the overwhelming number of noncitizens found 
within the Federal justice system despite legal attempts to reduce courtroom disadvantage.  
Furthermore, Feldmeyer and Ulmer (2011) argue it is also necessary to study Federal sentencing 
practices because of the sheer number of men and women in Federal prisons.  More than 250,000 
men and women currently reside in federal prisons.  Likewise, Federal decisions substantially 
affect social attitudes as a result of “visibility and legal prominence-coupled with its symbolic 
representation of national criminal justice policy” (Feldmeyer and Ulmer 2011; 239).  Federal 
policies may directly and indirectly influence state law.  It is also an opportunity to examine 
whether stringent policies are effective in curving discrimination.  Federal law assumes that the 
same policies will be applied by culturally diverse regions/districts in a uniform manner.  
Therefore, research is needed to ensure a modicum degree of conformity is present in the 
application of the law. 
Despite the importance of understanding disproportionality between citizens and 
noncitizens at the Federal level, few studies have successfully done so.  Of research studies that 
do include citizenship status, “most treat citizenship as a control” (Wu and DeLone 2012: 215).  
Demuth (2002) argues that this may be a result of a lack of interest in protecting this group from 
legal injustices.  However, he argues that it is more likely a matter of practical constraints 
including, but not limited to, difficulties in gathering information on citizenship status at the state 
level, as well as difficulties collecting information on criminal histories and comparing the 
different outcomes of citizens on non-citizens.  Despite numerous studies examining racial 




black/white dichotomy, with the omission of Hispanic defendants (Johnson et al. 2011). This is 
particularly surprising considering that the Hispanic population is now larger than the African-
American population.  Those who have included Hispanic defendants in their research have 
identified significant degrees of inequality (Albonetti 1997; Steffensmeier and Demuth 2006).  
This dearth of research is particularly concerning because non-citizens represent a large portion 
of federal cases, this percentage is growing, and as stated previously, citizenship status is an 
extralegal variable that should not influence sentencing outcomes (Demuth 2002). 
 
RESEARCH AGENDA 
This study examines regional and longitudinal trends in federal sentencing disparities 
among non-citizen drug offenders.  As previously acknowledged, few studies have examined the 
effects of citizenship status on sentencing outcomes.  Of these studies, nearly none have 
examined longitudinal or regional effects beyond mere control variables.  Because noncitizens 
are so dramatically represented within Federal prisons for drug offenses, the sample will focus 
on Federal drug offenders.  
Federal law is expected to apply equally and uniformly across the United States.  
However, it is unlikely that all districts have the same values and abilities to apply such laws 
consistently.  Different districts struggle with different types and levels of crime and can 
therefore be expected to prioritize policies differently.  As Feldmeyer and Ulmer (2011) state, 
“this diverse array of social contexts may result in localized justice meted out in context-specific 
ways” (240).  As a result, current inclinations toward stringent immigration policies are likely a 
result of important contextual elements including both local and national political and economic 




Courtroom actors are not immune to these regional and longitudinal attitude shifts.  As 
such, judges and attorneys are likely to be influenced by their surroundings.  Though federal 
judges are not obligated to consider state laws in their decisions, the local ideologies that 
promote get-tough policies are likely to influence the cognitive framework within which the 
judge interprets federal law.  Despite the increased prominence of federal mandatory sentencing 
strategies and sentencing guidelines, judges maintain a sufficient amount of discretion in 
interpretation for critical decisions, particularly with regard to awarding substantial departures.  
Because judges are subject to local and cultural influences, it is likely that federal judges’ 
decisions will mirror local ideologies and priorities.  Attitudes toward non-citizens are no 
exception.  Federal sentencing outcomes are likely to vary according to local and current 
reactions toward foreign residents.   
This study examines whether non-citizens receive harsher sentencing outcomes compared 
to U.S. citizens as well as within noncitizen variations for federal drug offenses, whether this 
sentencing disparity varies by district, and whether these disparities change over time.  Chapter 2 
provides the socio-historical context in which the relationship between drug policies and 
immigration has evolved.  Chapter 3 briefly summarizes the limited research that has examined 
the effects of citizenship on sentencing outcomes.  I then examine how such variation may be 
influenced by defendant ethnicity, region, and time.  Chapter 4 outlines the theoretical 
framework within which judicial discretion is likely to exist.  Particularly, I argue that punitive 
reactions toward noncitizens are a result of socially agreed upon fears of economic, social, and 
political competition.  This competition influences individual level interpretations of 
blameworthiness and recidivism via perceptual shorthand.  Such perceptions, however, will vary 




and methodological strategy in Chapter 5.  Sentencing disparities between citizens and 
noncitizens are examined at the case level in Chapter 6, the results of which frequently support 
many of the theoretical premises with noncitizens receiving more severe sentencing outcomes 
than their U.S. citizen counterparts across all dependent variables.  I then examine geographic 
predictors of sentencing disparities in Chapter 7.  Longitudinal patterns in sentencing outcomes 
are discussed in Chapter 8.  Finally, the findings from the data analysis are synthesized within 
the theoretical framework in Chapter 9.  Limitations and policy implications are also 







 “Reflecting on the earlier wave of drug intolerance, one cannot help but be concerned that the 
fear of drugs will again translate into a simple fear of the drug user and will be accompanied by 
draconian sentences and specious links between certain drugs and distrusted groups within 
society....” 
― David F. Musto 1999: 171 
The proliferation of anti-immigration sentiments has permeated societal attitudes, local 
and government policies, as well as the criminal justice system.  The extent and manifestation of 
these sentiments, however, appear to be both region and time specific.  Some states appear to 
demonstrate disproportionate punitiveness toward noncitizens and Latinos.  Punitive attitudes 
toward noncitizens appear to be more pronounced in states that are closer to the Mexican border.  
These Border States appear to apply stricter penalties for crimes committed by noncitizens.  For 
instance, almost 49% of unlawful re-entry federal convictions by “prior aggravated felons” are in 
the following jurisdictions: California South, Texas West, and Arizona (Maxfield and Burchfield 
2002).  As of 2012, roughly 60% of unauthorized immigrants lived in California, Florida, 
Illinois, New Jersey, New York, and Texas (Passel and Cohn 2014).  Conversely, Maine, 
Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia have fewer than 5,000 
unauthorized immigrants per state (Passel and Cohn 2014).  As a result, Demleitner and Sands 
(2002) argue that the Southwest Border has focused greatly on border control.  District level 




California exhibiting removal rates of almost 16%, the western district of Texas about 48%, and 
the rates for Arizona over 95%, (Maxfield and Burchfield 2002).   
Even within border states, responses toward immigration are likely to vary across time.  
From 2009-2012, only Florida, Idaho, Maryland, Nebraska, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and 
Virginia saw an increase in unauthorized immigrants (Passel and Cohn 2014).  Alabama, 
Arizona, California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, 
Nevada, New Mexico, New York, and Oregon demonstrated noticeable declines in unauthorized 
immigrants.  The remaining states showed no significant population changes among 
unauthorized immigrants (Passel and Cohn 2014).  The restrictionist attitudes observed during 
the Post WWII era and the 1980s (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993) have not yet become obscure.  
The post 9-ll wave and anti-immigration policies continue to limit opportunities for noncitizens.  
Tough immigration policies appear to vary in intensity and frequency by location and time.  As 
observed by Kevin Johnson (1996), “…the beauty (if one can call it that) of anti-illegal alien 
rhetoric is its ability to tap into the specific racial fears in a particular region and allow for 
consensus on national solutions to the ‘alien problem’ (290).  It is this very rhetoric that may also 
place noncitizens at a disadvantage within the courtroom.   
 
THE NONCITIZEN-DRUG NEXUS 
According to Demuth (2002), there exists an important relationship between citizenship 
status and sentencing outcomes for drug offenders which he refers to as a noncitizen-drug nexus.  
In fact, politicians have used immigration and crime concerns interchangeably, so that 
immigrants are frequently associated with crime, particularly drug and gun crimes (Johnson et al 




noncitizens.  Chief Justice Burger once stated that the nation “is powerless to stop the tide of 
illegal aliens - and dangerous drugs - that daily and freely crosses our 2000- mile southern 
boundary” (as cited by Johnson 1996: 284).  Though there are often mandatory minimum 
sentences for certain drug offenses that vary by type and amount, judges may apply discretion for 
those who provide a substantial assistance according to the United States sentencing guidelines 
section 5K.1.1 (Cano and Spohn 2012).  This clause provides an opportunity for judges to 
circumvent mandatory drug minimums as well (Cano and Spohn 2012).  While immigration 
violations result in longer prison terms than drug violations for noncitizens, this variation 
disappears for U.S. citizens (Wu and DeLone 2012).  White-collar criminals received longer 
sentences than drug violations for citizens, but this disappeared for noncitizens.   
While drug laws appear to be the legal mechanism through which the targeting of 
noncitizens is justified, race and ethnicity appear to be proxies through which to identify 
noncitizens. Ethnic disparities may be greater among drug charges compared to non-drug 
offenses (Demuth 2002).  Because noncitizens are often presumed to be of Latino descent, the 
war on drugs has disproportionately affected Hispanic stereotypes (Feldmeyer and Ulmer 2011).  
“Current political discourse regarding national security threats from Mexican drug cartels and a 
concurrent media induced panic regarding immigration and crime has produced a fear of 
immigrants in the United States” (Hartley and Armendariz 2011: 47).  Though the current 
association within the U.S. between certain drugs, specifically marijuana, and Mexican 
immigrants appears absolute, the connection between undesirable substances and immigrants of 





REFRAMING THE IMMIGRANT-DRUG THREAT 
 
Early Colonists and Native Americans (1600s-1830s) 
Originally, upon the arrival of the early colonists, immigration and substance abuse were 
of little concern.  Throughout most of the 17th and 18th century, the colonies were expanding.  
Rather than fearing “outsiders,” the colonists faced territorial disputes against the Native 
Americans.  The first immigration law did not occur until the 1790s.  The Alien and Sedition 
Acts were among the first policies to limit immigration, and was a result of reducing French 
radicalism (Johnson 1996).  Citizenship status was limited to white men, excluding other 
ethnicities as well as women.  These acts also required residency of at least 14 years prior to 
obtaining citizenship, and permitted the deportation of dangerous aliens.  The residency 
requirement was reduced to 5 years in 1802.   
 While immigration policies were of little concern to the early colonists, substance use 
was cause of even less distress.  Domestic production of hemp was encouraged.  Opium, a 
narcotic with a calming effect, was used as a form of medical treatment (Musto 1999). Morphine 
was being extracted from opium by 1803.  Alcoholic beverages, on the other hand, were far from 
uncommon during this time.  The earliest substance control policy was formed during the 1830s, 
and forbade the sale of alcohol to “Indians.”   
 
Potato Famine and Irish Immigrants (1830s-1850s) 
 The early and mid-19th century brought an expansion of both diverse immigration as well 
as new medicinal and recreational substances, with few policies enacted to control either.  The 




eventually resulting a substantial hostilities directed toward the Irish (Johnson 1996).  The 
Chinese population was expanding at a rapid pace (Musto 1999).  The newly freed slaves began 
to raise questions of citizenship, though the Dred Scott decision made it clear in 1857 that 
society would not accept freed black men as U.S. citizens at this time.  It was during this time 
period that the first Mexican citizens were established.  The signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo in 1848 ended the Mexican-American war (1846-1848).  This treaty granted the U.S. 
several new territories that had previously belonged to Mexico.  In doing so, many Mexican 
inhabitants were forced to choose between Mexican or U.S. citizenship.  Roughly 90% chose 
U.S. citizenship, creating 50,000 new Mexican-Americans.  Due to their small population and 
distance from the major communities, these new citizens were not considered to be a threat.   
During this time, very little focus was placed on substance control.  Alcohol consumption 
began to wane in popularity while synthetic drugs such as Opium and Morphine grew, 
particularly because they were inexpensive and compact (Musto 1999).  Some, however, 
criticized opium for being “un-American” and “non-Western” (Musto 1999: 2) indicating an 
association of drug use among noncitizens.  Codeine was synthesized in 1831.  Policies designed 
to curtail the use of these substances were mostly absent.   
 
Profiteering off of China (1860s-1880s) 
Toward the late 19th century, law makers began considering regulating both incoming 
immigrants as well as mind-altering substances.  Some of these regulations were progressive.  
After the civil war (1861-1865), African-Americans gained citizenship via the 14th amendment.  
The 1864 contract labor law allowed businesses to recruit foreign labor.  New York declared 




York.  These tolerant policies did not extend to every nationality, however.  For instance, the 
permissiveness of bringing in foreign labor did not extend to Chinese workers.  Though Chinese 
immigrants were at first welcomed by the U.S. in order to take up jobs that many U.S. citizens 
did not want, these immigrants soon became a concern.  Many felt as though the Chinese were 
too industrious (Massey 2007).  They would work hard and rise to higher positions, taking 
desirable jobs.  To deter Chinese recruitment, the anti-coolie act required a tax for those who hire 
Chinese workers.  Furthermore, Chinese immigrants were denied citizenship status even after the 
1870 Naturalization act which broadened citizenship.  Finally, by 1882, all immigrants were 
required to pay a 50 cent tax upon reaching port.   
While several policies were enacted to deter the immigration of the overly industrious 
Chinese, anti-opium attitudes began to spread.  Opium, a narcotic popularized in China, was 
banned in some states, including San Francisco, during the 1870s.  Some states, such as 
Pennsylvania, enacted antimorphine law in 1860s (Musto 1999).  Alcohol legislation also began 
during this time.  Heroin was being marketed in the U.S. during this period, and the hypodermic 
needle was popularized.     
 
Excluding Asia (1880s-1914) 
 When employment taxes failed to curtail Chinese immigrants sufficiently, various 
policies were soon enacted to entirely limit the entrance of the Chinese as well as most of Asia 
and the substances associated with them.  The 1882 Chinese exclusion act suspended Chinese 
immigration for 10 years, and was renewed in 1892 for another 10 years.  Furthermore, the alien 
contract labor law forbade the importing of unskilled aliens, though this did not apply to the 




immigration was created in 1891.  In 1902, the anarchist exclusion act prohibited anyone 
believed to be associated with anarchist ideology.  By 1906, the ability to speak fluent English 
became a requirement for naturalization.  The exclusion of Chinese immigration soon expanded 
to include Japanese immigrants as a result of the 1907 Gentlemen’s agreement.  These nativist 
attitudes were so entrenching that even women who were U.S. citizens would lose their 
citizenship status if they marry a “foreigner” as a result of the 1907 expatriation act.  Also during 
1907, the head tax for noncitizens was raised, the exclusion list was further expanded, and the 
Dillingham report identified certain Europeans as inferior and Mexican immigrants as 
nonassimilable.  In 1913, California’s alien land law made it illegal for anyone ineligible for 
citizenship to own land, which mostly effected Asian immigrants (Musto 1999). 
 As immigration laws were becoming less tolerant, so were drug policies.  During this 
time, opium importation declined.  Morphine and cocaine, which had traditionally been popular 
for medical treatment as well as certain beverages including Coca Cola and some wines, were 
beginning to become controlled by the end of the 19th century.  Society began to worry that these 
drugs were spurring violence and taking away the users’ humanity.  States began forming 
policies to ban mind-altering substances due to fears of addiction and immorality.  In 1880, Ohio 
banned smoking opium.  Illinois prohibited cocaine in 1897 (Musto 1999).  The emphasis on 
substance control at the federal level, however, was focused on opium.  In 1909, the International 
opium commission, also known as the Shanghai opium commission, met to address international 
drug concerns, particularly that of opium.  Partially in response to the findings of the 
commission, a meeting was called at the Hague in 1912 to address taking action, which 
ultimately lead to the Harrison act.  These restrictions on opium, morphine, and cocaine created a 




1906, the Pure Food and Drug Act required the labeling of products containing opiates, cocaine, 
and cannabis, resulting in the decline in distribution and use (Musto 1999).  This policy was 
amended in 1912 to make false claims of therapeutic powers illegal.   
 
Recruiting Mexican Immigrants (1914-1920s) 
The early 1900s witnessed an increase in Mexican immigration as well as marijuana 
regulation.  The exclusion of Asian immigrants presented a discernable absence of employees 
willing to work in lower tier occupations.  This need for workers reached significant altitude in 
1914 as the U.S. entered World War I.  With vast numbers of working men joining the military, 
women and those left behind filled the gaps.  Several official labor recruitment programs aimed 
at bringing in Mexican immigrants began, though Asian immigrants continued to be omitted.  
The 1917 immigration act added literacy tests and instilled an Asiatic Barred zone.   Restrictions 
began to tighten once again at the end of World War I in 1918, a period referred to by Musto 
(1999) as Post WWI hysteria.  In 1921, the quota act further restricted both eastern and southern 
Europe, though this act seems to have had no impact on Western immigration. 
At the same time that Mexican immigration increased, marijuana regulation became more 
frequent.  In 1914, the Harrison tax act further regulated opiates and coca products, limiting sales 
to licensed physicians and requiring a tax.  These physicians must now keep records of drugs 
sold.  Several concerns arose with disagreements over legitimate and illegitimate prescriptions.  
Many felt that prescribing substances for addiction maintenance was a legal loophole.  
According to Musto (1999), the period from 1914 to 1931 marks the beginning of anti-marijuana 





The Roaring 20s (1920s) 
 During the 1920s, an increase in anti-immigrant sentiment as well as more substance 
control was evident.  After the war, many of those enlisted in the military returned to their 
families.  No longer an active part of the military, many men expected to resume their former 
lives and jobs.  Anti-immigrant attitudes soon resurfaced as the returning men found themselves 
in competition with the immigrants who had migrated to the U.S. in order to fill jobs.  
Furthermore, much of society was fearful of immigrants as a result of the 1919 Red scare (Musto 
1999).  Policies constricting citizenship and immigration return as the Mexican population 
continues to increase, establishing Barrios in Los Angeles and Chicago (Massey 2007).  The 
Mexican immigrant population is becoming more visible during this decade.  Their presence was 
accepted, however, because employers appreciated the cheap Mexican labor.  Society, however, 
associated their presence with crime (Musto 1999).  Asian immigration restrictions remained 
present throughout this decade.  Although the 1922 cable act reversed the expatriation act for 
women who married most immigrants, it did not include those who marry an Asian man.  
Japanese immigrants continue to be ineligible for citizenship, and in 1923, U.S. v. Bhaghat Singh 
Thind decided that immigrants from India are also ineligible for citizenship.  By 1924, those who 
are ineligible for citizenship are not permitted to enter the county and immigration quotas are 
reduced.  These reductions are made permanent in 1929.   
 During the 1920s, alcohol was prohibited due to its associated with jazz, flappers, and 
hedonism.  This prohibition did not end until 1933.  In the absence of liquor, recreational 






The Great Depression (1930s) 
 Anti-immigrant and anti-marijuana attitudes reached a peak in the 1930s with the 
introduction of deportation campaigns followed by the 1937 Marijuana Tax Act which 
effectively made marijuana illegal.  While competition over jobs increased after the war, the 
economic surplus resulting from WWI provided enough opportunities that ethnic tensions were 
somewhat tolerable during the 1920s.  This suddenly changed when the stock market crashed in 
1929.  The Great Depression of the 1930s created such an extensive shortage of work that 
competition over even the most undesirable of jobs ensued.  Due to the Asiatic Bar, many of the 
noncitizens were of Western descent, particularly Mexican.  Deportation campaigns cut the 
Mexican population by nearly half.  Those who remain behind were marginalized and 
scapegoated.  The Great Depression resulted in the loss of the few pro-immigration supporters 
that remained (Musto 1999).  Mexican immigrants were no longer welcome in the United States. 
 As deportation campaigns focused on removing Mexican immigrants, Marijuana, a drug 
associated with Mexico, became increasingly regulated via the 1937 Marijuana Tax Act.  This 
act required all sellers to register and pay taxes, maintain written order forms, and tax transfers.  
Simultaneously, the creation of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics in 1930 emphasized stringent 
enforcement (Musto 1999).  This combination resulted in a de facto ban.  In order to reduce the 
potential for the media’s promotion of the drug, the 1934 Production Code of the Motion Picture 
Association banned the inclusion of narcotics in movies and film (Musto 1999). 
 
WWII and the Braceros (1940s) 
The negative attitudes directed at Mexican immigrants as well as strict drug policies 




U.S. entered WWII toward the end of 1941.  By 1942, the U.S. Departments of State, Labor, and 
Justice had enacted the Bracero program which was created to bring in temporary workers from 
Mexico to once again fill the jobs of those who joined the military.  This increased the Mexican 
population and provided discretionary income.  Many Mexican immigrants began to use this 
income to purchase extravagant outfits, popularizing the pachuco and zoot suit.  It was not long 
before anti-Mexican riots began to occur, and local law enforcement often defended the 
instigating U.S. military men rather than protect the victimized immigrants.  Despite the resulting 
violence, bracero programs continued throughout the 1940s and some employers recruited 
workers illegally into the early 1950s. 
Though few substance control laws were enacted during this time, Marijuana use 
declined throughout the 1940s and 50s.  In 1942, the opium poppy act regulated opium poppy 
cultivation in U.S.  During this time period, film restrictions on narcotics began to relax and 
some films depicted narcotics (Musto 1999). 
 
The Disposable Work Force (1950s) 
 The 1950s were met with the militarization of U.S. borders as well as increasing 
substance control, particularly for opiates and cocaine.  With the economy once again thriving 
after the war, Mexican migrants were no longer needed.  By the mid-1950s, Operation Wetback 
had begun.  The U.S. immigration and Naturalization service militarized the borders.  Despite the 
increased border patrol, temporary work visas continued to increase, resulting in fewer 
apprehensions overall (Massey 2007).   
 Once again, drug policies paralleled anti-immigration ideologies.  In 1951, the Boggs act 




heroin to a minor if the seller is an adult was death at the jury’s discretion (Musto 1999), though 
the courts focused more on opiates and cocaine which were viewed as more dangerous (Musto 
1999).  This decade represented the peak of anti-drug attitudes (Musto 1999). 
 
Civil Protest (1960s) 
 The 1960s was marked by an awareness of inequality, civil protest, and political changes 
toward immigration as well as illicit drug use.  The Civil Rights Movement reached great strides 
within the African-American community, abolishing segregation and bringing attention to the 
extensive discrimination faced by many African-Americans.  This new society also 
acknowledged the exploitive nature of the bracero program, resulting in a drastic reduction of 
temporary migrant workers.  The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act abolished origins quotas 
and finally permitted Asian and African immigrants.  The new quotas included racially neutral 
ones such as Western and Eastern hemispheres.  Despite the good intentions of these policies, the 
racial neutral quotas left Mexican immigrants to compete with other nationalities along the 
Western hemisphere for a finite number of admissions.  Without the Bracero programs, legal 
access was limited.  Because employers value the cheap source of labor, many chose to hire 
immigrants illegally.  Furthermore, because the penalty for doing so was of relatively little 
consequence, many immigrants crossed the border to work illegally for little pay.  This lead to an 
increase in undocumented Mexican workers.  As a result of this increase, the stigmatization and 
demonization of Mexican immigrants heightened.  Undocumented workers began to be seen as a 
security threat (Massey 2007). 
 Attitudes toward substance use during the 1960s were also more relaxed.  Responses 




emphasis was placed on law enforcement.  Methadone maintenance was popularized as a 
treatment for heroin.  Marijuana use began to increase in popularity again, reaching a peak in the 
1970s along with alcohol.  Minor marijuana possession was decriminalized in some states.  
President Kennedy funded research on therapy and psychiatric responses to drug addiction.  In 
1965, the Drug Abuse Act was amended, and in 1968, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics moved to 
the Justice Department and became the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (Musto 1999).  
 
The War on Drugs (1970s-1980s) 
 Though the 1970s saw relatively little immigration reform, the 1980s is marked by clear 
conservative attempts to control this social problem deemed as a threat.  In fact, President 
Ronald Reagan declared illegal immigration to be a threat to security, linking noncitizens to 
terrorism.  As a result, the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 provided more 
funding for border control, created programs for short term and long term legalization, and 
criminalized the hiring of undocumented workers.  It also provided amnesty for those residing in 
the U.S. (Hagan and Phillips 2008).  This legislation, however, did not reduce immigration long 
term.  Despite a brief drop in immigration during the 1980s, immigration was back up by the 
1990s. 
 While immigration was being reframed as a terrorist threat, substance control was 
simultaneously emphasized despite the fact that alcohol, cigarettes, and drug use were declining 
after the mid-1970s.  The 1970 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act 
addressed drug research via funding to public health services hospitals, funded a 2 year study to 
examine the impact of certain drugs, and provided the National Commission on Marijuana and 




These schedules ranked drugs on a scale of I-IV according to a risk-benefit analysis, with 
marijuana identified as a schedule I substance.  Schedule I drugs were those that offer the least 
health benefits and are associated with the most harms.  Prior to the 1970s, heroin was associated 
with Turkish immigrants.  The control of this drug was associated with national security.  During 
the 70s, this association changed.  Heroin soon became associated with Mexican poppy fields.  
The office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement was created in 1972.  Methadone clinics increased.  
Drug education was emphasized in an effort to reduce demand.  Cocaine use increased.        
The War on Drugs is generally marked as beginning in 1982 during President Ronald 
Reagan’s presidency (Alexander 2010).  During this decade, noticeable pro-substance control 
sentiments are evident.  Alcohol and cigarette ads began to be restricted.  Some states began 
recriminalizing marijuana.  Reactions toward users shifted from a focus on treatment to that of 
enforcement.  The change in societal reactions from treatment to enforcement is reflected in 
several prominent drug laws.  In 1984 the Comprehensive Crime Control Act increased the 
penalty for possession or sale of crack cocaine, which is more frequently found in poor 
neighborhoods, to 100 times greater than that for powder cocaine, which is often found in more 
prominent locations (Logan 1999). This law was updated two years later to create the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy and established what has since become known as the National 
Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign (HR5210) (Kautt 2002; Paternoster 2011). The Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1986 provided mandatory minimums for drug use and increased the penalty for 
crack.  It also recriminalized marijuana as well as designer drugs (Albonneti 2011; Kautt 2002; 
Paternoster 2011).  Nancy Reagan’s “Just say no campaigns” was a preventive effort to deter 
youths from drug use.  Crack cocaine appeared during the mid-1980s. The appeal of this drug is 




arrests spiked and crime declined, though whether the link is direct or indirect is debatable.  
 
The Gulf War and the Middle East (1990s-Present Day) 
Immigration concerns intensified throughout the 1990s and the new millennium while 
attitudes toward marijuana shifted.  Funding for removal expanded greatly during the 1990s and 
deportation for those with a criminal history broadened with the passing of the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) and the Anti-Terrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) (Hagan and Phillips 2008).  The Department of 
Homeland security was created in 2002.  Because the 9-11 terrorists were of middle-eastern 
descent, anti-immigration attitudes have been redirected toward Muslims, though Mexican 
immigrants continue to be marginalized and disadvantaged as well.  By 2011, almost 400,000 
immigrants were removed, returned, or deported in one year (U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement 2014).  This is a total of 105,846 more than were removed five years before then in 
2007.  The vast majority of this increase is driven by removals while returns and voluntary leave 
via the Mexican Interior Repatriation Program (MIRP) have been modestly decreasing (U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2014).   
Numerous immigration policies were proffered in effort to control immigration.  Bill 
Clinton’s 1993 “Prevention through Deterrence” essentially militarized border control (Hagan 
and Phillips 2008).  Blockades were set up during the 1990s to reduce illegal crossings including: 
Operation Blockade near El Paso in 1993, Operation Gatekeeper in the San Diego area in 1994, 
and Operation Rio Grande in the Brownsville area in 1997 (Hagan and Phillips 2008).  Several 
states also began to attempt to pass laws that would restrict immigrants’ privileges during this 




prohibited noncitizens use of several social services including health care and public schooling.  
Though it failed, this proposition set the framework for controversy to come.  Arizona’s 2010 SB 
1070, or the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, resulted in the creation 
of a misdemeanor charge for undocumented immigrants to be merely be in the state, permitted 
law enforcement to request proof of legal status under reasonable suspicion, and permit the 
detention of anyone believed to enter the country illegally (Kubrin 2014). 
 Immigration policies became excessively severe post September 11, 2001.  The terrorist 
attack left much of the U.S. united in their apprehension of immigration.  As a result, the USA 
PATRIOT Act essentially permitted the removal of any immigrant believed to have committed 
or intend to commit an act of terrorism without due process (Massey 2007). Under the guise of 
protecting the U.S. from terrorism, this policy has been used to justify the failure to uphold one’s 
right to jury trial and right to counsel as well as property seizures without due process for 
noncitizens (Whitehead and Aden 2002).  Furthermore, new screening requirements were added 
for non-immigrants, intelligence reports to congress were delayed, and domestic terrorism was 
redefined.  It allows the U.S. to refuse entry to anyone who supports or promotes groups that 
undermine the United States’ effort to reduce terrorism; this policy also extends to their families 
(Whitehead and Aden 2002).  The PATRIOT act reassigned several crimes (including threats of 
homicide, intimidation, bombing, and malicious mischief against U.S. government property to 
name a few) that were originally under the jurisdiction of other agencies to that of the Attorney 
General, extending his investigative authority (Whitehead and Aden 2002).  It also permits the 
indefinite detention for non-citizens without due process.  Some argue that the PATRIOT act 
permits the government to essentially spy on citizens via the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 




relatively strict response toward immigration from the federal government, many argue that more 
should be done to defend our borders. 
Bush’s 2005 “Secure Border Initiative” provided more resources for border control, 
including the creation of fencing in the Southwest.  The 2008 “Secure Communities” was 
implemented to better identify undocumented immigrants through fingerprinting (Kubrin 2014). 
The relationship between substance and immigration control began to diverge slightly 
during the 1990s and new millennium.  Although historically, drugs affiliated with unwanted 
minorities have been demonized and thus heavily criminalized, with marijuana being no 
exception, the permeation of marijuana into White culture resulted in shifting attitudes toward 
the substance.  While both state and federal laws attempt to increase national security, drug 
policies appear to be lessening.  Some states have once again decriminalized marijuana use 
(California’s proposition 215 and Arizona’s proposition 200).  Other states of legalized medical 
marijuana.  A few, Colorado and Washington, have even legalized recreational use.  Drug arrests 
appear to be declining (Musto 1999).   
 
FEDERAL DRUG ARRESTS OF NONCITIZENS 
Despite the current decline in drug arrests, noncitizens are disproportionately represented 
for many federal offenses, but this is especially true for drug charges.  Within federal court, most 
noncitizen charges are for immigration and drug violations (Demleitner and Sands 2002).  Of 
noncitizen offenders processed in federal court, nearly 88% are charged with a drug or 
immigration violation each year (Wu and DeLone 2012).  A little fewer than half of noncitizens 
convicted of a crime in federal court were found guilty of drug charges (Katzenelson, Conley, 




communication facility in a drug transaction, noncitizens represented more than 1 in 4 of those 
convicted (Katzenelson et al 1996).  Because politicians have used immigration concerns and 
drug concerns interchangeably within political rhetoric (Johnson 1996) and because a large 
portion of noncitizens entangled within the criminal justice system are accused of drug offenses, 








EXTANT LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 “You are not a citizen of this country.  This country was good enough to allow you to come in 
here and to confer upon you… a number of the benefits of this society, form of government, and 
its opportunities, and you repay that kindness by committing a crime like this.  We have got 
enough criminals in the United States without importing any.” 
― United States v. Onwuemene 
 
THE EFFECT OF CITIZENSHIP STATUS ON SENTENCING OUTCOMES 
It appears as though noncitizens suffer from a distinct disadvantage throughout the 
criminal justice process across numerous decision making stages.  In fact, Maxfield and 
Burchfield (2002) argue that prosecutorial charging policies may be to blame for regional 
variations in sentencing disparities.  Likewise, noncitizens are at a disadvantage within 
corrections.  A large number of noncitizens are currently on probation.  Noncitizens face 
additional hurdles while on probation, often as a result of difficulties with assimilation, 
employment restrictions, and difficulties with welfare (Demleitner and Sands 2002).  These 
disparities, however, fall outside of the control of the USSC guidelines and are beyond judicial 
discretion.  When examining disparities for noncitizens within sentencing outcomes, however, 
research is at best inconclusive, suggesting severe incarceration decisions, lenient sentence 
lengths, and mixed findings for departures (Albonetti 1997; Cano and Spohn 2012; Demuth 
2002; Katzenelson et al 1996; Maxfield and Burchfield 2002; Wolfe, Pyrooz, and Spohn 2011; 




Noncitizens are disproportionately more likely than U.S. citizens to receive a prison 
sentence compared to alternative sanctions even when controlling for legally relevant variables 
(Albonetti 1997; Demuth 2002; Wolfe, Pyrooz, and Spohn 2011).  This finding remains 
consistent across a variety of studies examining various timeframes.  For instance, Albonetti’s 
1997 study examined extralegal factors related to sentencing outcomes for federal drug offenders 
using the United States Sentencing Commission’s Monitoring of Federal Sentencing data from 
1991-1992.  Using tobit analysis, she found that noncitizens were 2% more likely to receive an 
imprisonment outcome than citizens.  Demuth (2002) found similar disparities in incarceration 
between citizens and noncitizens.  Using data from the Monitoring of Federal Sentencing from 
1996-1999, Demuth (2002) found noncitizens were more likely to receive a prison sentence than 
U.S. citizens.  Using logistic and OLS regressions, the study found significant effects for the 
decision to imprison non-citizens while controlling for legally relevant variables including the 
minimum presumptive sentence, sentencing departures, criminal history points, trial/plea, 
sentencing guideline zone (A-D), and multiple charges as well as extralegal variables such as age 
and education; though he argues that these legal predictors were stronger than citizenship status.  
He found that legal aliens were 30%, and illegal aliens 44%, more likely to receive a prison 
sentence than citizens.   
Using the 2006 data, Wolfe and colleagues (2011) found that legal noncitizens were 37% 
more likely to go to prison than U.S. citizens and illegal noncitizens were 9.5 times more likely 
to be imprisoned.  This finding is particularly true for drug offenses, with drug offenses 
demonstrating a greater increase in imprisonment decisions for undocumented noncitizens than 
for U.S. citizens.  Katzenelson and colleagues (1996) argue that the disproportionality in 




incarceration are present, suggesting that disparities between citizens and noncitizens within 
incarceration decision continues to exist even in in the presence of judicial discretion. 
Conversely, noncitizens appear to receive shorter prison sentences when incarcerated 
(Demuth 2002; Katzenelson et al 1996; Wu and DeLone 2012), though some variations are 
discernible.  Albonetti’s 1997 study is an outlier, representing one of the few studies suggesting 
that noncitizen defendants receive longer sentences when compared to U.S. citizens.  The vast 
majority of research examining the effects of citizenship status on sentence length has found the 
reverse to be true.  Using the Monitoring of Federal Sentencing data for the year 1995, 
Katzenelson and colleagues (1996) argue that the average sentencing length for citizens (69.5 
months) is longer than that for noncitizens (47.4 months).  In Demuth’s (2002) study examining 
MoF data from 1996-1999, he also found that prison sentence lengths were generally shorter for 
non-citizens than for citizens.  More recently, Wu and DeLone (2012) found that noncitizens 
received shorter sentences than U.S. citizens in a study examining border states from 2006-2008.  
While shorter sentence lengths for noncitizens may be interpreted as leniency, it may be an 
artifactual inference.  Shorter sentence lengths may be driven by disproportionate immigration 
arrests, which are associated with shorter sentence lengths than many other criminal offenses, 
and by trafficking drugs associated with lower penalties (Katzenelson et al 1996).   
The effects of citizenship status for the use of sentencing departures from the guidelines 
are somewhat more ambiguous than the effects for incarceration decisions and sentence length.  
It appears as though a relationship is present; the direction of this relationship, however, is 
disputed.  This is likely because judicial departures are one particular variable for which 
sentencing guidelines provide the most judicial discretion.  Downward departures allow judges 




Substantial assistance departures reward defendants who are able to provide information that can 
aid in the prosecution or conviction of an offender.  When examining federal immigration 
violations from 1993-1997, Maxfield and Burchfield (2002) suggest that noncitizens benefit 
from downward departures.  The researchers find that one in four immigration offenders receive 
a downward departure and 34.4% of noncitizens accused of unlawful entry receive a departure 
compared to only 13.6% of other offenses (Maxfield and Burchfield 2002).  Conversely, 
Katzenelson et al (1996) find that U.S. citizens are more likely to receive substantial assistance 
departures, while noncitizens are more likely to receive downward departures.  Noncitizens are 
more likely to receive a sentence within the federal guideline range than U.S. citizens.  A study 
conducted by Cano and Spohn (2012) examined the effects of extralegal variables on federal 
sentencing departures using OLS and logistic regression for three districts in the Midwest from 
1998 to 2000.  Like Katzenelson et al (1996), Cano and Spohn (2012) found that citizens are 
more likely to receive a substantial assistance departure than noncitizens.  They also found 
significant results for gender, number of dependent children, and educational achievement.  Race 
and ethnicity were not significant, suggesting that citizenship status is more influential than race.  
Of granted departures, US citizens received a 22% larger reduction than non-citizens (Cano and 
Spohn 2012).   
Several explanations have been suggested for why such variations in findings have 
occurred.  These variations are likely a result of methodological, regional, and temporal 
dissimilarities.  Different studies control for different legal variables.  For instance, the 
appearance of noncitizen leniency may be artifactually driven by left censoring, with the criminal 
history of many noncitizens remaining unknown to the court.  Another issue with comparing 




to the 2005 Booker decision which permits judges to step beyond the guidelines under certain 
circumstances.  Therefore, it comes as no surprise when research examining pre-Booker and 
post-Booker data differ.  Likewise, some of the studies examine different districts while others 
look at national data.  Regional variation, however, is likely to exist with regard to the effects of 
citizenship status as a result of differential experiences, interactions, and priorities.  A third 
explanation for differences in research findings involves the various crimes for which the 
defendant has been accused.  For instance, studies examining immigration violations find an 
increase in the use of departures for noncitizens compared to U.S. citizens while research 
examining drug violations often find a reduction in the use of departures.  Even while controlling 
for legal variables, however, not all unexpected findings are explained.  Demuth (2002) 
acknowledges that with noncitizens receiving lower guideline minimum scores and criminal 
history scores, it remains unclear why non-citizens are more likely to receive a prison sentence.   
 
CITIZENSHIP STATUS AS A MODERATING EFFECT  
Because ethnicity and immigration status are so thoroughly intertwined, race and 
ethnicity are often used informally as a proxy for citizenship within discourse and policy 
application.  The majority of immigrants are of Latino descent.  When referring to the 
“immigration problem,” many assume Mexican arrivals.  Logic might dictate that immigration 
concerns will disproportionately affect Latino citizens as well.  Wolfe et al (2011) suggest that 
this group might receive more severe sentencing outcome as a result of their racial minority 
status interacting with their citizenship status.  Research suggests that this might be the case.  
Though few studies have directly tested racial/ethnic differences in sentencing outcomes within 




sentenced within the United States, with mixed findings regarding the potential moderating 
effects of citizenship status.  For instance, Albonetti (1997) found that the effects of citizenship 
status are dependent upon the ethnicity of the defendant.  Citizenship status does not appear to be 
as important for white defendants compared to other races.  According to this study, being a 
noncitizen only increases sentencing severity for black and Hispanic defendants.  She found a 
slightly stronger, though statistically nonsignificant, effect for black defendants with regard to 
imprisonment decisions and sentence length.  Demuth (2002) also found a relationship between 
citizenship status and race when examining sentencing outcomes.  According to this study, 
Demuth (2002) found that when examining the effects of citizenship status and sentencing 
outcomes by race, black and Hispanic defendants are more frequently incarcerated compared to 
white defendants, regardless of citizenship status, though race effects were found to be more 
prominent for citizens than for non-citizens.  While higher guideline minimums and criminal 
history scores may explain harsher sentences for black defendants, the minimums and criminal 
history scores for Hispanic defendants are more comparable to white defendants.  Wolfe et al 
(2011) find that Latino citizen receive shorter sentences than white citizens, but Latino 
undocumented noncitizens receive longer sentences.  Wu and DeLone (2012) also find that 
important racial disparities exist.  For instance, noncitizen Hispanics received longer sentences 
while noncitizen Asians received shorter ones.  Wu and DeLone (2012) did not find that racial 
differences varied by citizenship status, finding instead that noncitizens received shorter 
sentences regardless of race. 
Hispanic defendants are not always sentenced more punitively, however.  Once 
imprisoned, Demuth (2002) found that white and Hispanic defendants receive similar sentence 




similar for citizens and noncitizens.  Logue (2009) also found that noncitizen Mexican 
defendants receive shorter sentences and are more likely to be convicted on marijuana and 
powder cocaine than non-Mexican Latino noncitizens.  The researcher also found noncitizen 
Mexican defendants to be more likely to receive a downward departure and less likely to receive 
a substantial assistance departure than non-Mexican Latino noncitizens.   
 
CONTEXTUAL VARIATIONS IN FEDERAL SENTENCING OUTCOMES 
Variations in sentencing outcomes are likely to vary according to context across time and 
place.  District and circuit level variations in disparities between citizens and noncitizens as well 
as within noncitizens are likely to drive differential responses to these populations.  Some 
sentencing jurisdictions comprise very few noncitizens, including the 4th circuit with only 8.3%, 
while others interact with a much greater number, such as the 9th circuit with nearly 44.3% 
(Katzenelson et al 1996).  The few studies that have controlled for region have found significant 
effects.  Though few studies have empirically examined change over time in citizen-noncitizen 
sentencing disparities, those that have seem to demonstrate temporal variation.   
Cano and Spohn (2012) emphasize the importance of region when examining sentencing 
variation.  The researchers suggest that “aggregating data across all district courts may distort the 
reality of decision making in each district court” (327).  A study conducted by Albonetti (1997) 
examining extralegal effects on federal sentencing outcomes found significant between-circuit 
variation for certain predictors.  In her study, eight of the eleven circuits examined were 
statistically more punitive than the District of Columbia, a finding interpreted as indicative of 
“substantial circuit-specific sentencing outcomes” (809).  No circuit variation was apparent for 




defendants in this study.  Likewise, Cano and Spohn’s (2012) findings of regional variation in 
the application of substantial assistance departures may also be indicative of contextual 
variations influencing punitiveness.  Maxfield and Burchfield’s (2002) study found that the 
effects of criminal history on sentencing length for immigration violations are larger in Arizona 
and Texas than California.  Departures reduce sentence length for noncitizens in Arizona, are not 
statistically different for Texas, and increase the sentence for California.  Ultimately, the 
researchers found substantial regional variation.   
According to Cano and Spohn (2012), the court district was “strongly associated with 
whether the prosecutor filed a motion for substantial assistance” (322).  For instance, prosecutors 
in the District of Minnesota are less likely to file the motion than those in the Southern District of 
Iowa.  Likewise, Demleitner and Sands (2002) find that the District of Arizona uses departures 
much more often for re-entry than other regions.  The finding that districts can differ so greatly 
in practice suggests that each district may have boundaries that define the community culture, 
suggesting “localized justice meted out in context-specific ways” (Cano and Spohn 2012; 329).   
Demleitner and Sands (2002) argue that fast-track procedures, such as those commonly 
used in the Southern District of California, may explain regional variations in observed leniency.  
Observed leniency may also be a result of deportation (Demleitner and Sands 2002; Maxfield 
and Burchfield 2002; Wu and DeLone 2012).  In some jurisdictions, defendants may receive a 
departure for waiving a formal deportation hearing which will allow the defendant to avoid 
prison while saving the government money on prison expenses (Demleitner and Sands 2002).  
Demleitner and Sands (2002) acknowledge, however, that jurisdictional variations should be 
examined cautiously as many fail to report all case decisions to the USSC. 




that “longitudinal analyses may be particularly useful for identifying how changes in 
racial/ethnic populations influence the application of social controls for minorities—especially 
considering the theoretical importance that demographic change plays in racial threat arguments” 
(261).   
Though research on the effects of citizenship status has progressed over the past decade, 
such studies have remained inconclusive, perhaps a result of variations in methods, location, and 
time.  Furthermore, while researchers are becoming increasingly aware of the importance of 
context, studies incorporating both regional and longitudinal effects within Federal sentencing 
have remained sparse.  Finally, as a result of the omission of regional and longitudinal context 
within Federal sentencing literature, a theoretical framework has not yet been applied to the 
empirical study of citizen effects that acknowledge micro as well as varying degrees of macro 
level decision making.   
Variations in immigration attitudes are likely to be partially explained by differences in 
context across time and region.  Only one study has tested longitudinal and district level 
variation in sentencing outcomes between citizens and noncitizens.  Using data from the USSC’s 
Monitoring of Federal Sentences, Michael T. Light (2014) analyzed differential incarceration 
and sentence lengths across districts from 1992-2009.  Mirroring previous studies, the author 
found that noncitizens are 3 times more likely to be sentenced to prison compared to U.S. 
citizens.  Contrary to most of the previous studies on citizenship effects, however, Light (2014) 
found that noncitizens receive 8.5% longer sentences, roughly equating to 6.5 months.  
Furthermore, these sentencing gaps seem to vary across time and place.  According to this study, 
roughly 62% of variance within incarceration decisions, and 53% of variance within sentence 




each year.  Variations in sentence length, however, have not changed significantly over time.  
Changes in disparities between citizens and noncitizens across time are district specific.  Districts 
with recent increases in noncitizens appear to demonstrate more hardening effects for 
incarceration decisions.  Surprisingly, the reverse is true for sentence length; districts with 
increases in noncitizen populations provide shorter sentence lengths.  Light (2014) argues that 
this may be a product of deportation upon release.   
This study is an invaluable contribution to sentencing literature, shedding light on many 
of the intricate contributions of context on understanding federal sentencing disparities between 
U.S. citizens and noncitizens.  However, many crucial themes remain unexplored.  While 
incarceration decisions appear to be a prominent contributor of disadvantage, this sentencing gap 
between citizens and noncitizens sentenced to prison appears even greater when alternatives to 
incarceration are an option (United States Sentencing Commission).  Furthermore, following the 
works of Katzenelson (1996), Maxfield and Burchfield (2002), and Cano and Spohn (2012), 
understanding the role of citizenship status in departure decisions can also illuminate the extent 
and cause of noncitizen sentencing disadvantage.  Because departures are indicative of judicial 
discretion, examining the effects of citizenship status on this decision across time and place may 
provide insight into sentencing disparities.  Additionally, within-noncitizen variations may 
persist.  Important racial and ethnic distinctions persist within noncitizen sentencing outcomes.  
In fact, the effects of citizenship may partially drive Latino sentencing disparities.  According to 
Light (2014), “…what appears to be increasing severity against Hispanics is largely attributable 
to increases in citizenship disparity” (465).  However, researchers have traditionally included 
race as a trichotomy comprising Hispanic, Black, and White as control variables.  Doing so 




racial terms.  A more useful strategy for measuring ethnicity would be to include one’s country 
of origin in addition to race.  Another important distinction within noncitizens is the 
documentation status.  Following Wolfe et al (2011), the inclusion of whether the individual is in 
the country legally or illegally in studies examining the impacts of citizenship status across time 
and place is imperative.  The significant findings suggesting that the district in which the 
sentence is decided contributes toward disparities present a constructive addition to the broader 
impacts of the effects of citizenship.  However, although Light (2014) examined federal cases 
across years using growth models, research has not yet examined changes across districts within 
time.  Because individual cases change from year to year, examining districts within years can be 
expected to be more advantageous than cases within years.  Finally, the omission of population 
data may obscure some of the contextual effects on these sentencing decisions.  The inclusion of 
general population as well as noncitizen population growths may impact disadvantages beyond 








Several theories have proffered an explanation for the relationship between race/ethnicity 
and sentencing disparities.  Because immigration discourse is so frequently racialized, these 
theories are likely to apply to disparities between citizens and noncitizens as well.  Many of the 
theories that have been applied to explain racial/ethnic inequality within the criminal justice 
system fall short of explaining variations at multiple levels of analysis.  For instance, some 
identify the primary cause of disparity as occurring predominately within individual level 
sentencing decisions, often leaving structural level impacts to the periphery.  Others isolate 
macro-level structures as the origins of inequality while failing to elaborate on the means in 
which structure influences agency.  Effective theoretical explanation of the effects of citizenship 
status on sentencing outcome should identify micro level causal factors as well as external macro 
elements.  Both micro and macro level theories, however, are often unsuccessful at recognizing 
the likelihood that the extent and manifestation of inequality will vary across place.  Those 
within close proximity are likely to share similar concerns and attitudes, resulting in the potential 
for clustering of attitudes which may vary over time.  Furthermore, sufficient theoretical 
conceptualization of racial/ethnic inequality within the criminal justice system should also take 
into account the interdependencies of macro and micro level effects on cumulative inequality. 
 
GROUP THREAT THEORY 
At the meso/macro level, Group Threat Theory, has been applied to explain the 




This theory, which has also been referred to as minority threat, racial threat, ethnic threat, gender 
threat, and power-threat depending on the outgroup being analyzed, is a critical theory used to 
explain previously found racial, ethnic, and/or gender disparities among the application of 
sanctions.  Group Threat theory ultimately assumes that “intergroup competition” is the source of 
disproportionately applied policies (Berg 2013).  This theory has traditionally been applied to 
examine differences in criminal sanctions applied to enforce social control as a result of 
economic and political competition over limited resources (Rockques and Paternoster 2011).  
Social control is often applied through formal controls such as policing, laws, courts, and 
corrections within the criminal justice system.  According to this theory, noncitizens are 
anticipated to receive more punitive sanctions compared to U.S. citizens as their population 
within society increases in an effort to limit their growing economic and political power. 
The origins of Group Threat theory has traditionally been traced to Blalock’s 1967 work 
Toward a Theory of Minority Group Relations (Wang and Mears 2009).  Blalock (1967) argues 
that as the population of a racial minority increases, so does the level of threat perceived by the 
majority.  The majority then attempts to reduce the threat via formal control (Wang and Mears 
2009).  Like conflict theories, Group Threat assumes that “subordinate groups are likely to be 
perceived as threats to the established social order, fueling group conflict prejudice, and 
discrimination in contexts in which they are most prevalent” (Johnson et al. 2011: 407).  Policies 
are then created to limit the mobility and opportunity of the perceived threat. 
The underlying cause of this threat can be traced to the assumption that the “dominant 
ethno-racial group feels ownership over important and finite resources such as jobs and cultural 
traditions,” and eventually comes to view the other races as a threat when they “desire these 




include “political mobilization, economic competition, and the threat of black-on-white crime…” 
(Johnson et al 2011: 409).  For economic threats, a decelerating threat effect, in which an 
increase in the population of a minority group is associated with a slower increase in “inter-
group competition,” is expected.  For political threats, however, an accelerating threat effect, in 
which an increase in the population of a minority group is associated with a faster increase in 
“inter-group competition,” is expected (Wang and Mears 2009).  Rockques and Paternoster 
(2011) argue that, although the threat is usually limited to economic and political concerns 
within etiological research, it could apply to cultural concerns as well.   
Furthermore, the relationship between group threat and formal control is predicted to be 
curvilinear.  Competition over resources increases along with increases in racial composition 
(Berg 2013).  Once the minority population increases beyond a certain threshold, the majority 
becomes threatened (Rockques and Paternoster 2011).  The threatened group begins to lash out 
at the incoming group in order to maintain dominance through social control.  Group Threat 
theory assumes such discrimination would not occur in communities that have been traditionally 
nonwhite.  Though researchers often test the theory with linear models, assuming that as the 
proportion of minorities increase so does the level of threat, Group Threat theory actually implies 
a curvilinear relationship in which threat increases along with the outgroup population until a 
particular point (Feldmeyer and Ulmer 2011).    
According to this theory, as noncitizens move into traditionally racially homogenous 
communities, the economic, cultural, and political levels of threat can be expected to increase.  
Noncitizens will be disproportionately punished in an attempt to maintain control of resources.  
If noncitizens from a particular country were to increase to the extent that they were no longer 




previous residents.  Group Threat, however, may depend on whether those in a given community 
are aware of the increase in the minority population.  It is possible that individuals within a given 
community remain unaware of actual increases in a minority population or that they may assume 
a particular group is increasing in size when it is not.  Regardless of whether the threat is actual 
or perceived, such concerns can result in real outcomes for noncitizen defendants.   
Empirical tests of this theory are somewhat divided.  Previous research has 
predominately tested this theory by examining race effects at the exclusion of identifying effects 
on ethnicity (Johnson et al 2011).  When examining race effects, researchers almost always 
examine whites as the majority (Wang and Meares 2009).  They have also focused on aggregate 
findings over individual ones, emphasizing population change over perceptions (Johnson et al 
2011; Wang and Mears 2009).  Finally, researchers frequently fail to distinguish between 
economic and political threats (Wang and Mears 2009).  As previously stated, researchers often 
examine only linear effects, resulting in model misspecification (Wang and Meares 2009).   
As a result of these limitations, researchers have reached mixed conclusions regarding the 
validity of the theory.  In a recent study, Justin Allen Berg (2013) used logit regression to 
examine whether Group Threat Theory or Symbolic Racism theory, which argues that negative 
stereotypes explain discriminatory policies and attitudes, best explains anti-immigration 
attitudes.  Using data from the 1994 General Social Survey and the 2004 Immigration Survey, 
the inclusion of variables designed to test Group Threat Theory was found to increase the 
explained variation by 4-10% while Symbolic Racism Theory added only 3-4%, depending on 
the dependent variable examined.  Berg (2013) also found an increase in support of anti-
immigration policies from 1994 to 2004, suggesting that discriminatory attitudes increase along 




economic resources that appears to drive the threat.  Berg also found that in areas marked by 
immigration declines, native-born participants are less likely to support anti-immigrant policies. 
Johnson and colleague’s 2011 study yielded similar results.  Using multilevel logistic 
regression to examine data collected via telephone surveys, the researchers found support for 
Group Threat theory.  Relying on the aggregate variable for minority population size, which has 
frequently been used as evidence of social and political power, Johnson et al (2011) found that 
the percent of the population that is Hispanic was not a significant predictor of support for using 
ethnicity in sentencing decisions.  However, increases in population are a predictor of support for 
using ethnicity in sentencing decisions.  A one unit increase in Hispanic population change 
resulted in a 55% increase in odds of policy support (Johnson et al 2011).  Furthermore 
perceptions of criminality and economic threats are related to this policy support, though 
political threat was not.  The researchers acknowledge that this finding may be artifactual, 
resulting from the selected measurement of the construct.  The researchers also found interaction 
effects between perceptions of threat and population changes, so that criminal and economic 
threats were stronger with increases in Hispanic populations (Johnson et al 2011).  
 Not all research has found support for Group Threat Theory.  Feldmeyer and Ulmer 
(2011), for instance, found that Hispanic and white defendants receive similar sentences, and 
while the effects of race vary according to region, it does not do so in a manner consistent with 
Group Threat Theory.  In fact, Hispanic defendants appear to receive leniency when they 
represent a larger percentage of the population than when they represent a smaller percentage.  
Using data from the USSC’s standardized research files from 2000-2002, the researchers argue 
that this finding contradicts Group Threat theory because it is evidence that as minority groups 




populations of a given minority may seem more “alien” and therefore in more need of control.  
The researchers ultimately argue that Group Threat theory oversimplifies the relationship 
between minorities and formal controls.  The researchers also acknowledge, however, that data 
for this study was collected prior to the Booker and Fanfan decisions, which permit judges to 
sentence outside of the guideline, resulting in greater discretion.  Furthermore, the researchers 
only examined sentence length while omitting incarceration decisions.  
 
FOCAL CONCERNS 
While Group Threat theory explains how punitive attitudes may spread at the aggregate 
level, the Focal Concerns perspective is a useful means of understanding punitive attitudes 
among individuals.  Like Group Threat theory, Focal Concerns has been used to explain racial 
and gender variations in sentencing outcomes.  Focal Concerns ultimately assumes that 
disproportionality is a result of courtroom actors carefully weighing decisions based on 
assumptions of the defendants as well as practical constraints.  Whether consciously or 
subconsciously attempting to maintain social control via formal controls, this perspective argues 
that disparities are a result of criminal justice agents attempting to effectively reach a legitimate 
decision based on limited information. 
The origins of Focal Concerns can be traced to Steffensmeier’s 1980 article “Assessing 
the Impact of the Women’s Movement on Sex-based Differences in the Handling of Adult 
Criminal Defendants,” in which the author argues that chivalry, naiveté, practicality, recidivism, 
and perceptions of danger account for disparities.  These five qualities were eventually subsumed 
under three focal concerns in Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer’s 1998 article applying focal 




researchers argue that judges and courtroom actors rely on the following three concerns to reach 
courtroom decisions:  defendant blameworthiness, community protection/dangerousness, and 
practical constraints (Steffensmeier et al 1998).  Blameworthiness is the extent to which the 
defendant deserves the punishment.  Such decisions may be based on legal factors such as the 
severity of the offense or whether aggravating factors are present as well as extralegal factors 
such whether the defendant’s mannerisms or whether he/she appears repentant.  This decision is 
often retributive in nature.  Another concern, protecting the community, may also be determined 
by legal factors such as whether the offense was violent as well as extralegal factors including 
whether the individual might recidivate.  Such decisions are often reached with the purpose of 
incapacitating the offender.  Decision makers strive to keep dangerous offenders off of the 
streets.  There may exist some overlap with blameworthiness and protecting the community.  For 
example, legal variables such as criminal history, sentencing guidelines, and offense severity to 
name a few have been used to measure both dangerousness and blameworthiness (Feldmeyer and 
Ulmer 2011).  The final focal concern is practical constraints and consequences.  Such concerns 
include the costs of courts, the separation of defendants from their children, and the judge’s 
career standing (Steffensmeier and Demuth 2006).   
Focal concerns theory “…expands upon Albonetti’s uncertainty avoidance (1986) and 
causal attribution (1991) theories…” (Feldmeyer and Ulmer 2011: 242).  The uncertainty 
avoidance thesis argues that “…controlling for legal and extralegal variables, case information 
that decreases uncertainty concerning victim/witness management will increase the probability of 
continued prosecution” when applied to prosecutorial discretion (Albonetti 1986: 623).  These 
two perspectives argue that when courtroom actors lack the evidence necessary to make accurate 




Therefore, racial and ethnic disparities are a result of judicial decisions based on stereotypes or 
previous experiences with analogous cases (Albonetti 1991).   
This theory may be particularly useful for examining micro-level sentencing decisions for 
noncitizens.  According to uncertainty avoidance/causal attribution, judges often have limited 
information on noncitizens’ criminal histories with which to make decisions, and must use a 
“perceptual shorthand” (Hartley and Armendariz 2011: 47).  This shorthand is based on 
blameworthiness, protecting the community, and practical considerations.  For instance, 
noncitizens may be viewed as more blameworthy than U.S. citizens for their law violations as a 
result of a double stigmatization in which they are punished for committing a crime as well as for 
violating their guest status within the country.  They may also be viewed as more dangerous.  
Political rhetoric may have framed immigrants as more threatening and “politically volative” 
(Hartley and Armendariz 2011: 48).  As previously acknowledged in Chapters 1 and 2, media 
and political depictions of immigrants as drug offenders in conjunction with rhetoric associating 
drug offenders and violent crimes have exacerbated a cognitive connection between noncitizens 
and violence.  Media depictions of violent crimes lead people to feel vulnerable, and so they seek 
reassurance that they are safe (Eisenstein et al 1988).  Finally, noncitizens may be more of a 
flight risk, suggesting a practical consideration for disproportionately imprisoning them.   
Empirical research testing the Focal Concerns theory is relatively promising.  Overall, 
Steffensmeier and Demuth (2006) found support for the focal concern theory in their study.  
Albonetti (1997) interpreted her findings that ethnicity conditioned the effects of other variables 
as compatible with the uncertainty avoidance/causal attribution perspective.  Cano and Spohn 
(2012) interpreted their findings as supporting Nagel and Schulhofer’s argument that substantial 




Rhetoric is often used to influence interpretations of sympathetic and salvageable offenders, 
which may be proxies for dangerousness and blameworthiness.  Furthermore, Cano and Spohn’s 
(2012) findings of regional variation in the application of substantial assistance departures may 
be evidence of practical concerns.  For instance, prison overcrowding within certain regions may 
increase the availability of departures.  Wu and DeLone (2012) also argue that their findings 
support focal concern theory, as well as the liberation hypothesis.  The (2013) Berg study 
examining Group Threat found that individual racist attitudes were a significant predictor in 
2004 attitudes toward immigration policies, though stronger support was found for Group Threat 
Theory.   
 
COURTROOMS AS COMMUNITIES 
While Focal Concerns argues that courtroom actors rely on judgments regarding 
blameworthiness, culpability, and practical constraints to reach decisions, these judgments are 
not formed within a vacuum.  Historical and cultural contexts mold these judgments.  It is not the 
actual blameworthiness or dangerousness of the offender that determines sentencing outcomes, 
however, as much as the PERCEPTION of these ambiguous traits that fuels punitiveness.  
Feldmeyer and Ulmer (2011) acknowledge the subjectivity with which determinations of the 
elements of Focal Concerns Theory are applied.  Therefore, the Courtroom Communities 
perspective, which suggests that subjectivity varies across courtrooms because courtroom actors 
exhibit similar norms and values which are spread as a result of a shared workplace environment, 





Court communities originated with Eisenstein, Flemming, and Nardulli’s (1988) The 
Contours of Justice: Communities and their courts.  According to this perspective, sentencing 
variations across courts result from courtroom actors, including judges as well as attorneys, 
forming working relationships and demonstrating a distinct “legal and organizational culture” as 
a product of working within a shared space (Wang and Mears 2010: 526).  This theory is often 
identified as exhibiting a social interactionist perspective by arguing that networks are defined by 
lines of communication (Ulmer 1997).  “The court communities perspective also describes a 
pathway by which perceptions of racial or ethnic threat might influence sentencing outcomes for 
minority groups.  This perspective explains that criminal courts and their personnel are 
embedded in larger communities and environments which are likely to shape the effects of 
extralegal factors in sentencing” (Feldmeyer and Ulmer 2011: 243).  Ultimately the unique 
contextual elements surrounding a particular courtroom will influence sentencing propensities 
within that courtroom community for various trends, including citizenship disparities, via shared 
ideologies and politics that spread as a result of the shared environment. 
According to Eisenstein et al (1988), theoretical explanations of sentencing decisions 
often assume the “law metaphor.”  This metaphor assumes that the sentencing process is a 
functional machine that operates efficiently according to the law.  They argue that the “law 
metaphor,” which most of society subscribes to, envisions the law as “transcending time, 
geography, and the circumstances surrounding specific cases” (5).  This metaphor further 
assumes that courtroom actors apply evidence and information uniformly, resulting in the “right” 
verdict.  The authors argue that a “community metaphor” better illustrates courtroom procedures.  
Such a metaphor acknowledges that all courts have a shared trait, but that the means in which the 




legal culture” in which “shared values and attitudes about how persons charged with crimes 
should be treated” (13).  Like a community, there is also power/status structure/hierarchy, with 
judges on top.   
Courts vary substantially, however.  For instance, courts are political; therefore, we must 
keep in mind that “…career ambitions, the influence of constituencies, personal values and 
political beliefs, personalities, and pressures exerted by organizational superiors to understand 
how courts process defendants” (11).  Like a community, courtrooms demonstrate 
“interdependencies,” defined as familiarity which vary by quality and degree, resulting from 
“geographical locality” because the actors share a “common workplace” (25).  According to 
Eisenstein et al (1988), courtrooms vary across five thematic characteristics: Self-Awareness 
defined as “the degree to which members consciously recognize the existence of a court 
community…” (28), Common Beliefs about interpersonal relations defined as “shared beliefs on 
how community members treat one another and generally conduct themselves…” (29), shared 
attitudes about how cases are processed including the “handling of cases” and the “going rate” of 
certain offenses (30), special language including word choice as well as nonverbal 
communication, and culture and a sense of tradition including a shared history with which to 
recall (Eisenstein et al 1988).   
This perspective assumes that regional variation in sentencing disparities for noncitizens 
are a result of differing priorities and contextual elements within courtrooms.  That said, certain 
patterns can be expected to emerge.  Courtrooms located in geographical proximity may 
demonstrate similar values and norms as a result of transmitted information via “grapevines.”  
Therefore, neighboring districts may demonstrate similar sentencing patterns as a result of 




news channels.  There also exists a national legal culture that creates the nationwide similarities.  
This legal culture may effect national values and legal decisions dictating drug policies, for 
example.  “Agreement about the perception of, and the need to respond to, a minority threat 
constitutes a type of substantive rationality, one that may become embedded in the normative 
operations of court communities” (Wang and Mears 2010: 527).  Furthermore, certain states 
have attempted to pass legislation that would overrule federal immigration laws (Hartley and 
Armendariz 2011).  Therefore, it may be the case that courtroom actors in these locations apply 
legal means to accomplish an objective that differs from nationally applied laws.  Though 
empirical research examining the Courtroom Communities perspective is limited, both 
theoretical and empirical findings suggest that the regional and longitudinal trends in policies 
and sentencing outcomes suggested by this perspective exist.   
 
THEORETICAL SYNTHESIS 
Each of these three theories contributes an important element of sociological 
understanding of citizen/noncitizen sentencing disparities.  According to Group Threat theory, 
punitive reactions toward noncitizens are a result of socially constructed fears of political and 
economic loss of resources.  These fears create and exacerbate stereotypes of the criminal 
immigrant.  According to Focal Concerns, these stereotypes influence perceptions of 
blameworthiness and dangerousness used to reach decisions.  Proponents of the Focal Concerns 
perspective also argue that practical concerns and constraints influence sentencing decisions.  
Furthermore, differential experiences and interactions with immigrants can be expected to vary 








 With this theoretical framework in mind, this study will examine four hypotheses.  
Focusing on drug offenders, I expect that: 
H1: Noncitizens will receive harsher sentencing outcomes than U.S. citizens 
 H1a: Noncitizens will be more likely to receive a prison sentence than citizens.  
H1b: Noncitizens will be more likely to receive a prison sentence even when nonprison 
alternatives are present  
H1c: Noncitizens will receive longer prison sentences than citizens.   
H1d: Noncitizens will be less likely to receive a downward departure than citizens. 
H2: The sentencing disparities between noncitizens and U.S. sentence will vary according to 
context. 
H2a:  Sentencing disparities between citizens and noncitizens will vary by 
district.  Districts serving a higher caseload of noncitizen defendants will demonstrate 
more disparity than those with fewer noncitizen defendants, as predicted by Group Threat 
Theory.   
H2b:  District level sentencing disparities will demonstrate spatial autocorrelation so that 
those situated within close proximity to one another will demonstrate more similar 




H2c: Sentencing disparities between citizens and noncitizens will vary over time.  Due to 
increasing concerns over the "immigration problem" across time, districts are expected to 
demonstrate more punitive attitudes toward noncitizens across time. 
H3: Sentencing outcomes will differ according to the ethnicity of Noncitizens 
 H3a: Hispanic immigrants will be more likely to receive a prison sentence compared to  
white defendants.   
H3b: Hispanic immigrants will be more likely to receive a prison sentence even when 
nonprison alternatives are present compared to other ethnicities. 
H3c: Hispanic immigrants will receive longer prison sentences compared to other 
ethnicities.   
H3d: Hispanic immigrants will be less likely to receive a downward departure compared 
to other ethnicities.  
H4: The sentencing disparities among differing ethnicities within noncitizens will vary according 
to context. 
H4a:  Sentencing disparities within noncitizens among various ethnicities will vary by 
district.  Districts serving a higher caseload of Hispanic defendants will demonstrate 
more disparity than those with fewer Hispanic defendants, as predicted by Group Threat 
Theory. 
H4b:  District level sentencing disparities will demonstrate spatial autocorrelation so that 
those situated within close proximity to one another will demonstrate more similar 
sentencing outcomes than those further away. 
H4c: Sentencing disparities within noncitizens among various ethnicities will vary over 




immigrants, districts are expected to demonstrate more punitive attitudes toward Hispanic 







 Previous research examining punitive sentencing outcomes for noncitizens are largely 
divided.  Unfortunately, methodological limitations have greatly limited analyses of this 
relationship.  Wu and DeLone (2012) argue that inconsistent findings in citizenship research are 
likely a result of “variations in methodology and research purposes” (215).  One such variation in 
methodological approach is the time period analyzed.   
Research examining the effects of citizenship status on federal sentencing outcomes 
utilize data dating as far back as 1991 and as recently as 2008.  It is likely that variations may be 
a product of differences in sentencing outcome across time.  Research examining data during a 
particular time period may reach conclusions undermining those in a different one.  That which 
appears to be contradicting findings may actually be indicative longitudinal variations.  
However, in the absence of sufficient longitudinal analysis, sentencing disparities between 
citizens and noncitizens demonstrates the illusion of inconclusive outcomes.  Several of these 
studies use only one year of data (Albonetti 1997; Katzenelson et al 1996; Wolfe et al 2011).  Of 
those who do include multiple years, most include fewer than four years (Cano and Spohn 2012; 
Demuth 2002; Maxfield and Burchfield 2002; Wu and DeLone 2012).  Studies that have 
incorporated multiple years of data often are limited to data from pre-Booker (Demuth 2002; 
Maxfield and Burchfield 2002).  Because judicial discretion to sentence outside of the guidelines 
is more permissible as a result of the Booker decision, sentencing disparities may be more 
pronounced post-Booker.  Time-varying research is merely one of the major criticisms levied at 




The absence of research effectively controlling for contextual level variations is 
particularly disconcerting.  The few existing studies examining the relationship between 
citizenship status and federal sentencing outcomes often rely upon standard Logistic or OLS 
regression (Kautt 2002).  This is problematic for several reasons.  First, it fails to account for 
within district clustering.  It is likely that cases within a particular district are more similar than 
those within another district.  A particular district can be expected to exhibit similar outcomes as 
a product of caseload size and/or similarity in cases brought forth.  Therefore, analyses assuming 
the independence of observations are likely to be misleading.  Research examining sentencing 
disparity should incorporate nested models.   
Second, single level analyses fail to adequately consider contextual level variation across 
years.  At any given point in time, a particular district will experience differential caseloads as 
well as case-specific characteristics.  In the same way that a particular decision may be 
influenced by district level data, a decision can also be expected to vary across years.  Growth 
curve analysis can allow researchers to examine sentencing disparities across time.   
Third, single level analysis fails to control for the likelihood of spatial autocorrelation.  It 
assumes that each observation is independent, and therefore unaffected by others which is 
unlikely given continuous borders and spatial units within large units such as districts or states 
which can be highly problematic (Kautt 2002).  Sentencing outcomes for a given area are likely 
to be more similar than, or even influenced by, those in nearby jurisdictions.  As one district 
demonstrates a particular response to crime, neighboring districts may conform as a product of 
shared ideologies spreading via lines of communication so that those within closer proximity 
share similar ideologies.  As one district demonstrates more punitive responses toward 




interdependence can be expected.  Covariance-based spatial statistical models can be of 
particular utility in disentangling similarities in sentencing outcomes across districts.  For these 
reasons, multilevel modeling is necessary to more accurately examine sentencing disparities 




Level 1 Data 
The level 1 Data for this study was collected from the Monitoring of Federal (MoF) 
Criminal Sentences program.  This data was collected by the United States Sentencing 
Commission, created in 1984 with the obligation to form neutral sentencing guidelines (Demuth 
2002).  It includes data from 1999 to 2013.  Compiled by the United States Sentencing 
Commission (USSC), this data includes all federal cases within the United States that were 
reported between October 1, 1998 and September 30, 2013 for a total of 1,081,779 federal cases 
over 15 years.  This data was collected to examine sentencing practices and policies, to offer 
advice on more efficient policies, and to collect a vast array of information to be used as an 
information resource for future studies.  The data presented includes demographics, sentencing 
details, and guideline information.   
The USSC’s MoF data was chosen for this study because it is the longest running dataset 
that provides accurate and extensive information on federal sentencing decisions as well as 
information on the offender’s citizenship status.  The sample for this study includes all drug-
related offenses reported to the USSC, a total of 388,229 cases (35.9%).  However, due to the 




Following Doerner and Demuth (2010), juveniles (ages 16 and 17 years) will be excluded 
because these cases are accompanied by unique circumstances that are likely to differ in 
substantial ways from adult cases.  Only 88 cases from 1999-2013 included juvenile defendants, 
representing less than 0.1% of reported cases.  Furthermore, cases in which the citizenship of the 
defendant is unknown will also be omitted.  Once again, this population is relatively small, 
comprising of roughly 2% of cases.  Likewise, those who were extradited (1,191 or 0.1%) will 
have been removed from this study. 
 
Level 2 Data 
 The level 2 data was created by aggregating individual level measures from the MoF data 
to the district level for each of the districts.  A total of 94 districts are present in the United States 
with each state housing between 1 and 4 districts.  However, state and territories are likely to 
differ in various ways.  Following Kautt (2002) and Ulmer et al (2010), the Northern Mariana 
Islands, Guam, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Washington DC are omitted.  Thus, this 




Dependent variables   
Four dependent variables regarding sentencing outcome are analyzed in this study.  
Because several researchers have suggested that noncitizens are disproportionately more likely to 
be incarcerated compared to U.S. citizens (Albonetti 1997; Demuth 2002; Wolfe, Pyrooz, and 




This variable is coded dichotomously as no prison or prison received.  The majority of drug 
cases resulted in incarceration (357,044 or 94.7%) with only 5.3% (19,941) receiving nonprison 
sentences. 
The second dependent variable examines the decision to incarcerate when non-prison 
sentencing options are available.  According to the United States Sentencing Commission’s 
annual report (2013), the gap between citizens and noncitizens is particularly large when 
examining citizenship effects for those who have the option of prison alternatives.  Like the 
PRISDUM variable, it is coded dichotomously as yes/no.  This variable, however, includes data 
on those who are capable of receiving a non-prison option which equates to only roughly 6% of 
the drug cases.  Therefore, defendants who would receive a prison sentence regardless due to 
mandatory sentencing laws are excluded from this variable.  A little over 44%, (10,263) received 
a non-prison sentence and over 55% (12,759) of drug users who were eligible for a nonprison 
option were incarcerated.   
The third variable is the sentence length (SENTTOT0).  Previous research has reached 
mixed findings with regard to disparities between citizens and noncitizens for sentence length.  
Most suggest that noncitizens may receive leniency (Demuth 2002; Katzenelson et al 1996; Wu 
and DeLone 2012) while some find the reverse to be true (Albonetti 1997).  This variable is 
continuous, ranging from 0 month to 2,880 months, with 0 representing the absence of 
incarceration.  For the purposes of this study, those receiving 0 months in prison were removed.  
Furthermore, any sentences over 470 months were considered life sentences and were therefore 
included within the 470 month cap.  The average months of time sentenced is 74 months.  Due to 
the skewness of this variable, the natural log will be used for sentence length. 




particularly important because it demonstrates judicial discretion.  Like sentence length, 
disparities between citizens and noncitizens for this legal decision are often mixed with some 
finding that noncitizens receive more leniency (Maxfield and Burchfield 2002) and others 
finding U.S. citizens receive more leniency (Cano and Spohn 2012; Katzenelson et al 1996).  
Because so few cases result in upward departures, less than 1%, this study will focus solely on 
downward departures.  This variable is operationalized differently depending on the year.  From 
1999 until 2003, the variable (DEPART) includes no departure, upward departure, downward 
departure, substantial assistance, and inapplicable.  However, from 2004 until 2013, the 
DEPART variable is operationalized differently (see Appendix A for the specific 
operationalization).  Both the 1999-2003 as well as the 2004-2013 DEPART variables are 
recoded as a dummy variable (DOWNWARD) that is coded as downward departure (1) if the 
offender received any form of downward or substantial assistance departure and no downward 
departure (0) if the offender received no departure, an upward departure, or the response is 
inapplicable.  Most of the defendants did not receive a downward departure (281,314 or 83.8%) 
with 54,282 (16.2%) receiving either a downward or substantial assistance departure.   
 
Theoretical variables 
Because noncitizens are expected to receive harsher sentences and are less likely to be 
beneficiaries of leniency, citizenship status is the primary explanatory variable.  Noncitizen is a 
dichotomous variable (created from NEWCIT) with U.S. citizens omitted as the reference 
category.  Because current rhetoric focusing on “illegal immigrants,” documentation status is 
also included.  Undocumented is a dichotomous variable (created using CITIZEN) that refers to 




Roughly 70% (258,595) of the drug cases involved U.S. citizens.  Of the remaining 30%, a little 
more than 30% (33,050) are legal immigrants, 57.6% (63,226) are illegal immigrants, and only 
12.3% (13,447) are of unknown citizenship.  Those with unknown citizenship status are removed 
from the study. 
The effects of citizenship status may be mediated and/or moderated by ethnicity.  
Therefore, two measures of ethnicity are included.  Using the NEWRACE variable, a dummy 
variable for Hispanic (43.4%) is included in the study.  A dummy for African-American (Black) 
(27.9%) is later added to the model.  White (25.9%) is omitted as the reference category.  Of 
particular interest to this study is the defendant’s nationality.  Because Hispanic fails to 
acknowledge unique geographic and cultural distinctions, a more specific measure of ethnicity is 
incorporated into the study.  Data is provided that examines the offender’s country of origin for 
all noncitizens (CITWHERE). This variable includes 199 countries.  This variable was originally 
recoded into 9 categories including Africa (1.2% or 1,349), Canada (1.7% or 1,889), the 
Caribbean (13,715 or 12.4%), Central/Southern/Western Asia (0.8% or 906), 
Eastern/Southeastern Asia (1,859 or 1.7%), Europe (1.5% or 1,690), Latin America (11,781 or 
10.7%), Mexico (69.8% or 77,025), and Oceana (.1% or 107) using the United Nations Statistics 
Division (2013) identification of countries.   
The majority of noncitizen drug offenders are from Latin America, Mexico, and the 
Caribbean.  Central/Southern/Western Asia and Eastern/Southeastern Asia were joined due to 
low samples.  Canada, Europe, and Oceana were included within other countries, due to 
variability concerns across districts.  Several of the districts included so few of these populations 
that a near singularity occurred during analysis.  Surprisingly, Africa was not affected despite the 




Latin America, Mexico, and other countries (see Appendix B) with Mexico omitted as the 
reference category.   
In order to examine geographic variations, the district in which the offender is sentenced 
is included.  This variable (CRICDIST) is coded as a numeric value ranging from 1 through 94.  
Each value represents a corresponding district.  Districts 1 (DC), 5 (Puerto Rico), 18 (Virgin 
Islands), 69 (Guam), and 74 (Northern Mariana Island) are omitted.  The percent of cases 
processed in each district vary from as few as 0.1% (Oklahoma East) to as many as 8.9% (Texas 
West).  The year in which the individual was sentenced, ranging from 1999-2013, is also 
included in order to examine how the effects of these variables may have changed over time.  
The percent of cases processed in each year vary from as few as 5.9% to as much as 7%, 
demonstrating relative consistency across time with no dramatic increases in any given year. 
 
Control Variables 
Several legal variables are considered in this study.  Because judges are expected to offer 
a specific sentence according to sentencing guidelines, the presumptive sentence is included as a 
legal control.  This variable provides a measure of offense severity and criminal history.  
Without controlling for the presumptive sentence, the effects of extralegal characteristics on 
sentencing outcomes will likely be grossly exaggerated (see Engen and Gainey 2000).  Because 
one of the sentencing measures in this study examines downward departures, the minimum 
guideline sentence (XMINSOR) will be included as a control variable.  The guideline minimum 
is coded in months, averaging 125.53 months.  Although the severity of the crime and the 
offender’s criminal history are included in the calculation of the guidelines, it is possible that 




sentence and are included in the study.  The number of counts (NOCOUNTS), which is 
operationalized numerically, is included (with a mean of 1.35) as well as criminal history 
(CrimHist) which is measured dichotomously with 1 indicating the presence of a criminal history 
(with a mean of .74).  Because so few cases consisted of more than one count, the variable was 
recoded dichotomously with multiple counts included in the analysis and single count omitted as 
the reference category.  The case disposition (NEWCNVTN), which examines whether the case 
was resolved by trial (1) or by plea agreement (0), is also included.  The vast majority of cases 
(96%) accepted a plea.  In order to examine whether sentencing outcomes vary according to the 
type of crime, the drug offense (COMBDRG2) is included.  This variable consists of cocaine 
(23.2%), crack (19.7%), heroin (7.1%), marijuana (27.5%), methamphetamine (17.7%), and 
other (4.8%), each of which were included as a dummy variable with the exception of marijuana.   
Finally, several extralegal control variables that have been identified within the academic 
sentencing literature as being related to sentencing outcomes are included.  Gender (MONSEX) 
is included as a dichotomous variable coded as male (86.8%) and female (13.2%).  Education 
status (NEWEDUC) originally included four categories: those with less than a high school 
degree (49%), those with a high school degree (33.3%), and those with a few years of college 
(14.9%), and college graduates (2.7%).  Because so few offenders were college graduates, this 
category was subsumed under those with some college as well.  Age is a continuous variable 





Table 1: Case Level Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Range S.D. Total 
Dependent Variables     
     Prison .95 1 .22 376985 
     INOUT (alternatives) .45 1 .50 23022 
     Logged Length 3.60 8.81 1.21 353692 
     Downward Departure .16 1 .36 377861 
Citizenship     
     Noncitizens .30 1 .45 369154 
          Documented .42 1 .28 377861 
          Undocumented .58 1 .37 377861 
Legal Variables     
     Logged Presumptive 3.54 9.21 1.50 335581 
     Number of Counts 1.35 432 1.86 377814 
     Criminal History .74 1 .43 366803 
     Trial .04 1 .19 377547 
     Drug Offense     
          Cocaine .23 1 .42 377861 
          Crack .20 1 .39 377861 
          Heroin .07 1 .26 377861 
          Marijuana .28 1 .44 377861 
          Meth .18 1 .38 377861 
          Other .05 1 .21 377861 
Extralegal Variables     
     Female .13 1 .33 374358 
     Education     
          No HS degree .49 1 .50 377861 
          Completed HS degree .33 1 .47 377861 
          Some/Completed College .18 1 .37 377861 
     Race     
          White .26 1 .43 377861 
          Black .28 1 .45 377861 
          Hispanic .43 1 .49 377861 
          Other .03 1 .16 377861 






Between Group Variations 
 When comparing the means for citizens and noncitizens across several level 1 predictors, 
unique distinctions are apparent (see Table 2).  While most federal cases resulted in incarceration 
(94%), this average is somewhat greater for noncitizens (99%).  Inversely, noncitizens (16%) 
received prison alternatives less frequently compared to U.S. citizens (57%).  The average 
logged sentence length assigned is somewhat shorter for noncitizens than U.S. citizens.  Finally, 
though comparable, noncitizens demonstrate a slightly greater average for downward departures 
(16%) compared to citizens. 
 Of court related variables, noncitizens appear to commit somewhat less severe offenses.  
The guideline minimum, which incorporates criminal history and offense severity scores, are 
somewhat lower for noncitizens.  Noncitizens also have lower criminal history scores and less 
frequently are charged with multiple counts.  There is no discernable difference between citizen 
and noncitizen cases going to trial.  Of drug violations, noncitizens are more frequently charged 
with a marijuana violation (39%) than citizens (22%).  They are also more often charged with 
cocaine violations (27%) than are citizens (21%) and are slightly more often charged with 
heroin.  Noncitizens are less frequently charged with crack, methamphetamine, and other 
violations. 
 Citizens and noncitizens also differ across several of the extralegal control variables.  
Fewer noncitizen drug offenders are female (28%) compared to U.S. citizens (36%).  
Noncitizens also have a greater average of offenders without a high school degree (66%) than 
citizens (40%).  The average for completed high school degrees and some/completed college are 
less for noncitizens than for U.S. citizens.  As expected, unique racial and ethnic distinctions are 




(82%) compared to U.S. citizens (26%).  U.S. citizens are much more often identified as White 
or Black compared to noncitizens, though those identified as other ethnicities are comparable for 
citizens and noncitizens.  Lastly, no dramatic differences in age averages are evident, with both 





Table 2: Between Groups Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Citizen Mean Noncitizen Mean 
Dependent Variables   
     Prison .94 .99 
     INOUT (alternatives) .57 .16 
     Logged Length 3.96 3.66 
     Downward Departure .15 .16 
Citizenship   
          Documented ---- .30 
          Undocumented ---- .57 
Legal Variables   
    Logged Presumptive 4.15 3.89 
     Number of Counts .20 .17 
     Criminal History .85 .47 
     Trial .04 .04 
     Drug Offense   
          Cocaine .21 .27 
          Crack .26 .03 
          Heroin .06 .10 
          Marijuana .22 .39 
          Meth .18 .16 
          Other .06 .03 
Extralegal Variables   
     Female .36 .28 
     Education   
          No HS degree .40 .66 
          Completed HS  .39 .17 
          Some/Completed  .20 .12 
     Race   
          White .34 .07 
          Black .37 .06 
          Hispanic .26 .82 
          Other .03 .02 





District Level Variables 
 Several caseload district level variables are included in this study, including the trial 
caseload, the guideline minimum, multiple offenses, and drug caseloads.  The trial caseload is 
measured by aggregating the micro level dichotomous trial variable to the district level.  It is 
likely that districts with greater trial caseloads may rely more heavily on heuristic decision 
making techniques in an effort to reach quick sentencing decisions and reduce the case backlog.  
Table 3 presents the district level averages for each level 2 predictor.  Trial caseloads range from 
as few 1.1% (Arizona) as to as many as 10% (Florida North).  Furthermore, following Light 
(2014), the average offense severity score is included for each district.  This variable is 
calculated by aggregating the minimum presumptive sentence length for each district and ranges 
from as low as 40.35 months in district 80 (New Mexico) to as high as 292.99 months in district 
90 (Florida North).  The case level variable for whether multiple charges were brought forward 
was also aggregated to the district level as an additional measure of district level caseload 
severity.  This variable ranges from a high of 66.1% in Pennsylvania East to a low of 5.8% if 
California South.   
The drug-crime caseload is also included.  This variable is measured as the percent of 
specific drug offenses brought forward per district.  It is possible that districts serving a higher 
portion of certain drug offenders may be inclined to demonstrate more punitive sentencing 
decisions for these offenses.  Furthermore, because certain drug violations are associated with 
foreign offenders (see Chapter 2), it is likely that greater caseloads of these drug violations will 
disproportionately impact noncitizen outcomes.  Because so few level cases exist at level 2 (89 
districts), it is not feasible to include a measure for all drug violations.  Therefore, the two drugs 




Cocaine violations range from 6.4% (Nebraska) to 50.3% (Florida South).  Marijuana violations 
also vary across district with some districts demonstrate as little as 4.6% (Connecticut) and other 
demonstrating as much as 76% (Arizona). 
Several theoretical variables are also included in the study.  In order to examine whether 
increases in noncitizen, and noncitizen proxies, are related to sentencing inequality, the 
noncitizen, Hispanic, Mexico, and undocumented populations are included.  Each of the 
variables are aggregated to the district level using case level dichotomous measures.  Unique 
district level variation is observed for each of these variables with Arizona frequently 
demonstrating greater numbers of these cases and West Virginia’s southern district frequently 
representing the least.  The noncitizen population varies greatly with a low of 1.8% (West 
Virginia South) and 65% (Arizona).  The population of Hispanic defendants range from 4% in 
district 27 (West Virginia South) to 87% in district 35 (Texas South) and the population of 
Noncitizen defendants range from 3% in district 27 (West Virginia South) to 77% in district 64 
(Arizona).  Like ethnicity, variation in undocumented populations are evident with a range of 
less than 1% in West Virginia’s southern district to a high of 46.4% in Arizona.  Mexican 
offender populations range from 0.2% (Maine and Vermont) to 63.4% (Arizona).  According to 
group threat theory, districts with larger populations of a minority group can be expected to 
demonstrate more severe outcomes toward that population in an attempt to increase social 
control. 
Finally, a few additional district level controls were added.  It may be the case that 
greater numbers of white offenders in a given jurisdiction will lower sentencing severity for 
noncitizens, many of whom are nonwhite, because attributions of the criminal immigrant may be 




be related to sentencing outcomes at the individual level, this variable could very well 
demonstrate aggregate level effects.  Furthermore, previous research has found a relationship 
between citizenship status and education with noncitizens having disproportionately less 
educational attainment compared to their citizen counterparts.  Therefore, it may be the case that 
districts with greater numbers of offenders without high school degrees rely more heavily on 





Table 3: District Level Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Range S.D. Total 
Courtroom Variables     
     % Prison .94 .24 .04 89 
     % INOUT (alternatives) .54 .71 .13 89 
     Logged Length Avg 4.03 1.66 .36 89 
     % Downward Departure .15 .30 .07 89 
     Logged Presumptive Avg  4.20 1.45 .31 89 
     % Number of Counts .23 .60 .13 89 
     % Trial .05 .09 .02 89 
     % Cocaine .22 .45 .10 89 
     % Crack .25 .55 .14 89 
     % Heroin .06 .36 .07 89 
     % Marijuana .16 .63 .12 89 
     % Meth .23 .75 .21 89 
     % Other Drugs .06 .23 .04 89 
Demography Variables     
     % Noncitizens .21 .67 .15 89 
     % Documented .06 .27 .05 89 
     % Undocumented .12 .44 .09 89 
     % Female .13 .18 .04 89 
     % No HS degree .43 .36 .07 89 
     % Completed HS degree .36 .36 .07 89 
     % Some/Completed College .18 .17 .04 89 
     % White .31 .65 .14 89 
     % Black .34 .70 .20 89 
     % Hispanic .29 .80 .19 89 
     % Other Race .04 .59 .08 89 
     Age Avg 33.65 6.16 1.07 89 
     % Asia Origin .03 .01 .01 89 
     % Africa Origin .05 .00 .01 89 
     % Caribbean Origin .25 .03 .05 89 
     % Latin America Origin .20 .02 .03 89 
     % Mexico Origin .64 .13 .13 89 







 Before conducting the multilevel analyses, several assumptions must be met.  All 
continuous variables were tested for skewness.  Age, criminal history, and offense severity met 
the criteria for normality with values ranging between -1 and 1.  The sentence length and 
guideline minimum were severely skewed and were transformed using the log of the variables.  
The number of counts were also skewed; however, few cases incorporated more than one counts.  
Therefore, the number of offenses was transformed into a dummy variable that consists of those 
with only one count and those cases with multiple counts. 
 Next, each variable was examined for multicollinearity.  Of the variables, only offense 
severity and guideline minimum were found to be collinear with a VIF value over 4.  Because 
sentencing guidelines take into account the severity of the offense as well as criminal history, the 
collinearity between severity and sentencing guidelines is expected.  Offense severity is dropped 
from the models.  Surprisingly, criminal history was not found to be collinear with the guideline 
minimum and is included in the model. 
 
ANALYTIC STRATEGY 
In order to analyze the effects of citizenship status on sentencing outcomes, several 
models will be examined.  First, legal and extralegal case level effects on the likelihood of 
incarceration, receiving a prison alternative, sentence length, and the application of downward 
departures are examined (H1a-d and H3a-d).  A series of single-level random effects models 
with grand mean centering is conducted for each of these four dependent variables as well as 
fixed effects models for comparison purposes (see Tables 4-11).  Because cases are nested within 




variables (H2a and H4a).  In order to examine covariance across districts, a spatial weight matrix 
will be included in the HLM analysis for the level 2 models examining variations between 
citizens and noncitizens as well as noncitizen proxies (see Tables 12-20).  Because states share 
borders as well as vertices, a queen contiguity matrix will calculated with Geoda (H2b and H4b).  
Finally, growth models will be used to examine changes in disparities across districts over time 
for each of the dependent variables (H2c and H4c) (see Tables 21-24).   
 Goodness of fit statistics are calculated for several of the models.  First, an unconditional 
model is run to identify the components variance (tau) for each of the Bernoulli models and the 
components variance and residual variance components (sigma) for the linear model.  These 
values are used to calculate the R-squared for each of the models (Behavioral Research and 
Teaching 2012).  To determine the explained variance, the level 1 r-squared is calculated for 
each linear model by subtracting each model’s sigma from the null model and then dividing the 
total by the null’s sigma.  R-squared values are calculated using Kreft and de Leeuw’s (1998) 
equation: 
R² = (unrestricted error – restricted error) / unrestricted error 
Unfortunately, the sigma value is not provided in the Bernoulli models; thus, no level 1 variance 
is available for the dichotomous dependent variables.  The level 2 model fit is determined by 
subtracting each model’s tau from the null model and then dividing the total by the null’s tau.  






UNRAVELING INDIVIDUAL LEVEL PREDICTORS 
 
 In order to examine whether, and to what extent, noncitizens receive harsher sentencing 
outcomes compared to their US counterparts (Hypothesis 1) and whether noncitizen sentencing 
disparities vary across ethnicity and country of origin (Hypothesis 3), several level 1 models 
were run for each of the four dependent variables using HLM 7.  The first model for 
incarceration, prison alternatives, sentence length, and downward departures examines the main 
effects of the theoretical variables (citizenship, ethnicity, and documentation status) without 
control variables.  Next, additional extralegal predictors such as age, gender, race, education, 
country of origin, and whether the case went to trial were included.  Legal controls, including the 
guideline minimum, criminal history, type of drug offense, and whether multiple charges were 
brought forward are added in the third model.  Finally, a dummy variable for each year is 
included in the 4th model, with 1999 omitted as the reference category.  This chapter focuses on 
Models 1-3 for each dependent variable.  Model 4 is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8 
which examines longitudinal trends in sentencing. 
 Each of these models were first run so that all variables were fixed, and then later run 
with some variables permitted to vary.  Each variable was selected to random one at a time; chi-
square statistics were examined to determine which variables would remain fixed and which 
would random.  Those significant at the p<.05 level were left random (see Raudenbush, Bryk, 
Cheong, Congdon, du Toit 2004) and have been bolded to demarcate the random effects.  A level 
1 fixed effects and level 1 mixed effects table is provided for each of the four dependent 




variables are likely to vary across districts, this analysis focuses on the mixed effects model, 
acknowledging fixed effects only when noteworthy distinctions are apparent.  
 Tables 4 through Table 11 include the Beta values for each variable with the standard 
errors in parentheses.  Asterisks are used to denote significance at varying levels as identified 
within each table.  The model fit for each series of analyses is examined using reliability 
estimates and level 1 R-squared values for the linear models.  R-squared values are calculated 
using Kreft and de Leeuw’s (1998) equation: 
R² = (unrestricted error – restricted error) / unrestricted error 
Level 1 R-squared values are calculated only for sentence length.  Unfortunately, Bernoulli 
models fail to provide an estimate for the residual variance components (sigma) (see 
Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, Congdon, du Toit 2004).  Thus no level 1 pseudo R-squared is 
provided for the three dichotomous dependent variables. 
 
INCARCERATION DECISIONS 
Like previous research (Albonetti 1997; Demuth 2002; Light 2014; Wolfe et al. 2011), 
the results of this study indicate that citizenship status is significantly related to incarceration.  
This relationship is consistently expressed in the projected manner, with higher odds of 
incarceration for noncitizens.  This finding persists when controlling for numerous legal and 
extralegal variables.  Furthermore, when the sample is limited to only those cases in which 
prison alternatives are optional, noncitizens continue to be the recipients of punitive 
incarceration decisions.     
The extent of the disparity varies across districts, however.  Noncitizens, Hispanic 




districts for incarceration decisions in Model 1 and Model 2, according to Table 5.  Once legal 
variables are added to the model, however, only noncitizens, of the three theoretical variables, 
remains random.  This suggests that these legal controls explain the variations in intercepts 
across districts for Hispanic and undocumented offenders but not for noncitizens (see Snijders 
and Bosker 1999; Raudenbush et al 2004).  Likewise, Latin America origins, origins from other 
countries, being Black, having some or a completed college degree, and going to trial vary in 
Model 2 of Table 5, but not in Model 3 or Model 4.  Age, Caribbean origins, and being female 
vary across all models.  Of legal variables, only criminal history and the logged guideline 
minimum are fixed, demonstrating that the intercepts for these variables do not statistically differ 
across districts.  
 
Hypothesis 1A 
 Noncitizens are statistically significantly more likely to be incarcerated than their U.S. 
counterparts according to both the fixed and mixed effects models, though to a slightly lesser 
extent in the mixed effects models.  The odds of incarceration for noncitizens are more than three 
and a half times higher than U.S. citizens in the fixed effects independent variables model.  
When permitted to vary, the odds of incarceration are reduced to a little more than two times 
higher for noncitizens. 
 The inclusion of additional demographic variables greatly increases the effects of 
citizenship.  The odds of incarceration for noncitizens rise from 2.27 to 5.18 with the 
introduction of additional extralegal factors.  Age, though not initially significant, is related to a 
decreased odds of incarceration when controlling for legally relevant variables.  The odds of 




counterparts before controlling for legally relevant variables.  Inversely, the odds of being 
incarcerated are nearly 70% less for women compared to men.  Incarceration odds are nearly 
1.36 times higher for those without a high school degree compared to those with a completed 
degree while these odds are roughly 40% less for those with some and/or a completed college 
degree compared to those with a high school degree. 
 Particularly noteworthy is the finding that the introduction of legal controls increase the 
impact of citizenship status on incarceration outcomes rather than explaining it.  The inclusion of 
legal variables increases the odds of incarceration from 4.79 to 9.26 in the fixed effects model 
and 5.18 to 6.64 in the mixed effects model.  Rather than explaining sentencing disparities 
between citizens and noncitizens, legal variables appear to exacerbate the relationship, 
demonstrating an unexpected suppression effect (see MacKinnon, Krull, and Lockwood 2000).  
All court related control variables are statistically significantly related to incarceration outcomes 
for the fixed and mixed effects models.  An increase in criminal history score, an increase in the 
guideline minimum, being charged with multiple offenses, and being charged with a cocaine, 
crack, heroin, and methamphetamine are related to an increased odds of incarceration across all 
models.  The odds of incarceration are lower for other drugs compared to marijuana.   
 
Hypothesis 3A 
 Though the odds of incarceration are greater for noncitizens than for U.S. citizens, the 
results of the level 1 analysis suggests that sentencing disadvantages may not be static across all 
noncitizens.  Those of Hispanic descent are more likely to be incarcerated even when controlling 
for citizenship status.  When examining only the theoretical variables in model 1 of the mixed 




of incarceration for Hispanic offenders are slightly lower in the fixed effects models.  The odds 
of incarceration rise to more than 2.5 times higher when extralegal factors are included.  The 
inclusion of legal variables, however, reduces the odds of incarceration for Hispanic offenders 
from 2.53 to 1.49, though the relationship continues to be significant at the .001 level.   
While ethnicity is related to incarceration, important patterns are discernable within the 
broader ethnic categories. According to the mixed effects model, those from Asia, Africa, the 
Caribbean, Latin America, and other countries are less likely to receive a prison sentence 
compared to those from Mexico.  Only African origins are no longer statistically significant with 
the inclusion of legal variables.  Of country origins, those of Asian descent demonstrate the 
lowest odds of incarceration compared to Mexican offenders with a decreased odds of 
incarceration of almost 75%.     
 Furthermore, sentencing outcomes are more severe for undocumented noncitizens 
compared to noncitizens who enter the country legally.  The odds of incarceration for 
undocumented noncitizens are more than 4 times higher, though the odds quickly decrease with 





Table 4: Models Predicting Incarceration at Level 1 with Fixed Effects 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Theoretical Demographic Legal Controls Full Level 1 
Noncitizen 3.628*** (.136) 4.794*** (.065) 9.258*** (.122) 9.391*** (.072) 
Hispanic 1.644*** (.061) 2.037*** (.025) 1.528*** (.031) 1.516*** (.031) 
Undocumented 3.890*** (.176) 2.900*** (.081) 3.029*** (.087) 2.975*** (.087) 
Age - 1.004*** (.001) .993*** (.001) .993*** (.001) 
Asia - .322*** (.132) .210*** (.164) .207*** (.164) 
Africa - .479*** (.212) .663 (.250) .647 (.250) 
Caribbean - .474*** (.095) .322*** (.107) .320*** (.107) 
Latin America - 1.002 (.129) .463*** (.142) .463*** (.142) 
Other Countries - .477*** (.106) .377*** (.121) .368*** (.121) 
Black - 2.913*** (.024) 1.637*** (.032) 1.635*** (.032) 
Female - .342*** (.019) .412*** (.023) .412*** (.023) 
No High School - 1.359*** (.021) 1.364*** (.026) 1.366*** (.026) 
College - .605*** (.021) .739*** (.026) .735*** (.026) 
Trial - 4.891 (.097) 2.986*** (.122) 2.984*** (.122) 
Criminal History - - 1.678*** (.024) 1.686*** (.024) 
Guideline Min - - 3.600*** (.009) 3.619*** (.009) 
Multiple Offenses - - 1.551*** (.037) 1.536*** (.038) 
Cocaine - - 1.098** (.033) 1.100** (.033) 
Crack - - 1.400*** (.045) 1.394*** (.045) 
Heroin - - 1.421*** (.050) 1.426*** (.050) 
Meth - - 1.532*** (.040) 1.500*** (.040) 
Other Drugs - - .714*** (.037) .709*** (.038) 
2000 - - - .978 (.056) 
2001 - - - .965 (.055) 
2002 - - - 1.029 (.055) 
2003 - - - 1.287*** (.056) 
2004 - - - 1.494*** (.060) 
2005 - - - 1.387*** (.059) 
2006 - - - 1.492*** (.060) 
2007 - - - 1.486*** (.060) 
2008 - - - 1.167** (.058) 
2009 - - - 1.148* (.057) 
2010 - - - 1.122* (.058) 
2011 - - - 1.101 (.056) 
2012 - - - 1.217*** (.057) 
2013 - - - 1.160* (.060) 
Reliability  .972 .972 .948 .949 
n (Level I) 376985 376985 376985 376985 
χ² 6794.154*** 6299.02542*** 4094.62207*** 4134.30613*** 






Table 5: Models Predicting Incarceration at Level 1 with Mixed Effects 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Theoretical  Demographic Legal Controls Full Level 1 
Noncitizen 2.272*** (.098) 5.177*** (.157) 6.638*** (.146) 6.880*** (.145) 
Hispanic 2.117*** (.750) 2.533*** (.055) 1.494*** (.032) 1.487*** (.032) 
Undocumented 4.365*** (.141) 2.903*** (.151) 2.634*** (.090) 2.640*** (.090) 
Age - .9995 (.002) .992*** (.002) .991*** (.002) 
Asia - .243*** (.164) .252*** (.194) .243*** (.194) 
Africa - .214*** (.243) .630 (.292) .571 (.292) 
Caribbean - .344*** (.179) .355*** (.179) .367*** (.183) 
Latin America - .512** (.219) .348*** (.176) .339*** (.175) 
Other Countries - .435*** (.191) .432*** (.164) .395*** (.162) 
Black - 2.890*** (.051) 1.591*** (.033) 1.565*** (.033) 
Female - .327*** (.042) .389*** (.037) .386*** (.037) 
No High School - 1.355*** (.022) 1.347*** (.026) 1.357*** (.026) 
College - .587*** (.031) .745*** (.026) .744*** (.027) 
Trial - 5.318*** (.132) 3.038*** (.123) 3.014*** (.124) 
Criminal History - - 1.726*** (.025) 1.740*** (.025) 
Guideline Min - - 3.637*** (.010) 3.712*** (.010) 
Multiple Offenses - - 1.647*** (.054) 1.616*** (.053) 
Cocaine - - 1.231*** (.063) 1.240*** (.065) 
Crack - - 1.525*** (.068) 1.518*** (.067) 
Heroin - - 1.453*** (.076) 1.497*** (.079) 
Meth - - 1.718*** (.065) 1.652*** (.067) 
Other Drugs - - .715*** (.060) .691*** (.058) 
2000 - - - .963 (.083) 
2001 - - - .894 (.076) 
2002 - - - 1.056 (.087) 
2003 - - - 1.181 (.096) 
2004 - - - 1.435*** (.103) 
2005 - - - 1.304** (.083) 
2006 - - - 1.434*** (.095) 
2007 - - - 1.440*** (.097) 
2008 - - - 1.138 (.104) 
2009 - - - 1.237 (.112) 
2010 - - - 1.141 (.103) 
2011 - - - 1.080 (.104) 
2012 - - - 1.219 (.111) 
2013 - - - 1.119 (.116) 
Reliability  .830 .758 .753 .740 
n (Level I) 376985 376985 376985 376985 
χ² 2105.186*** 645.36822*** 896.98007*** 685.94543*** 








As a product of determinate sentencing policies for certain drug violations, it is possible 
that incarceration disparities are not truly a product of judicial discretion, but rather prosecutorial 
discretion in charging practices.  By examining decisions to assign alternative sanctions for those 
who are eligible, a more accurate measure of judicial discretion is observable.  While noncitizens 
are disadvantaged regarding the odds of incarceration, this disparity is much greater for the 
discretionary incarceration alternative outcome for those who are eligible for nonincarceration 
sentencing outcomes.  The odds of receiving a prison alternative for noncitizens are 78% less 
than their U.S. citizen counterparts according to the fixed effects model (see Table 6).  When 
permitted to vary, the disparity is somewhat lessoned (see Table 7).  The odds of receiving a 
prison alternative are 36% less for noncitizens.   
The inclusion of extralegal factors further increases noncitizen disadvantage according to 
the mixed effects model.  The odds of receiving a prison alternative drop to 63% less than 
citizens once age, race, gender, education, country of origin, and attending trial are added.  Age, 
Black, female, no high school, and college are statistically significantly related to prison 
alternatives.  An increase in age is related to slightly lower odds of receiving a prison alternative.  
The odds of receiving an incarceration alternative are 51% less for Black offenders compared to 
white offenders.  Women receive a 1.78 times increased odds of receiving an incarceration 
alternative.  The odds of receiving a nonprison outcome are nearly 20% less for those without a 
high school degree and 1.36 times higher for those with some college compared to those with a 




The inclusion of legal variables slightly reduces the odds of receiving a prison alternative 
to 64% less for noncitizens.  This suppression effect mirrors that of the incarceration outcomes, 
though to a much smaller extent.  While all of the legal variables were significant predictors of 
incarceration, the same is not true for incarceration alternatives.  As expected, criminal history, 
multiple offenses, and increased guideline minimums are related to decreased odds of receiving a 
nonprison outcome.  Those charged with crack, heroin, and methamphetamine are less likely to 
receive a prison alternative compared to marijuana offenses.  Only cocaine and other drugs do 
not differ significantly from marijuana in the odds of receiving a prison alternative in Model 3 of 
Table 7.    
 
Hypothesis 3B 
The within noncitizen and ethnic variations evident within prison alternative outcomes 
further mirrors that for incarceration.  Those of Hispanic descent are less likely to receive a 
nonincarceration sentencing outcome, even when prison alternatives are an option, compared to 
other races.  The odds of receiving a prison alternative are 89% less for Hispanic offenders 
before legal and extralegal variables are included according to the fixed effects model.  The 
disparity is reduced to 34% less when ethnicity is allowed to vary.  The odds of receiving a 
prison alternative is somewhat reduced from 34% to 38% with the inclusion of extralegal factors.  
The inclusion of legal factors reduces the disparity to only 22% reduced odds for Hispanic 
offenders compared to their white counterparts. 
Once again, variations exist within ethnicity.  These variations appear to be particularly 
disadvantageous for those of Mexican origins.  African, Caribbean, Latin American, and other 




category.  Unlike incarceration decisions, those of African descent have much higher odds of 
receiving a prison alternative than the other countries, with an increased odds of 3.21 at the .05 
level of significance.  Only Asia does not differ from Mexico in the mixed effects demographics 
model.  The inclusion of legally relevant variables limits the significant origin predictors to only 
the Caribbean and Latin America.  The advantage for those from Africa and other countries are 
explained by criminal history, the number of offenses, the guideline minimum, and the drug type 
with African origins failing to achieve significance when introducing these variables. 
The importance of documentation status on prison alternatives is less consistent than the 
other theoretical variables.  According to the fixed effects models, undocumented citizens are 
statistically significantly less likely to receive a nonincarceration alternative.  This relationship 
persists when controlling for legal and extralegal factors.  When permitted to vary, however, 
documentation status is only significant for Model 1.  When examining only the theoretical 
variables in the mixed effects model, the odds of receiving a prison alternative are more than 
40% less than the odds for their documented counterparts.  Once extralegal variables were 
included, this variable failed to achieve significance.  Documentation status is the only 





Table 6: Models Predicting Prison Alternative at Level 1 with Fixed Effects 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Theoretical  Demographic Legal Controls Full Model 
Noncitizen .223*** (.067) .370*** (.086) .319*** (.090) .323*** (.090) 
Hispanic .110*** (.049) .636*** (.054) .746*** (.057) .755*** (.058) 
Undocumented .152*** (.084) .709*** (.090) .771** (.091) .781** (.091) 
Age - .994*** (.002) .998 (.002) .999 (.002) 
Asia - 1.52 (.236) 1.393 (.242) 1.359 (.239) 
Africa - 1.910* (.314) 1.138 (.320) 1.130 (.321) 
Caribbean - 1.784*** (.141) 1.837*** (.146) 1.789*** (.147) 
Latin America - 1.885*** (.170) 2.311*** (.175) 2.291*** (.175) 
Other Countries - 1.534* (.168) 1.537* (.172) 1.498* (.173) 
Black - .491*** (.047) .668*** (.053) .677*** (.054) 
Female - 1.781*** (.043) 1.543*** (.045) 1.558*** (.046) 
No High School - .819*** (.041) .874** (.043) .870*** (.043) 
College - 1.354*** (.046) 1.178*** (.048) 1.191*** (.048) 
Trial - .813 (.119) 1.117 (.127) 1.097 (.128) 
Criminal History - - .639*** (.045) .644*** (.045) 
Guideline Min - - .785*** (.012) .781***(.020) 
Multiple Offenses - - .870* (.060) .878* (.060) 
Cocaine - - 1.089 (.056) 1.063 (.056) 
Crack - - .803** (.074) .792** (.074) 
Heroin - - .858 (.087) .847 (.087) 
Meth - - .842* (.068) .826** (.069) 
Other Drugs - - 1.343*** (.062) 1.362*** (.062) 
2000 - - - 1.132 (.126) 
2001 - - - .930 (.121) 
2002 - - - 1.043 (.120) 
2003 - - - .659*** (.110) 
2004 - - - .703** (.116) 
2005 - - - .585*** (.118) 
2006 - - - .652*** (.120) 
2007 - - - .748* (.122) 
2008 - - - .770* (.119) 
2009 - - - .761* (.113) 
2010 - - - .650*** (.122) 
2011 - - - .694** (.120) 
2012 - - - .571*** (.118) 
2013 - - - .531*** (.124) 
Reliability  .809 .801 .764 .771 
n (Level I) 23022 23022 23022 23022 
χ² 749.512*** 730.270*** 733.408*** 765.223*** 





Table 7: Models Predicting Prison Alternative at Level 1 with Mixed Effects 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Theoretical  Demographic Legal Controls Full Level 1 
Noncitizen .638*** (.120) .367*** (.088) .362*** (.093) .348*** (.093) 
Hispanic .656*** (.076) .622*** (.055) .775*** (.059) .836** (.058) 
Undocumented .591*** (.114) .853 (.130) .932 (.133) 1.003 (.138) 
Age - .994*** (.002) .510 (.002) .998 (.002) 
Asia - 1.689 (.276) 1.252 (.247) 1.336 (.252) 
Africa - 3.217* (.496) 2.497 (.559) 1.662 (.535) 
Caribbean - 1.754*** (.145) 1.367* (.158) 1.380* (.159) 
Latin America - 1.804*** (.175) 1.800** (.188) 1.955*** (.188) 
Other Countries - 1.638** (.174) 1.328 (.186) 1.348 (.187) 
Black - .491*** (.047) .681*** (.054) .708*** (.055) 
Female - 1.778*** (.044) 1.542*** (.046) 1.526*** (.047) 
No High School - .816*** (.041) .881** (.043) .869*** (.044) 
College - 1.357*** (.046) 1.169*** (.049) 1.191*** (.049) 
Trial - .795 (.119) 1.084 (.127) 1.101 (.128) 
Criminal History - - .565*** (.062) .581*** (.058) 
Guideline Min - - .787*** (.012) .793*** (.021) 
Multiple Offenses - - .877* (.060) .896 (.061) 
Cocaine - - .914 (.083) .966 (.073) 
Crack - - .728*** (.097) .811** (.076) 
Heroin - - .740** (.109) .802* (.091) 
Meth - - .699*** (.099) .770** (.092) 
Other Drugs - - 1.191 (.091) 1.305** (.084) 
2000 - - - 1.098 (.130) 
2001 - - - .917 (.126) 
2002 - - - 1.097 (.125) 
2003 - - - .714** (.115) 
2004 - - - .685** (.121) 
2005 - - - .557*** (.123) 
2006 - - - .627*** (.125) 
2007 - - - .734* (.127) 
2008 - - - .768* (.125) 
2009 - - - .612*** (.137) 
2010 - - - .647*** (.128) 
2011 - - - .634** (.139) 
2012 - - - .554*** (.123) 
2013 - - - .519*** (.130) 
Reliability .646 .846 .583 .780 
n (Level I) 23022 23022 23022 23022 
χ² 405.805*** 256.655*** 64.588*** 252.324*** 






Though most research finds that noncitizens are disproportionately incarcerated, the 
effects of the variable on sentence length remains a point of contention in the sentencing 
literature.  The results of this study may proffer an explanation for what appears to be 
contradictory findings.  At first glance, it appears as though noncitizens receive shorter sentence 
lengths (see Table 8 and Table 9).  This continues to be the case even when country of origin and 
other extralegal predictors are included.  The relationship between citizenship and sentence 
length is mediated by legal factors.  Once legal predictors are included, noncitizens receive 
longer sentences than their citizen counterparts.   
Not only are not citizens more likely to receive a prison sentence compared to U.S. 
citizens, even when alternatives are optional, they also receive longer sentences.  The majority of 
previous research indicates that noncitizens receive shorter sentences (Demuth 2002; 
Katzenelson et al 1996; Wu and DeLone 2012).  Though shorter sentences were found for 
noncitizens in this study, the inclusion of legal variables acts as a moderating effect, reversing 
the direction of the relationship.  Rather than the anticipated inverse correlation, the results of 
this study indicate that, with proper legal controls, the relationship is positive, supporting the 
findings of Albonetti (1997).   
The following variables were allowed to vary in all models: noncitizen, Hispanic, 
undocumented, age, other countries, Black, female, college, and trial.  Criminal history, multiple 
offenses, cocaine, crack, heroin, methamphetamine, and other drugs vary in model 3, and Asia, 






Noncitizens appear to receive shorter sentences than their U.S. counterparts at first 
glance.  Noncitizens receive a 4.9% sentence reduction for the logged sentence length in the 
mixed effects theoretical model (p<.05).  This coefficient is reduced to -.094 in the fixed effects 
model (p<.001). 
When extralegal controls are included to the mixed model, being noncitizen is associated 
with a small 3.5% decrease in sentence length.  As with incarceration decisions, age, race, 
gender, education, and going to trial are statistically significantly related to sentence length.  
Before the introduction of legal variables, age is related to a slight increase in sentence length.  
Black offenders receive 43% longer sentences than their white counterparts while women receive 
60% shorter sentences.  Education is only statistically significant for those with a college degree.  
Offenders with some or a completed college degree receive 20% shorter sentences.  Those with 
no high school degree do not receive statistically significantly different sentence lengths than 
those with a completed high school degree.  Furthermore, a trial penalty does appear to exist, 
with those who appear in court receiving a 98% increase in logged sentence length. 
The leniency that noncitizens seem to reap in regard to sentence length disappears with 
the introduction of legal variables.  Noncitizens receive a 7.4% increase in the logged sentence 
length.  This finding is the same in both the fixed effects and mixed effects models.  Not only 
does the inclusion of legal variables alter the direction of the relationship between noncitizens 
and sentence length, it also increases statistical significance from .05 to .001.  All legal variables 
were statistically significant at the .001 level, with the exception of other drugs which did not 
statistically differ in sentence length from marijuana.  Cocaine, crack, heroin, and 




related to a 12.6% increase in sentence length.  Offenders with multiple offenses receive a 14.7% 
increase in logged sentence length.  An increase in the logged guideline minimum is related to an 
increase in the logged sentence length. 
 
Hypothesis 3C 
While the effects of citizenship change directions with the introduction of legal variables, 
ethnic and documentation variations respond in a more predictable manner.  Hispanic offenders 
receive a 6.4% increase in the logged sentence length according to the theoretical mixed effects 
model.  This disparity is greater in the fixed effects model.  The inclusion of extralegal variables 
further exacerbate the sentence length severity for Hispanic offenders from 6.4% to 25.3%. The 
inclusion of legal variables reduces the impact of being Hispanic on sentence length to 10.5%. 
Though country of origin is initially a significant predictor, any disparities are explained 
by legal predictors in the mixed effects models.  According to the demographics model, those 
from Africa and other countries receive shorter sentences compared to those of Mexican descent.  
Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America do not differ from Mexico.  None of the variables are 
significant in the final mixed effects model.  The results of the fixed effects findings differ 
greatly.  According to the final fixed effects models, only Asia failed to achieve significance.  
Africa, the Caribbean, Latin America, and other countries are each associated with longer 
sentence lengths compared to Mexico in the final fixed effects model.  
 Documentation also status appears to be related to sentence length, though only in the 
theoretical models.  The inclusion of extralegal and legal variables negates the impact of 
documentation status on sentence length for the mixed effects models.  Undocumented 




slightly lower in the fixed effects models, with undocumented noncitizens receive a 2.3% longer 
sentence than documented noncitizens.  Documentation status is significant at the .001 level 





Table 8: Models Predicting Sentence Length at Level 1 with Fixed Effects 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Theoretical  Demographic Legal Controls Full Level 1 
Noncitizen -.094*** (.006) -.187*** (.007) .038*** (.005) .040*** (.005) 
Hispanic .016*** (.005) .187*** (.005) .081*** (.004) .084*** (.004) 
Undocumented .023*** (.007) .034*** (.006) .022*** (.004) .023*** (.004) 
Age - .007*** (.0002) .0006*** (.0001) .001*** (.0001) 
Asia - .145*** (.025) .015 (.016) .011 (.016) 
Africa - -.172*** (.029) .062*** (.019) .056** (.019) 
Caribbean - .122*** (.011) .056*** (.007) .053*** (.007) 
Latin America - .300*** (.011) .066*** (.007) .063*** (.007) 
Other Countries - -.025 (.017) .040*** (.011) .035*** (.011) 
Black - .413*** (.005) .096*** (.004) .100*** (.004) 
Female - -.495*** (.005) -.250*** (.003) -.248*** (.003) 
No High School - .006 (.004) .020*** (.003) .018*** (.003) 
College - -.183*** (.005) -.073*** (.003) -.074*** (.003) 
Trial - .967*** (.009) .246*** (.006) .244*** (.006) 
Criminal History - - .132*** (.003) .137*** (.003) 
Guideline Min - - .776*** (.001) .776*** (.001) 
Multiple Offenses - - .120*** (.003) .118*** (.004) 
Cocaine - - .152*** (.004) .152*** (.004) 
Crack - - .204*** (.005) .200*** (.005) 
Heroin - - .192*** (.005) .196*** (.005) 
Meth - - .201*** (.004) .201*** (.004) 
Other Drugs - - .015 (.006) .020*** (.006) 
2000 - - - .006 (.006) 
2001 - - - .029*** (.006) 
2002 - - - .037*** (.006) 
2003 - - - .065*** (.006) 
2004 - - - .090*** (.006) 
2005 - - - .059*** (.006) 
2006 - - - .057*** (.006) 
2007 - - - .059*** (.006) 
2008 - - - .056*** (.006) 
2009 - - - .010 (.006) 
2010 - - - .004 (.006) 
2011 - - - .025*** (.006) 
2012 - - - -.010 (.006) 
2013 - - - -.029*** (.006) 
Reliability .996 .995 .993 .993 
n (Level I) 353692 353692 353692 353692 
R² (Level I) .02 .11 .63 .63 
χ² 72688.846*** 61722.262*** 27957.802*** 27646.011*** 





Table 9: Models Predicting Sentence Length at Level 1 with Mixed Effects 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Theoretical  Demographic Legal Controls Full Level 1 
Noncitizen -.049* (.019) -.035* (.016) .074*** (.009) .067*** (.010) 
Hispanic .064** (.021) .253*** (.018) .105*** (.007) .111*** (.008) 
Undocumented .045* (.017) .023 (.015) .009 (.008) .015* (.007) 
Age - .004*** (.0005) .000003 (.0002) .0003 (.0002) 
Asia - .032 (.034) -.014 (.017) -.014 (.017) 
Africa - -.297*** (.032) -.029 (.020) -.016 (.019) 
Caribbean - -.032 (.028) -.025 (.008) -.023** (.008) 
Latin America - -.016 (.028) -.007 (.008) -.003 (.008) 
Other Countries - -.129*** (.035) .002 (.017) -.002 (.016) 
Black - .430*** (.020) .111*** (.009) .117*** (.009) 
Female - -.584*** (.023) -.308*** (.016) -.307*** (.016) 
No High School - .011 (.007) .018*** (.003)  .017*** (.003) 
College - -.206*** (.010) -.073*** (.005) -.072*** (.005) 
Trial - .984*** (.022) .251*** (.015) .238*** (.014) 
Criminal History - - .126*** (.008) .135*** (.008) 
Guideline Min - - .771*** (.009) .772*** (.001) 
Multiple Offenses - - .147*** (.009) .144*** (.101) 
Cocaine - - .086*** (.010) .082*** (.011) 
Crack - - .155*** (.012) .148*** (.012) 
Heroin - - .114*** (.014) .122*** (.013) 
Meth - - .128*** (.013) .126*** (.014) 
Other Drugs - - -.026 (.013) -.013 (.014) 
2000 - - - .004 (.009) 
2001 - - - .023* (.010) 
2002 - - - .040*** (.010) 
2003 - - - .047*** (.013) 
2004 - - - .076*** (.013) 
2005 - - - .039** (.013) 
2006 - - - .043* (.016) 
2007 - - - .046** (.015) 
2008 - - - .038* (.017) 
2009 - - - -.010 (.018) 
2010 - - - -.032 (.019) 
2011 - - - -.021 (.018) 
2012 - - - -.051** (.018) 
2013 - - - -.065** (.020) 
Reliability .991 .984 .971 .971 
n (Level I) 353692 353692 353692 353692 
R² (Level I) .02 .14 .64 .64 
χ² 41441.604*** 18746.824*** 7573.321*** 7850.978*** 






The sentence length outcomes are determined by the federal sentencing guidelines.  
Though guidelines incorporate a range from which the judge may choose, it remains a limited 
measure of discretion.  Conversely, judicial decisions to depart from the guidelines is a much 
more definitive measure of discretion.  Therefore, if sentencing inequality is truly a product of 
direct and/or underlying judicial prejudices, sentencing disparities are expected to be more 
pronounced for this outcome.   
Like Cano and Spohn (2012) the results of this study indicate that noncitizens are less 
likely to receive a downward departure than citizens.  In fact, of the theoretical variables, 
citizenship is the only consistently significant predictor of receiving a downward departure.  All 
theoretical variables are significantly related to downward departures in the fixed effects model.  
However, only citizenship status is a significant predictor of receiving a downward departure in 
the mixed effects models, demonstrating the importance of multilevel modeling.  Noncitizens, 
Hispanic, undocumented, age, Asia, Black, female, and no high school vary in Model 2 and 
Model 3.  Crack, methamphetamine, and other drugs are also permitted to vary in Model 3. 
 
Hypothesis 1D 
 The odds of receiving a downward departure are much less for noncitizens according to 
the fixed effects model.  Noncitizens receive an 83% decreased odds of a downward departure 
(see Table 10).  When permitted to vary, the odds of receiving a downward departure are only 
12% less than those for U.S. citizens (see Table 11).   
The odds of receiving a downward departure are 14% less for noncitizens with the 




fixed effects model.  Several of the extralegal variables were found to be significantly related to 
the receipt of a downward departure.  For instance, the odds of receiving a downward departure 
increase with age.  Prior to the introduction of legal variables, women have a 1.4 times increased 
odds of receiving a downward departure compared to men.  Those without a high school degree 
have a slightly greater than 4% decreased odds of receiving a downward departure, but this 
relationship is significant only at the .05 level.  The odds of receiving a downward departure are 
1.05 times greater for those with some or a completed college degree compared to those with a 
high school degree.  Those who appear in court are more likely to receive a downward departure.  
While age, race, gender, education, and trial are significant predictors of downward departures 
according to the mixed effects models, this is the only outcome variable in which race is not 
statistically significant in the mixed effects model.  The odds of receiving a downward departure 
are higher for Black offenders than for white offenders according to the fixed effects model.  
Noncitizens have a 16% decreased odds of receiving a downward departure with the 
introduction of legal variables.  All legal variables are significant predictors of being a departure 
recipient with the exception of being charged with a methamphetamine violation.  Cocaine, 
crack, and heroin violations are less likely to receive a downward departure compared to 
marijuana offenses.  Other drugs, however, is related to a 1.28 increase in departures.  Those 
with a criminal history and multiple offenses are less likely to receive a downward departure.  
Surprisingly, an increase in the logged guideline minimum is related to increased odds of 







Though ethnic variation exists across other sentencing decisions, the importance of 
ethnicity and within-citizen variation on downward departure decisions are less straightforward.  
Several of these variables are significant across all fixed effects models, but none of the mixed 
effects models.  The odds of receiving a downward departure are 1.2 times higher for Hispanic in 
the theoretical fixed effects model.  The importance of ethnicity on departure outcomes are 
greater with the introduction of extralegal and legal variables.  According to the full fixed effects 
model, the odds of receiving a departure are 1.3 times higher for Hispanic offenders.  All of these 
effects disappear when ethnicity varies.        
Though ethnicity does not appear to impact opportunities for downward departures, 
country of origin was found to be significant in certain circumstances.  Those from Asia are 1.24 
times more likely to receive a departure compared to Mexican offenders, though this finding 
disappears with the introduction of legal variables.  Offenders of Latin American origins do not 
differ from Mexican offenders in either mixed model.  Being from Africa and other countries are 
associated with increased odds of receiving a departure.  Only Caribbean offenders are less likely 
to receive a downward departure compared to their Mexican counterparts.    
 Like ethnicity, documentation status appears to be related to sentence length in the fixed 
effects models, but not the mixed effects model.  The odds of receiving a downward departure 
are about 12% less for undocumented noncitizens compared to documented noncitizens in the 
fixed effects model.  This relationship is significant at the .001 level.  This finding is not 
substantially altered with the introduction of extralegal and legal variables.  Documentation fails 





Table 10: Models Predicting Downward Departure at Level 1 with Fixed Effects 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Theoretical  Demographic Legal Controls Full Level 1 
Noncitizen .170*** (.016) .937*** (.019) .903*** (.019) .904*** (.020) 
Hispanic 1.160*** (.013) 1.267*** (.015) 1.297*** (.015) 1.303*** (.015) 
Undocumented .882*** (.018) .892*** (.018) .883*** (.018) .872*** (.019) 
Age - 1.003*** (.001) 1.003*** (.001) 1.002*** (.001) 
Asia - 1.086 (.068) 1.008 (.068) 1.043 (.069) 
Africa - 1.260*** (.070) 1.284*** (.071) 1.324*** (.072) 
Caribbean - .752*** (.031) .782*** (.031) .787*** (.031) 
Latin America - .841*** (.031) .845*** (.032) .853*** (.032) 
Other Countries - 1.216*** (.044) 1.090 (.045) 1.105* (.045) 
Black - 1.111*** (.014) 1.124*** (.017) 1.119*** (.017) 
Female - 1.373*** (.014) 1.421*** (.014) 1.418*** (.014) 
No High School - .950*** (.011) .955*** (.012) .962*** (.012) 
College - 1.043** (.014) 1.038* (.014) 1.042** (.014) 
Trial - 1.278*** (.024) 1.132*** (.025) 1.167*** (.025) 
Criminal History - - .799*** (.012) .782*** (.013) 
Guideline Min - - 1.193*** (.006) 1.195*** (.006) 
Multiple Offenses - - .939*** (.014) .952*** (.014) 
Cocaine - - .721*** (.016) .711*** (.017) 
Crack - - .844*** (.020)  .858*** (.020) 
Heroin - - .797*** (.023) .769*** (.023) 
Meth - - .838*** (.018) .820*** (.018) 
Other Drugs - - 1.226*** (.024) 1.172*** (.025) 
2000 - - - .948 (.029) 
2001 - - - 1.158*** (.028) 
2002 - - - 1.128*** (.028) 
2003 - - - .744*** (.030) 
2004 - - - 2.311*** (.026) 
2005 - - - .628*** (.031) 
2006 - - - .725*** (.029) 
2007 - - - .756*** (.029) 
2008 - - - .908*** (.029) 
2009 - - - 1.228*** .027) 
2010 - - - 1.475*** (.027) 
2011 - - - 1.360*** (.027) 
2012 - - - 1.362*** (.027) 
2013 - - - 1.480*** (.028) 
Reliability  .983 .983 .984 .984 
n (Level I) 377861 377861 377861 377861 
χ² 17865.656*** 17993.742*** 18063.847*** 18078.243*** 






Table 11: Models Predicting Downward Departure at Level 1 with Mixed Effects 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Theoretical  Demographic Legal Controls Full Level 1 
Noncitizen .875*** (.035) .856*** (.037) .835*** (.037) .850*** (.033) 
Hispanic .974 (.034) 1.026 (.037) 1.044 (.037) .979 (.031) 
Undocumented .990 (.037) 1.030 (.038) 1.034 (.037) .992 (.031) 
Age - 1.004*** (.0009) 1.004*** (.0009) 1.001 (.001) 
Asia - 1.236* (.096) 1.182 (.101) 1.020 (.073) 
Africa - 1.298*** (.074) 1.272** (.076) .906 (.121) 
Caribbean - .861*** (.039) .893** (.039) .906* (.039) 
Latin America - .958 (.038) .954 (.039) .967 (.039) 
Other Countries - 1.258*** (.049) 1.145** (.050) 1.153** (.050) 
Black - 1.029 (.031) 1.028 (.029) .985 (.028) 
Female - 1.353*** (.025) 1.416*** (.024) 1.418*** (.025) 
No High School - .958* (.017) .963* (.017) .983 (.016) 
College - 1.049*** (.014) 1.047*** (.014) 1.065*** (.015) 
Trial - 1.280*** (.024) 1.113*** (.025) 1.159*** (.026) 
Criminal History - - .797*** (.013) .760*** (.013) 
Guideline Min - - 1.212*** (.006) 1.235*** (.006) 
Multiple Offenses - - .939*** (.014) .939*** (.014) 
Cocaine - - .759*** (.017) .776*** (.018) 
Crack - - .908*** (.029) .961 (.028) 
Heroin - - .841*** (.024) .846*** (.024) 
Meth - - .951 (.041) .974 (.040) 
Other Drugs - - 1.283*** (.043) 1.244*** (.042) 
2000 - - - .460*** (.101) 
2001 - - - .522*** (101) 
2002 - - - .498*** (.100) 
2003 - - - .345*** (.101) 
2004 - - - 2.569*** (.128) 
2005 - - - .587*** (.031) 
2006 - - - .688*** (.030) 
2007 - - - .721*** (.030) 
2008 - - - .879*** (.029) 
2009 - - - 1.218*** (.028) 
2010 - - - 1.501*** (.027) 
2011 - - - 1.429*** (.027) 
2012 - - - 1.485*** (.027) 
2013 - - - 1.536*** (.028) 
Reliability  .968 .966 .952 .957 
n (Level I) 377861 377861 377861 377861 
χ² 12543.813*** 9041.496*** 4662.538*** 4019.573*** 







The results of this study support a great deal of the previous research examining 
sentencing disparities between citizens and noncitizens. Like the findings of Albonetti (1997), 
Demuth (2002), Light (2014), and Wolfe and colleagues (2011), noncitizens are more likely to 
receive a prison sentence.  As the first study to examine the effects of citizenship status on 
receiving prison alternatives for eligible offenders, this study finds that sentencing inequality is 
exacerbated within this dependent variable associated with higher discretion.  Contrary to 
Demuth (2002), Katzenelson and colleagues (1996), and Wu and DeLone (2012), the results of 
this study find that noncitizens receive longer sentences once legal variables are introduced to the 
model, complementing the findings of Albonetti (1997).  Like Cano and Spohn (2012) this study 
found that noncitizens are less likely to receive a downward departure.  In sum, noncitizens are 
disadvantaged across all four courtroom decision-making variables. 
  Furthermore, the inclusion of legal variables fails to negate these relationships, 
demonstrating that differential offending patterns do not explain sentencing disparities between 
citizens and noncitizens.  The finding that noncitizens are disproportionately incarcerated even 
when eligible for prison alternatives and are less likely to receive a downward departure suggests 
that discretion does, in fact, play a key role in sentencing inequality.   
Though legal variables do not explain the citizenship disparity, these variables are 
frequently significantly related to sentencing severity.  As anticipated by Focal Concerns, most 
courtroom related variables are significantly related to sentencing outcomes including the 
guideline minimum, multiple offenses, going to trial, and the type of drug offense.  Only a few of 
the drug violations did not differ significantly compared to the reference category.  Even when 




committed multiple offenses frequently receive more severe sentencing outcomes.  Offenders 
who emulate aggressive and/or recidivist propensities are likely to be identified as dangerous, 
and therefore receive more severe penalties. 
Even when controlling for legal variables, several theoretical extralegal predictors remain 
significant.  Legal variables fail to alleviate the importance of citizenship status, ethnicity and 
documentation status.  Undocumented noncitizens are more likely to receive a prison sentence 
above and beyond citizenship status.  They also receive longer sentences and are less likely to 
receive a departure.  This punitiveness toward undocumented noncitizens is likely a product of 
the double stigmatization of this subgroup (Hartley and Armendariz 2011).  The double 
stigmatization of undocumented noncitizens is particularly targeted toward those of Mexican 
descent.  Many of the other country origins demonstrate lower odds of incarceration, greater 
odds of nonprison alternatives, shorter sentences, and increased odds of receiving a downward 
departure compared to Mexican offenders.  Such a penalty is illustrative of the heightened 
“blame” placed on “illegal Mexican immigrants.”  Therefore, the increased risk of incarceration 
for this subgroup may be demonstrative of Steffensmeier’s blameworthiness postulate.   
 In the process of running the case level analyses, it became clear than unique 
discrepancies exist across place.  Several of the variables vary significantly according to the χ² 
values.  In fact, while the effects of the case level theoretical variables vary across district for 
several of the dependent variables, all four of these measures demonstrate random effects for 
sentence length and downward departures.  Furthermore, permitting these variables to vary 
somewhat alters the findings from the fixed effects models demonstrating that traditional 




this shortcoming, Chapter 7 examines district level impacts while Chapter 8 acknowledges 








 While sentencing disparities between U.S. citizens and noncitizens persist at the 
aggregate level, these disparities often vary across place.  The omission of level 2 predictors 
neglects to address the complexities of inter-district variations.  This chapter examines whether 
and to what extent disparities between citizens and noncitizens as well as disparities across 
ethnicity and country of origin vary across place.  Several models are examined.  First, the 
broader impacts of place on sentencing outcomes are examined for each of the dependent 
variables (incarceration, prison alternative, sentence length, and downward departure).  Level 1 
mixed effects are added in Model 2 with random effects bolded.  Cross level interactions are 
examined in Model 3.  The final model consists of only significant predictors in order to 
maximize degrees of freedom and statistical power. 
 
INCARCERATION DECISIONS 
At first glance, very few district level variables are related to incarceration outcomes 
when controlling for spatial autocorrelation (see Table 12).  Only the average guideline 
minimum and no high school mean are statistically significant in the first model.  None of the 
remaining variables, including the means for noncitizens, Hispanic populations, Mexican 
populations, undocumented noncitizens, trials, multiple offenses, cocaine and marijuana cases, 
white populations, and age, are statistically significantly related to incarceration decisions.  The 




Once individual level predictors are included, the guideline mean and the population 
without a high school degree are no longer statistically significant.  Only the measure for 
marijuana caseloads is significant, although the percent Hispanic approaches significance.  
Districts with larger marijuana caseloads demonstrate an increased odds of incarceration while 
Hispanic offender populations are inversely related to incarceration odds.  No other demographic 
predictors, including the percentage of noncitizens, Mexico, undocumented, white, and no high 
school degree nor the age mean were significant.  Likewise, of court related predictors, the 
means for trial, guideline minimum, multiple offenses, and cocaine offenses failed to 
significantly impact incarceration decisions.   
With the introduction of level 1 variables in Model 2, all case level predictors were found 
to be statistically significant at the .001 level except for African offender origins which failed to 
achieve significance.  Noncitizens, Hispanic, Undocumented, Black, those without a high school 
degree, cases that go to trial, those with a criminal history, higher guideline minimums, and 
multiple offenses were related to an increase in the odds of incarceration.  Likewise, cocaine, 
crack, heroin, and methamphetamines were affiliated with higher odds of incarceration compared 
to marijuana offenses.  Those from Asia, the Caribbean, Latin America, and other countries 
demonstrate lower odds of incarceration compared to those from Mexico.  Women, those with 
college degrees, and those who commit other drug violations are less likely to receive a prison 
sentence compared to men, those with high school degrees and those who commit marijuana 







Once the effects of district level variables were included in the model for noncitizens, 
unique cross-level interactions emerge.  Although Mexican populations do not impact 
incarceration odds at the broader level, this variable is significant for noncitizen odds of 
incarceration.  Districts with greater percentages of Hispanic offenders have a decreased odds of 
incarceration overall, but this district variable specifically increases these odds for noncitizens.  
This finding is even greater for districts with large numbers of undocumented noncitizens.  The 
odds of incarceration for noncitizens soar with the introduction of district level undocumented 
population percentages.  Due to the extremity of this finding, it is likely that is value is inflated 
due to severe variations in undocumented populations across districts (see Menard 2002)  While 
the marijuana caseload demonstrates a significant impact overall on incarceration odds, this 
variable is also related to an increase in incarceration odds specifically for noncitizens.  
Inversely, districts with larger white offender populations are related to a decrease in 
incarceration odds.  The populations of noncitizens, trial caseloads, guideline minimums, 
multiple offense averages, cocaine, age, and no high school degrees do not significantly impact 
incarceration odds for noncitizens.  The introduction of cross-level interactions does not 
substantially alter the level 1 findings with the exception of African origins which become 
statistically significantly related to a decreased odds of incarceration in the final model. 
The exclusion of nonsignificant variables does not alter the findings substantially.  Once 
again, marijuana caseloads increase overall incarceration odds as well as noncitizen incarceration 
odds.  Increases in the percent of Hispanic offenders per district decrease incarceration odds 
overall and for noncitizens.  Undocumented populations greatly increase incarceration odds for 




noncitizens.  Each of these relationships demonstrate an increase in statistical significance once 





Table 12: Models Predicting Incarceration at Level 2 with Spatial Weighting 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 L2 Only Full Interactions Final Model 
NONCIT x̅ 3.158 (1.77) 6.206 (1.287) 10.240† (1.234) - 
HISPANIC x̅ .866 (.847) .286† (.663) .214* (.639) .269* (.635) 
MEXICO x̅ 1.506 (1.498) .675 (1.169) .866 (1.119) 1.251 (.873) 
UNDOC x̅ .289 (3.561) .561 (2.624) .243 (2.514) 5.874 (1.646) 
TRIAL x̅ 25.402 (4.391) 259.945 (3.985) 405.988 (3.898) - 
GUIDE MIN x̅ 1.005** (.002) 1.001 (.002) 1.001 (.002) - 
MULTIPLE x̅ 1.154 (.603) .895 (.528) .854 (.510) - 
COCAINE x̅ .772 (3.561) .346 (.870) .395 (.845) - 
MARIJ x̅ .667 (.771) 5.446** (.636) 5.013* (.613) 4.488** (.515) 
WHITE x̅ 3.189 (.737) 2.527 (.645) 2.156 (.627) 1.929 (.490) 
AGE x̅ .893 (.075) .984 (.065)  .976 (.063) - 
NO HS x̅ 43.661* (1.596) 1.894 (1.372) 2.124 (.1323) - 
Noncitizen - 6.667*** (.145) 21.954 (3.005) 7.703*** (.303) 
NONCIT x̅ - - 2.343 (1.248) - 
HISPANIC x̅ - - .149* (.782) .070*** (.499) 
MEXICO x̅ - - .014** (1.338) .007*** (.684) 
UNDOC x̅ - - 304.518* (2.597) 69053.551*** (1.016) 
TRIAL x̅ - - 38.059 (5.927) - 
GUIDE MIN x̅ - - 1.001 (.002) - 
MULTIPLE x̅ - - 1.316 (.733) - 
COCAINE x̅ - - .421 (1.191) - 
MARIJ x̅ - - 6.959* (.812) 16.202*** (.398) 
WHITE x̅ - - .125* (.888) .182*** (.512) 
AGE x̅ - - .968 (.091) - 
NO HS x̅ - - 1.853 (1.811) - 
Hispanic - 1.483*** (.032) 1.488*** (.032) 1.497*** (.033) 
Undocumented - 2.651*** (.090) 2.626*** (.090) 2.500*** (.089) 
Age - .991*** (.002) .991*** (.002) .991*** (.002) 
Asia - .241*** (.196)  .238*** (.200) .244*** (.195) 
Africa - .620 (.296) .590 (.300) .551* (.287) 
Caribbean - .395*** (.186) .327*** (.209) .321*** (.195) 
Latin America - .348*** (.176) .328*** (.181) .356*** (.179) 
Other Countries - .402*** (.162) .395*** (.166) .416*** (.160) 
Black - 1.567*** (.033) 1.573*** (.033) 1.571*** (.033) 
Female - .380*** (.037) .382*** (.038) .384*** (.037) 
No High School - 1.353*** (.026) 1.354*** (.026) 1.358*** (.026) 
College - .742*** (.027) .742*** (.027) .743*** (.027) 
Trial - 3.008*** (.125) 3.006*** (.125) 2.992*** (.124) 
Criminal History - 1.743*** (.025) 1.744*** (.025) 1.734*** (.025) 
Guideline Min - 3.705*** (.010) 3.705*** (.010) 3.701*** (.010) 
Multiple Offenses - 1.619*** (.055) 1.567*** (.053) 1.588*** (.053) 
Cocaine - 1.246*** (.066) 1.256*** (.067)  1.262*** (.065) 
Crack - 1.500*** (.067) 1.499*** (.068)  1.548*** (.068) 
Heroin - 1.544*** (.078) 1.540*** (.078)  1.502*** (.079) 
Meth - 1.639*** (.068) 1.641*** (.068)  1.663*** (.067) 
Other Drugs - .705*** (.057) .708*** (.056)  .698*** (.057) 
2000 - .972 (.084) .951 (.083) .957 (.082) 
2001 - .915 (.076) .914 (.076) .902 (.076) 
2002 - 1.073 (.087) 1.055 (.088) 1.054 (.088) 
2003 - 1.191 (.097) 1.171 (.096) 1.175 (.095) 
2004 - 1.434*** (.104)  1.402*** (.103)  1.396** (.102) 




Table 12. (continued) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 L2 Only Full Noncitizen Effects Final Model 
2005 - 1.309** (.0822) 1.298** (.083) 1.297** (.082) 
2006 - 1.436*** (.948)  1.441*** (.096)  1.431*** (.094) 
2007 - 1.454*** (.098)  1.430*** (.099)  1.444*** (.098) 
2008 - 1.136 (.105) 1.114 (.106) 1.123 (.103) 
2009 - 1.234 (.113) 1.212 (.113) 1.225 (.111) 
2010 - 1.156 (.105 1.146 (.105) 1.134 (.104) 
2011 - 1.089 (.106) 1.083 (.105) 1.067 (.104) 
2012 - 1.231 (.111) 1.223 (.112) 1.209 (.110) 
2013 - 1.126 (.117) 1.116 (.118) 1.113 (.115) 
Reliability  .964 .729 .720 .813 
n (Level I)  335,308 335,308 335,308 335,308 
n (Level II) 89 89 89 89 
R² (Level II) .20 .18 .25 .09 
χ² 3835.000*** 619.653*** 592.927*** 1098.177*** 






 The importance of controlling for spatial autocorrelation is particularly pronounced when 
comparing these findings to those without the weight matrix.  The district level predictors appear 
greatly exaggerated without controlling for geographic proximity (see Table 13).  Initially both 
analyses appear similar.  When only examining level 2 predictors, the sentencing guideline mean 
is the only significant predictor.  Like the weighted analysis, this variable is no longer significant 
across any of the other modes.  The percent of offenders without a high school degree is also not 
significant in any of the unweighted models.   
 Once case level predictors are included in the analysis, unique distinctions begin to 
emerge.  The district level predictors demonstrate much greater impacts on incarceration odds.  
For instance, while the percent of noncitizens increase incarceration odds by six times in the 
weighted Model 2, this increase reaches 37 for the unweighted model.  Several of the district 
level predictors that are not significant in the weighted models appear statistically significant in 
the unweighted final model including the Hispanic, trial, and cocaine averages.  That said, the 
values for main effects of trial and the cross-level interaction of documentation status on case 
level noncitizen outcomes appear highly inflated which is likely a product of severe variations in 
cases across districts (see Menard 2002).  District level findings for the percent of noncitizen 
offenders and offender populations without high school degrees suggest cross-level interaction 





Table 13: Models Predicting Incarceration at Level 2 without Spatial Weighting 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 L2 Only Full Interactions Final Model 
NONCIT x̅ 7.095 (1.801) 36.706** (1.200) 32.495** (1.130) 29.398** (1.059) 
HISPANIC x̅ .883 (.907) .158** (.664) .130** (.638) .129*** (.614) 
MEXICO x̅ 2.830 (1.472) .432 (1.067) .248 (1.022) .474 (.955) 
UNDOC x̅ .036 (3.397) .211 (2.293) .459 (2.176) .209 (2.090) 
TRIAL x̅ 44.938 (4.388) 1003.309† (3.733) 1205.284† (3.747) 1755.732* (2.898) 
GUIDE MIN x̅ 1.005** (.002) 1.001 (.001) 1.001 (.001) - 
MULTIPLE x̅ 1.383 (.597) .922 (.490) 1.021.488) - 
COCAINE x̅ .578 (.974) .190* (.795) .176* (.780) .229† (.753) 
MARIJ x̅ .537 (.749) 4.117* (.574) 5.046** (.557) 4.530 (.483)** 
WHITE x̅ 1.619 (.687) 1.836 (.564) 1.313 (.554) 1.109 (.511) 
AGE x̅ .915 (.076) .939 (.061) .942 (.060) - 
NO HS x̅ 13.030 (1.567) 1.555 (1.281) 2.215 (1.259) 2.865 (1.142) 
Noncitizen - 6.096*** (.128) 3.111 (3.085) 3.806 (.682) 
NONCIT x̅ - - .238 (1.169) .192† (.899) 
HISPANIC x̅ - - .182* (.800) .228* (.710) 
MEXICO x̅ - - .006*** (1.274) .010*** (.944) 
UNDOC x̅ - - 8292.333*** (2.181) 4335.328*** (1.874) 
TRIAL x̅ - - 10.794 (6.141) - 
GUIDE MIN x̅ - - .999 (.002) - 
MULTIPLE x̅ - - 2.093 (.764) - 
COCAINE x̅ - - .642 (1.154) - 
MARIJ x̅ - - 4.143† (.752) 3.109* (.547) 
WHITE x̅ - - .162* (.813) .202* (.675) 
AGE x̅ - - 1.004 (.087) - 
NO HS x̅ - - 14.479 (1.853) 14.990† (1.565) 
Hispanic - 1.461*** (.033)  1.462*** (.033) 1.462*** (.033)  
Undocumented - 3.110*** (.149)  3.004*** (.145) 2.987*** (.143)  
Age - .991*** (.002) .991*** (.002) .990*** (.002) 
Asia - .280*** (.190)  .271*** (.200)  .271*** (.199)  
Africa - .627 (.284) .589 (.293) .585 (.292) 
Caribbean - .363*** (.148)  .325*** (.168)  .325*** (.166)  
Latin America - .445*** (.170)  .404*** (.184)  .404*** (.183)  
Other Countries - .419*** (.152)  .408*** (.165)  .405*** (.163)  
Black - 1.464*** (.049)  1.471*** (.048)  1.470*** (.048)  
Female - .380*** (.037)  .380*** (.038) .380*** (.038) 
No High School - 1.347*** (.026)  1.347*** (.026)  1.347*** (.026)  
College - .743*** (.027)  .743*** (.027)  .743*** (.027)  
Trial - 3.089*** (.126)  3.108*** (.126) 3.104*** (.126)  
Criminal History - 1.810*** (.033)  1.809*** (.035) 1.810*** (.034) 
Guideline Min - 3.986*** (.030)  3.990*** (.030)  3.986*** (.030)  
Multiple Offenses - 1.598*** (.052)  1.593*** (.052)  1.587*** (.052)  
Cocaine - 1.183* (.066)  1.181* (.066)  1.180* (.066) 
Crack - 1.483*** (.071)  1.487*** (.071)  1.484*** (.071) 
Heroin - 1.487*** (.082)  1.484*** (.082)  1.488*** (.082)  
Meth - 1.536*** (.071)  1.547*** (.071)  1.545*** (.071)  
Other Drugs - .683*** (.062)  .680*** (.061)  .679*** (.061)  
2000 - .932 (.084) .933 (.084) .937 (.084) 
2001 - .891 (.077) .887 (.077) .888 (.077) 
2002 - 1.031 (.088) 1.030 (.089) 1.029 (.089) 
2003 - 1.125 (.092) 1.124 (.94) 1.131 (.094) 





Table 13. (continued) 
     
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 L2 Only Full Interactions Final Model 
2005 - 1.262** (.086) 1.258* (.882) 1.265** (.088) 
2006 - 1.407*** (.098)  1.401*** (.097) 1.409*** (.097) 
2007 - 1.415*** (.097)  1.421*** (.097) 1.426*** (.098) 
2008 - 1.095 (.107) 1.083 (.106) 1.083 (.106) 
2009 - 1.192 (.114) 1.187 (.115) 1.188 (.115) 
2010 - 1.106 (.108) 1.103 (.109) 1.108 (.109) 
2011 - 1.044 (.106) 1.042 (.107) 1.046 (.107) 
2012 - 1.174 (.112) 1.167 (.112) 1.718 (.112) 
2013 - 1.071 (.115) 1.063 (.116) 1.067 (.115) 
Reliability  .964 .716 .718 .719 
n (Level I)  335,308 335,308 335,308 335,308 
n (Level II) 89 89 89 89 
R² (Level II) .32 .04 .04 .07 
χ² 3961.778*** 833.660*** 845.325*** 821.540*** 





Hypothesis 4A & 4B 
The assumption that demographics serving as proxies for citizenship status, or lack 
thereof, will disproportionately affect sentencing disparities is partially supported.  Of district 
variables, the district mean for noncitizen offenders does not significantly impact incarceration 
odds.  However, ethnicity, country of origin, and documentation mean are statistically significant 
predictors of noncitizen incarceration outcomes.  While Hispanic, Mexican, and undocumented 
offender populations are frequently related to incarceration outcomes, this relationship is not 
always revealed in the anticipated direction.  Of ethnicity proxies, only undocumented 
populations increase incarceration odds for noncitizens.  Mexican and Hispanic offender 
populations are actually related to reduced odds of incarceration.  This may be indicative of a 
nonlinear function for these populations as suggested by Feldmeyer and Ulmer (2011).  Once 
again, this relationship is mediated by geographical proximity.  Once spatially weighted, the 
strength of the relations declines, though remains statistically significant.   
 
PRISON ALTERNATIVES 
Greater district level variation is apparent for prison alternatives than for the overall 
incarceration outcome variable.  This finding is congruent with expectations.  The decision to 
incarcerate an offender when nonincarceration alternatives are available is a better measure of 
discretion than simple incarceration outcomes.   
Districts with a greater number of marijuana cases demonstrate lower odds for prison 
alternatives (see Table 14).  An increase in the guideline mean is related to a slight decrease in 
prison alternatives.  Districts with a greater number of offenders with no high school degree 




district level predictors (trial mean and multiple offenses mean) are not related to the odds of 
receiving a prison alternative.  Increases in white offender populations are related to a decrease 
in prison alternative odds.  No other demographic predictors, including noncitizen, Hispanic, 
Mexico, undocumented, cocaine, and age are related to nonincarceration outcomes in the Model 
1 (see Table 15).   
The impact of district level variables is even greater with the introduction of level 1 
predictors.  The marijuana caseload continues to be affiliated with a decreased odds of prison 
alternatives.  Cocaine, which was nonsignificant, is now approaching statistical significance.  
The guideline minimum continues to be inversely related to prison alternatives.  Multiple 
offenses continue to fall short of statistical significance.  Noncitizen means are now statistically 
related to decreased odds of receiving a prison alternative.  An increase in the percent of 
Hispanic offenders is related to increased odds of nonincarceration options.  An increase in white 
offenders are related to decreased odds of incarceration alternatives at a level approaching 
significance.  Mexican populations, undocumented populations, trial caseloads, age averages, 
and the percent of offenders without a high school fail to achieve significance. 
While most level 1 variables were found to be significant predictors of prison alternatives 
prior to the inclusion of level 2 variables (see Table 4), substantially fewer level 1 variables are 
related to the odds of receiving a prison alternative.  Noncitizens, Hispanic offenders, Black 
offenders, those without a high school degree, those with a criminal history, higher guideline 
minimum, multiple offenses, and those who commit crack, heroin, and methamphetamine 
violations have significantly lower odds of receiving a prison alternative.  Those from the Latin 
America, women, those with college degrees, and offenders who commit other drug violations 




Caribbean, and other country origins, going to trial, and cocaine violations are not related to 
prison alternatives.   
 
Hypothesis 2A 
Although numerous district level predictors are related to the odds of receiving a prison 
alternative, some of these appear to specifically impact noncitizens.  For instance, the Mexican 
origin mean is significantly related to an increased odds of prison alternatives for noncitizens.  
Increases in white offenders are related to increased odds of prison alternatives for noncitizens.  
The district level age mean is related to an increase in prison alternatives for noncitizens.  This is 
one of the few instances in which the mean age of a district significantly predicts one of the four 
outcome variables.  Greater marijuana caseloads are related to decreased odds of prison 
alternatives for noncitizens.   
Several of these level 2 variables are also significance beyond interaction effects, 
demonstrating unique main effects on sentencing severity.  Higher populations of noncitizen are 
related to reduced odds of receiving a prison alternative, though no interactions are discernable.  
Main effects can also be found for populations of offenders of Mexican descent at a level 
approaching significance.  Greater numbers of Mexican and Hispanic offenders are related to 
increased odds of receiving prison alternatives.  Undocumented, trial, multiple, white, age, and 
no high school means do not demonstrate any main effects.  Of court related level 2 predictors, 
guideline minimums continue to reduce prison alternatives; however, trial caseloads and multiple 
offense means are not statistically significant.  Cocaine caseloads increase the odds of prison 
alternatives while marijuana caseloads decrease these odds.  The only level 1 change worth 




noncitizen prison alternative outcomes are introduced, undocumented offenders demonstrate a 
statistically significant decrease in these odds, but Latin American offenders no longer differ 
from those of Mexican descent. 
Once nonsignificant variables are removed from the model, a few minor changes become 
discernable.  The Hispanic district mean is no longer significant in Model 4.  The Mexican mean, 
which had previously approached significance, becomes statistically related to an increase in 
prison alternatives odds.  Likewise, the guideline minimum mean, which previously approached 
significance, is related to a significant decrease in prison alternatives.  All other district level 





Table 14: Models Predicting Prison Alternatives at Level 2 with Spatial Weighting 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 L2 Only Full Interactions Final Model 
NONCIT x̅ .155 (1.175) .055*** (.805) .062*** (.789) .219** (.507) 
HISPANIC x̅ 1.997 (.581) 2.262* (.404) 2.416* (.412) 2.070 (.374) 
MEXICO x̅ 3.031 (1.028) 3.001 (.719) 3.778† (.721) 5.107** (.536) 
UNDOCUME x̅ 2.145 (2.373) 19.179 (1.637) 13.933 (1.607) - 
TRIAL x̅ .080 (3.167) .031 (2.435) .031 (2.635) - 
GUIDE MIN x̅ .996** (.001) .998* (.001) .998† (.001) .997*** (.001) 
MULTIPLE x̅ 1.075 (.432) 1.362 (.330) 1.507 (.352) - 
COCAINE x̅ 2.387 (.714) 2.852† (.541) 3.731* (.568) 2.854* (.527) 
MARIJ x̅ .151*** (.531) .247*** (.390) .212*** (.396) .152*** (.350) 
WHITE x̅ .341* (.520) .485† (.394) .696 (.426) .634 (.371) 
AGE x̅ 1.073 (.054) 1.012 (.041) 1.043 (.043) 1.042 (.039) 
NO HS x̅ .038** (1.124) .467 (.837) .369 (.870) - 
Noncitizen - .363*** (.094) .0002** (2.985) .00003*** (2.343) 
NONCIT x̅ - - .577 (1.030) - 
HISPANIC x̅ - - 2.052 (.689) - 
MEXICO x̅ - - 39.924** (1.277) 3.914* (.609) 
UNDOCUME x̅ - - .096 (2.054) - 
TRIAL x̅ - - .299 (5.811) - 
GUIDE MIN x̅ - - 1.003 (.002) - 
MULTIPLE x̅ - - 1.581 (.786) - 
COCAINE x̅ - - 5.490 (1.155) - 
MARIJ x̅ - - .107** (.784) .110*** (.542) 
WHITE x̅ - - 7.895* (.898) 5.565*** (.458) 
AGE x̅ - - 1.241* (.091) 1.250*** (.067) 
NO HS x̅ - - .456 (1.680) - 
Hispanic - .763*** (.060) .721*** (.061) .717*** (.061) 
Undocumented - .922 (.137) .596*** (.127) .614*** (.124) 
Age - .998 (.002) .999 (.002) .999 (.002) 
Asia - 1.271 (.629) .699 (.285) .658 (.280) 
Africa - 2.412 (.162) 1.799 (.662) 1.581 (.638) 
Caribbean - 1.343 (.190) .819 (.217) .753 (.203) 
Latin America - 1.819** (.188) 1.279 (.222) 1.156 (.214) 
Other Countries - 1.289 (.188) .778 (.214) .735 (.206) 
Black - .685*** (.055) .686*** (.056) .683*** (.055) 
Female - 1.557*** (.047) 1.569*** (.047) 1.575*** (.047) 
No High School - .883** (.044) .880** (.044) .881** (.044) 
College - 1.192*** (.049) 1.199*** (.049) 1.197*** (.049) 
Trial - 1.085 (.129) 1.063 (.128) 1.055 (.128) 
Criminal History - .576*** (.063) .596*** (.062) .594*** (.062) 
Guideline Min - .783*** (.020) .785*** (.021) .786*** (.020) 
Multiple Offenses - .875* (.062) .878* (.062) .886* (.061) 
Cocaine - .915 (.083) .890 (.082) .888 (.083) 
Crack - .722*** (.098) .727** (.098) .723*** (.098) 
Heroin - .712** (.112) .718** (.114) .714** (.113) 
Meth - .793*** (.100) .691*** (.097) .691*** (.096) 
Other Drugs - 1.249* (.090) 1.254* (.090) 1.252* (.090) 
2000 - 1.080 (.129) 1.078 (.129) 1.087 (.129) 
2001 - .937 (.125) .935 (.126) .938 (.126) 
2002 - 1.036 (.123) 1.028 (.124) 1.036 (.123) 
2003 - .687*** (.114)  .689*** (.115)  .689*** (.114)  
2004 - .696** (.120) .688** (.120) .692** (.120) 




Table 14. (continued) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 L2 Only Full Interactions Final Model 
2006 - .651*** (.123)  .638*** (.124)  .642*** (.123)  
2007 - .757* (.126) .742* (.126) .747* (.126) 
2008 - .800 (.123) .789 (.123) .797 (.123) 
2009 - .767* (.116) 739** (.117) .741* (.116) 
2010 - .659*** (.126)  .665*** (.127)  .667*** (.127)  
2011 - .699** (.124) .684** (.124) .689** (.124) 
2012 - .575*** (.122)  .569*** (.122)  .572*** (.122)  
2013 - .537*** (.128)  .525*** (.129) .532*** (.128)  
Reliability  .782 .538 .505 .501 
n (Level I)  15,823 15,823 15,823 15,823 
n (Level II) 89 89 89 89 
R² (Level II) .35 .62 .68 .69 
χ² 485.081*** 42.331*** 42.137*** 47.970*** 






 These district level effects on incarceration alternatives are uniquely different when 
compared to the unweighted models (see Table 15).  Without controlling for spatial 
autocorrelation, district level predictors appear over-exaggerated for the main effects while 
concealing several level 2 interactions.  In the final unweighted model, Hispanic, and 
undocumented population means are significantly related to increased odds of receiving a prison 
alternative, but are not significantly in the final weighted model.  Furthermore, the case level 
measure of citizenship status is not significant when spatial autocorrelation is not included.  
Finally age interaction effects, which are prominent in the weighted model, disappear in the 





Table 15: Models Predicting Prison Alternatives at Level 2 without Spatial Weighting 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 L2 Only Full Interactions Final Model 
NONCIT x̅ .108† (1.168) .216** (.561) .162** (.569) .195*** (.492) 
HISPANIC x̅ .536 (.612) 1.873† (.335) 1.930† (.356) 1.986* (.328) 
MEXICO x̅ 2.652 (.991) 3.211* (.575) 3.943* (.606) - 
UNDOCUME x̅ 7.404 (2.217) 5.303 (1.087) 6.122 (1.114) 15.890*** (.800) 
TRIAL x̅ .086 (3.105) .013* (2.133) .004* (2.462) .029* (1.763) 
GUIDE MIN x̅ .997** (.001) .999 (.0001) .999 (.001) - 
MULTIPLE x̅ .039 (.418) 1.644† (.282) 1.758† (.316) - 
COCAINE x̅ 3.539† (.675) 2.320† (.439) 2.465† (.484) - 
MARIJ x̅ .181*** (.506) .248*** (.320) .208*** (.344) .272*** (.222) 
WHITE x̅ .536 (.474) .722 (.322) .899 (.362) .844 (.268) 
AGE x̅ 1.041 (.054) .984 (.033) 1.001 (.037) - 
NO HS x̅ .066* (1.089) .880 (.687) .885 (.773)  - 
Noncitizen - .646** (.160) .004 (3.800) .651 (.273) 
NONCIT x̅ - - .200 (1.635) - 
HISPANIC x̅ - - 1.244 (.999) - 
MEXICO x̅ - - 13.544 (1.66) - 
UNDOCUME x̅ - - .620 (3.025) - 
TRIAL x̅ - - .002 (6.923) - 
GUIDE MIN x̅ - - 1.003 (.002) - 
MULTIPLE x̅ - - 1.948 (.910) - 
COCAINE x̅ - - 1.925 (1.329) - 
MARIJ x̅ - - .148* (.917) .117*** (.417) 
WHITE x̅ - - 5.244† (.969) 4.385* (.584) 
AGE x̅ - - 1.144 (.106) - 
NO HS x̅ - - .936 (2.241) - 
Hispanic - .759*** (.063)  .753*** (.063) .746*** (.062) 
Undocumented - .670** (.133) .678** (.129) .673** (.130) 
Age - .999 (.002) .999 (.002) .999 (.002) 
Asia - .724 (.278) .716 (.285) .671 (.278) 
Africa - .602 (.365) .600 (.368) .539 (.362) 
Caribbean - .843 (.202) .900 (.221) .773 (.200) 
Latin America - 1.290 (.209) 1.380 (.223) 1.200 (.210) 
Other Countries - .870 (.211) .898 (.220) .799 (.205) 
Black - .740*** (.070)  .731*** (.069) .730*** (.069) 
Female - 1.529*** (.047)  1.531*** (.047) 1.528*** (.047) 
No High School - .878** (.044) .877** (.044) .877**(.044) 
College - 1.194*** (.049)  1.196*** (.050) 1.194*** (.049) 
Trial - 1.061 (.129) 1.060 (.129) 1.054 (.129) 
Criminal History - .597 *** (.047)  .595*** (.047) .595*** (.047) 
Guideline Min - .798*** (.021) .798*** (.021) .798*** (.021) 
Multiple Offenses - .900 (.062) .900 (.062) .909 (.061) 
Cocaine - .940 (.075) .932 (.075) .940 (.074) 
Crack - .796** (.078) .799** (.078) .798** (.078) 
Heroin - .764* (.116) .753* (.119) .764* (.116) 
Meth - .741** (.096) .737** (.095) .729*** (.094) 
Other Drugs - 1.279** (.085) 1.297** (.085) 1.292** (.086) 
2000 - 1.108 (.130) 1.103 (.130) 1.105 (.130) 
2001 - .924 (.125) .916 (.126) .921 (.126) 
2002 - 1.094 (.124) 1.092 (.124) 1.099 (.124) 
2003 - .871 (.130) .854 (.131) .860 (.131) 
2004 - .699** (.120) .696** (.120) .699** (.120) 




Table 15. (continued) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 L2 Only Full Interactions Final Model 
2006 - .643*** (.124)  .636*** (.124) .639*** (.124) 
2007 - .685* (.152) .695* (.153) .698* (.153) 
2008 - .871 (.149) .876 (.149) .866 (.149) 
2009 - .593*** (.136)  .593*** (.137) .593*** (.137) 
2010 - .672** (.128) .669** (.128) .671** (.128) 
2011 - .658** (.140) .654** (.140) .655** (.139) 
2012 - .565*** (.123)  .557*** (.123) .558*** (.123) 
2013 - .542*** (.129) .534*** (.129) .539*** (.129) 
Reliability  .778 .693 .679 .674 
n (Level I)  15,823 15,823 15,823 15,823 
n (Level II) 89 89 89 89 
R² (Level II) .47 .07 .04 .16 
χ² 487.817*** 295.742*** 261.540*** 262.510*** 





Hypothesis 4A & 4B 
 Compared to incarceration decisions, noncitizen proxies are less frequently related to 
sentencing disparities for prison alternatives.  District level Hispanic and undocumented 
population means are not significant predictors of this sentencing outcome.  Neither main effects 
nor interaction effects are observed for ethnicity or documentation status.  Of noncitizen proxies, 
only the Mexican country of origin mean is a significant predictor of prison alternatives.  
Increases in this population do not exhibit the hypothesized decrease in leniency.  Instead, 
greater Mexican populations are related to increases the odds of receiving a departure broads as 
well as specifically for noncitizens.  According to the unweighted model, Mexican population 
means are not related to prison alternatives.  Instead, these models suggest that Hispanic and 
undocumented means are better predictors of prison alternatives, with no cross-level interaction 
effects among noncitizen proxies.  This finding once again demonstrates the importance of 
controlling for geographic proximity.   
 
SENTENCE LENGTH 
Both court related and demographic variables appear to influence sentence length 
outcomes.  Greater numbers of noncitizen offenders, white offenders, and larger marijuana 
caseloads are related to shorter sentence lengths prior to the addition of level 1 variables; though 
noncitizen and white means approach significance (see Table 16).  Greater trial caseloads and 
higher guideline minimum means are also related to longer sentence lengths.  Hispanic, 
documentation, multiple offense means, cocaine caseloads, white populations, and no high 




The inclusion of level 1 predictors reduces the impact of several of the district level 
variables.  Trial caseloads, which were significant at the .05 level of significance, is reduced to a 
level approaching significance.  Higher trial caseloads are related to longer sentences at a level 
approaching significance.  The marijuana caseload is no longer statistically significantly related 
to sentence length.  In fact, this is one of the few series of analysis in which the level 2 measures 
for cocaine and marijuana caseloads fail to achieve statistical significance.  The guideline 
minimum mean, which was significant at the .001 level, is now significant at the .05 level.  
Noncitizen and documentation means are not significant.  Ethnicity is significantly related to 
sentence length with increases in Hispanic and white offender means decreasing sentence length.  
The multiple offenses mean is not related to sentence length.  Education and age also fail to 
achieve significance at the district level.   
While nearly all of the level 1 legal variables are statistically significant with the 
additional of district level variables, several of the demographic predictors are not.  Criminal 
history, guideline minimums, multiple offenses, and cocaine, crack, heroin, and 
methamphetamine violations are associated with longer logged sentence lengths.  Hispanic 
offenders receive longer sentences compared to white offenders.  Those from the Caribbean 
receive shorter sentences than their Mexican counterparts.  Black offenders, those with no high 
school degree, and those who go to trial receive longer sentence lengths.  Women and those with 
college degrees receive shorter sentences.  Documentation status, age, Asian, African, Latin 






The inclusion of level 2 variables on the logged sentence length outcomes for noncitizens 
alters the significance of the level 1 noncitizen variable.  According to Model 3 in Table 3, 
noncitizens receive longer sentences than their citizen counterparts, though citizenship status is 
not statistically significant.  Of district level variables, the average of Hispanic and Mexican 
offenders as well as the guideline minimum average per district is significantly related to 
sentence length for noncitizens specifically, each of which reduce the sentence length for this 
population.  None of the remaining district level variables appear to interact with citizenship for 
sentence length.  The inclusion of district level interaction for noncitizens does not appear to 
substantially alter the level 2 main effects.  Larger averages of Hispanic and white offenders are 
related to shorter overall sentence lengths.  Conversely, districts with larger trial caseloads and 
higher guideline minimum averages often exhibit longer sentence lengths.  Other than citizenship 
status, the inclusion of level 2 interactions does not alter any of the level 1 predictors 
substantially.   
Several noteworthy trends emerge with the exclusion of nonsignificant predictors.  The 
average number of cases with noncitizens becomes statistically related to a decrease in overall 
sentence lengths.  Hispanic and white populations continue to be related to a decrease in sentence 
length.  The guideline minimum average, though approaching significance, is no longer 
statistically significant.  Conversely, the mean for Mexican origins and trial caseloads become 
significant in the final model.  Being a noncitizen is also significant in the final model.  While 
the noncitizen mean now increases sentence length for noncitizens, the Mexican mean, guideline 





Table 16: Models Predicting the Logged Sentence Length at Level 2 with Spatial Weighting 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 L2 Only Full Interactions Final Model 
NONCIT x̅ -1.147† (.631) -.408* (.178) -.227 (.146) -.242** (.088) 
HISPANIC x̅ -.060 (.300) -.155 (.097) -.172* (.077) -.138* (.069) 
MEXICO x̅ .859 (.532) .027 (.158) .189 (.142) .219** (.080) 
UNDOCUME x̅ .540 (1.266) .336 (.338) -.0001 (.298) - 
TRIAL x̅ 3.215* (1.550) 1.635** (.536) .877† (.486) 1.093* (.422) 
GUIDE MIN x̅ .002*** (.001) .0001** (.000) .0004* (.000) .0003† (.000) 
MULTIPLE x̅ .135 (.213) -.100 (.070) .073 (.065) - 
COCAINE x̅ -.532 (.355) -.092 (.112) -.102 (.105) - 
MARIJ x̅ -1.438*** (.273) -.117 (.082) .018 (.077) -.048 (.067) 
WHITE x̅ -.443† (.260) -.355*** (.084) -.332*** (.081) -.273*** (.063) 
AGE x̅ -.009 (.026) .007 (.009) .012 (.008) - 
NO HS x̅ .266 (.565) .202 (.185) .106 (.167) - 
Noncitizen - .071*** (.009) .283 (.174) .120*** (.021) 
NONCIT x̅ - - -.138* (.068) .164*** (.032) 
HISPANIC x̅ - - .055 (.042) - 
MEXICO x̅ - - -.199* (.077) -.107* (.042) 
UNDOCUME x̅ - - .113 (.140) - 
TRIAL x̅ - - -.223 (.337) - 
GUIDE MIN x̅ - - -.0003* (.000) -.0004*** (000) 
MULTIPLE x̅ - - -.046 (.043) - 
COCAINE x̅ - - -.031 (.066) - 
MARIJ x̅ - - -.072 (.045) -.071* (.031) 
WHITE x̅ - - .031 (.055) - 
AGE x̅ - - -.004 (.005) - 
NO HS x̅ - - -.127 (.103) - 
Hispanic - .111*** (.008) .111*** (.008) .111*** (.007) 
Undocumented - .013 (.008) .013 (.008) .013 (.008) 
Age - .0002 (.000) .0002 (.000) .0002 (.000) 
Asia - -.014 (.017) -.019 (.017) -.018 (.017) 
Africa - -.033 (.020 -.035 (.020) -.035 (.020) 
Caribbean - -.030*** (.008) -.033*** (.009) -.033*** (.009) 
Latin America - -.010 (.008) -.011 (.009) -.012 (.009) 
Other Countries - -.005 (.012) -.006 (.017) -.007 (.016) 
Black - .116*** (.009) .115*** (.009) .116*** (.009) 
Female - -.307*** (.016) -.307*** (.016) -.307*** (.016) 
No High School - .016*** (.003) .016*** (.003) .016*** (.003) 
College - -.074*** (.005) -.074*** (.005) -.074*** (.005) 
Trial - .247*** (.006) .248*** (.015) .248*** (.015) 
Criminal History - .135*** (.008) .134*** (.008) .134*** (.008) 
Guideline Min - .770*** (.008) .770*** (.009) .770*** (.009) 
Multiple Offenses - .144*** (.009) .147*** (.009) .148*** (.009) 
Cocaine - .086*** (.010) .087*** (.010) .087*** (.010) 
Crack - .151*** (.012) .151*** (.013) .151*** (.012) 
Heroin - .128*** (.014) .131*** (.014) .131*** (.014) 
Meth - .128*** (.013) .130*** (.013) .129*** (.013) 
Other Drugs - -.020 (.013) -.018 (.013) -.019 (.014) 
2000 - .001 (.006) .0004 (.006) .0004 (.006) 
2001 - .022*** (.006) .021*** (.006) .021*** (.006) 
2002 - .035*** (.006) .035*** (.006) .035*** (.006) 
2003 - .049*** (.006) .080*** (.006) .048*** (.006) 
2004 - .081*** (.006) .080*** (.006) .080*** (.006) 





Table 16. (continued) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 L2 Only Full Interactions Final Model 
2006 - .050*** (.006) .050*** (.006) .050*** (.006) 
2007 - .052*** (.006) .051*** (.006) .051*** (.006) 
2008 - .046*** (.006) .045*** (.006) .045*** (.006) 
2009 - .002 (.006) .002 (.006) .002 (.006) 
2010 - -.013* (.006) -.013* (.006) -.013* (.006) 
2011 - -.00003 (.006) -.001 (.006) -.001 (.006) 
2012 - -.040*** (.006) -.042*** (.006) -.042*** (.006) 
2013 - -.051*** (.006) -.052*** (.006) -.052*** (.006) 
Reliability  .988 .968 .967 .966 
n (Level I)  323,772 323,772 323,772 323,772 
n (Level II) 89 89 89 89 
R² (Level I) - .64 .65 .65 
R² (Level II) .64 .80 .81 .81 
χ² 17177.289*** 8839.841*** 7668.139*** 7335.624*** 







 Like incarceration and prison alternative decisions, sentence length outcomes differ with 
the omission of spatial autocorrelation (see Table 17).  Although the main effects of the 
noncitizen mean are similar in both analyses, the unweighted model trivializes the main effects 
of the Hispanic and Mexican means on sentence length as well as interaction effects for 
marijuana and Hispanic district means for noncitizens.  Furthermore, the unweighted models 
indicate significant main effects for multiple offenses as well as significant interactions for 
undocumented and multiple offense means.  Failure to control for geographic proximity paints a 





Table 17: Models Predicting the Logged Sentence Length at Level 2 without Spatial Weighting 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 L2 Only Full Interactions Final Model 
NONCIT x̅ -1.193† (.617) -.241* (.117) -.277* (.124) -.217* (.094) 
HISPANIC x̅ -.063 (.309) -.035 (.067) -.029 (.070) - 
MEXICO x̅ .875† (.502) .016 (.113) .138 (.118) .133† (.077) 
UNDOCUME x̅ .550 (1.161) .120 (.227) -.060 (.241) -.076 (.208) 
TRIAL x̅ 4.056** (1.491) .394 (.414) .445 (.422) - 
GUIDE MIN x̅ .002*** (.001) .001** (.000) .001*** (.001) .001*** (.000) 
MULTIPLE x̅ .101 (.203) .114* (.054) .142* (.055) .175*** (.049) 
COCAINE x̅ -.364 (.330) -.023 (.084) -.020 (.086) - 
MARIJ x̅ -1.408*** (.255) .028 (.061) .036 (.064) - 
WHITE x̅ -.334 (.234) -.117† (.065) -.129† (.066) -.086† (.048) 
AGE x̅ -.011 (.026) .011 (.007) .012† (.007) - 
NO HS x̅ .526 (.533) .164 (.139) .203 (.143) - 
Noncitizen - .071*** (.009) .408* (.185) .106*** (.019) 
NONCIT x̅ - - .093 (.071) - 
HISPANIC x̅ - - -.001 (.046) - 
MEXICO x̅ - - -.305*** (.077) -.330*** (.044) 
UNDOCUME x̅ - - .400** (.136) .486*** (.064) 
TRIAL x̅ - - -.274 (.345) - 
GUIDE MIN x̅ - - -.0002† (.000) -.0002* (.000) 
MULTIPLE x̅ - - -.083† (.043) -.102** (.036) 
COCAINE x̅ - - -.106 (.064) - 
MARIJ x̅ - - -.037 (.045) - 
WHITE x̅ - - .020 (.052) - 
AGE x̅ - - -.007 (.005) - 
NO HS x̅ - - -.145 (.107) - 
Hispanic - .112*** (.007) .112*** (.007) .112*** (.007) 
Undocumented - .015* (.007) .015* (.007) .015* (.007) 
Age - .0003 (.000) .0003 (.000) .0003 (.000) 
Asia - -.018 (.017) -.020 (.017) -.019 (.017) 
Africa - -.032 (.019) -.034 (.020) -.034 (.020) 
Caribbean - -.031*** (.008)  -.034*** (.009) -.034*** (.009) 
Latin America - -.011 (.008) -.014 (.009) -.014 (.009) 
Other Countries - -.002 (.017) -.005 (.017) -.004 (.017) 
Black - .115*** (.009) .115*** (.009) .115*** (.009) 
Female - -.307*** (.016) -.308*** (.016) -.308*** (.016) 
No HS - .014*** (.003) .014 (.003) .014*** (.003) 
College - -.075*** (.005) -.075*** (.005) -.075*** (.005) 
Trial - .242*** (.015) .242*** (.015) .243*** (.015) 
Criminal History - .136 (.008) .136*** (.008) .136*** (.008) 
Guideline Min - .771*** (.009) .771*** (.009) .771*** (.009) 
Multiple Offenses - .147*** (.009) .147*** (.009) .147*** (.009) 
Cocaine - .080*** (.010) .080*** (.010) .080*** (.010) 
Crack - .148*** (.011) .148*** (.011) .148*** (.011) 
Heroin - .123*** (.012) .124*** (.012) .123*** (.012) 
Meth - .123*** (.013) .124*** (.012) .123*** (.012) 
Other Drugs - -.019 (.013) -.019 (.013) -.019 (.013) 
2000 - .004 (.009) .004 (.009) .038 (.009) 
2001 - .023* (.010) .023* (.009) .022* (.009) 
2002 - .041*** (.010) .040*** (.010) .040*** (.010) 
2003 - .044*** (.012) .043*** (.012) .043*** (.012) 
2004 - .074*** (.013) .074*** (.013) .073*** (.013) 





Table 17. (continued) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 L2 Only Full Interactions Final Model 
2006 - .039* (.016) .039* (.016) .038* (.016) 
2007 - .044** (.015) .044** (.015) .044** (.015) 
2008 - .036* (.017) .035* (.017) .035* (.017) 
2009 - -.011 (.018) -.011 (.018) -.012 (.018) 
2010 - -.035 (.019) -.035 (.019) -.036 (.019) 
2011 - -.026 (.017) -.026 (.017) -.026 (.017) 
2012 - -.056** (.018) -.056** (.018) -.056** (.018) 
2013 - -.071*** (.020) -.071*** (.020) -.070*** (.020) 
Reliability  .988 .968 .967 .967 
n (Level I) 323,772 323,772 323,772 323,772 
n (Level II) 89 89 89 89 
R² (Level I) - .65 .65 .65 
R² (Level II) .66 .80 .80 .80 
χ² 16230.729*** 7499.689*** 7344.802*** 7439.006*** 






Hypothesis 4A & 4B 
 While several theoretical population predictors associated with immigration, including 
country of origin and documentation status, are significantly related to sentencing severity, these 
district level predictors are not necessarily limited to noncitizens as anticipated.  Increases in 
Mexican origins are related to more severe sentencing outcomes regarding sentence length.  
However, increases in Mexican offender populations appear to provide leniency for noncitizens 
to some extent.  The percentage of Hispanic offenders, however, appears to decrease sentence 
length overall while demonstrating no notable effects on noncitizens specifically.  While country 
of origin is the only proxy variable that specifically impacts sentence length for noncitizens in 
the weighted model, it is worth noting that the unweighted analysis finds significant interactions 
for noncitizens with Mexican and undocumented populations  
 
DOWNWARD DEPARTURES 
Like incarceration, downward departures do not initially appear to vary greatly across 
district.  Of level 2 predictors, only the noncitizen mean is a significant predictor prior to the 
introduction of level 1 predictors (see Table 18).  As the average number of noncitizen offenders 
increases, the odds of receiving a downward departure appears to decrease initially.  All other 
district variables fail to achieve significance.   
Once individual level predictors are included, the guideline minimum becomes 
significant at the .05 level.  Like the noncitizen mean, guideline averages appear related to a 
decrease in the odds of receiving a downward departure.  Noncitizen populations demonstrate an 
even greater reduced odds of departures in Model 2.  Even with the introduction of district level 




the individual level.  Hispanic and documentation status are not significantly related to the odds 
of receiving a downward departure, however.  Furthermore, offenders from Africa and other 
countries are more likely to receive a departure compared to Mexican offenders.  Those from the 
Caribbean are less likely to receive a departure.  Asia and Latin America are not statistically 
different from those from Mexico.  Downward departures is the only dependent variable in 
which Black offenders do not differ from white offenders in their propensity to receive a 
downward departure.  The odds of receiving a downward departure are greater for women 
compared to their male counterparts.  Education is also related to departures.  Those with some 
or a completed college degree are more likely to receive a departure compared to those with a 
high school degree, though those without a high school do not differ significantly.  Most of the 
court related predictors remain significant.  The odds of receiving a downward departure are 
lower for those with a criminal history as well as those with multiple offenses.  Increases in 
guideline minimums actually increase the odds of receiving a sentencing departure.  Of drug 
violations, cocaine, crack, and heroin are related to decreased odds of receiving a departure 
compared to marijuana.  Other drugs are associated with greater odds of departures.  Only 
methamphetamine violations do not differ significantly from marijuana.   
 
Hypothesis 2A 
While district level predictors do not initially appear to be valuable contributions to 
understanding citizenship disparities, once these effects on departures for noncitizens are 
included in the model, district level variables explain away the importance of citizenship status.  
The district’s noncitizen offender mean, which was previously related to decreased odds of 




remaining significant district level predictor, the guideline minimum average continues to be 
inversely related to departure odds.  Only the Mexican offender population and marijuana 
caseloads demonstrate a cross level interaction for noncitizens.  Mexican means are related to a 
decrease in departures while marijuana means increase these odds, but at a level approaching 
significance.    
Once the model is limited to significant predictors, a few noteworthy changes are 
discernable.  The main effects of the noncitizen mean is substantially smaller and reduced to a 
level approaching significance.  The marijuana caseload becomes significant for the first time at 
the main level.  The guideline minimum continues to be related to reduced departure odds.  The 
interaction effects remain steady with Mexican means decreasing departure odds for noncitizens 
and marijuana means increasing these odds.  Of level 1 predictors, only the guideline minimum 
differs from previous models.  This variable is not significantly related to the odds of receiving a 





Table 18: Models Predicting Downward Departures at Level 2 with Spatial Weighting 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 L2 Only Full Interactions Final Model 
NONCIT x̅ .972** (1.332) .538* (1.148) 12.733* (1.122) 3.393† (.662) 
HISPANIC x̅ 1.272 (.635) 1.886 (.564) 1.839 (.557) 1.120 (.531) 
MEXICO x̅ .691 (1.124) .304 (.987) .285 (.973) - 
UNDOCUME x̅ .019 (2.676) .230 (2.310) .272 (2.255) - 
TRIAL x̅ 1.828 (3.291) 4.534 (3.038) 2.960 (3.035) - 
GUIDE MIN x̅ .999 (.001) .997* (.001) .998* (.001) .997** (.001) 
MULTIPLE x̅ .937 (.452) .755 (.413) .774 (.411) - 
COCAINE x̅ 1.872 (.753) 2.403 (.683) 2.470 (.679) - 
MARIJ x̅ .696 (.578) .425 (.519) .476 (.514) .251** (.434) 
WHITE x̅ 1.713 (.552) 1.426 (.501) 1.436 (.499) - 
AGE x̅ .972 (.056) .956 (.051) .964 (.051) - 
NO HS x̅ .402 (1.199) .538 (1.095) .561 (1.089) - 
Noncitizen - .840*** (.038) .540 (.949) .920 (.060) 
NONCIT x̅ - - 1.366 (.424) - 
HISPANIC x̅ - - .459** (.260) .705** (.120) 
MEXICO x̅ - - 1.192 (.416) - 
UNDOCUME x̅ - - 2.088 (.867) - 
TRIAL x̅ - - .180 (1.880) - 
GUIDE MIN x̅ - - 1.001 (.001) - 
MULTIPLE x̅ - - 1.086 (.234) - 
COCAINE x̅ - - 1.120 (.356) - 
MARIJ x̅ - - 1.661* (.249) 1.268† (.138) 
WHITE x̅ - - 1.096 (.286) - 
AGE x̅ - - 1.013 (.028) - 
NO HS x̅ - - .715 (.594) - 
Hispanic - 1.025 (.038) 1.017 (.039) 1.010 (.038) 
Undocumented - .999 (.038) .998 (.037) .998 (.038) 
Age - 1.002* (.001) 1.002 (.001)* 1.002* (.001) 
Asia - 1.170 (.109) 1.179 (.106) 1.170 (.104) 
Africa - 1.283*** (.077) 1.277** (.079) 1.290*** (.078) 
Caribbean - .883** (.039) .894** (.043) .890** (.040) 
Latin America - .943 (.039) .952 (.041) .947 (.040) 
Other Countries - 1.123* (.051) 1.113* (.053) 1.120* (.051) 
Black - 1.012 (.030) 1.011 (.030) 1.010 (.030) 
Female - 1.410*** (.025) 1.412*** (.025) 1.412*** (.026) 
No High School - .976 (.016) .975 (.017) .982 (.012) 
College - 1.052*** (.015) 1.053*** (.015) 1.047** (.015) 
Trial - 1.149*** (.026) 1.148*** (.026) 1.149*** (.026) 
Criminal History - .774*** (.013) .774*** (.013) .773*** (.013) 
Guideline Min - 1.214*** (.006) 1.214*** (.006) 1.214 (.006) 
Multiple Offenses - .954*** (.014) .954*** (.014) .954 (.014) 
Cocaine - .752*** (.017) .751*** (.017) .753*** (.017) 
Crack - .934* (.030) .936* (.030) .938* (.030) 
Heroin - .816*** (.024) .940*** (.024) .817*** (.024) 
Meth - .941 (.041) .940 (.041) .943 (.041) 
Other Drugs - 1.204*** (.041) 1.202*** (.041) 1.205*** (.042) 
2000 - .953 (.029) .953 (.029) .952 (.030) 
2001 - 1.172*** (.028) 1.172*** (.028)  1.172*** (.028)  
2002 - 1.132*** (.028)  1.132 *** (.028) 1.132*** (.028)  
2003 - .765*** (.030)  .765*** (.030)  .765*** (.030)  
2004 - 2.394*** (.027)  2.394*** (.270)  2.393*** (.027)  




Table 18. (continued) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 L2 Only Full Interactions Final Model 
2006 - .743*** (.030)  .742*** (.020)  .743*** (.030)  
2007 - .770*** (.030)  .770*** (.030)  .770*** (.030)  
2008 - .968 (.029) .968 (.029) .968 (.029) 
2009 - 1.334*** (.028)  1.3333*** (.028)  1.334*** (.028)  
2010 - 1.615*** (.027)  1.614*** (.027)  1.615*** (.027)  
2011 - 1.501*** (.027)  1.500*** (.027)  1.501*** (.027)  
2012 - 1.537*** (.027)  1.536*** (.027)  1.538*** (.027)  
2013 - 1.580*** (.029)  1.579 *** (.028)  1.581*** (.028)  
Reliability  .979 .936 .936 .943 
n (Level I)  335,596 335,596 335,596 335,596 
n (Level II) 89 89 89 89 
R² (Level II) .21 .05 .19 .08 
χ² 9343.220*** 3979.357*** 3969.013*** 3491.691*** 






 Without the inclusion of a weight matrix addressing geographic proximity, several of the 
district level interactions on the odds of receiving a downward departure for noncitizens are 
suppressed while others are exaggerated (see Table 19).  While the final weighted model found 
district level interactions for only Mexico and marijuana, several significant district level 
predictors are observable in the unweighted model.  For instance, noncitizen and Mexican means 
are related to a decreased departure odds for noncitizens.  Hispanic means are related to 
increased odds for this population.  Marijuana means continue to increase departure odds for 
noncitizens.  Likewise, several of the main effects differ greatly between the weighted and 
unweighted models.  Mexican origins and greater populations of those without high school 
degrees are related to decreased departure odds that are not present in the weighted models.  
Undocumented populations and cocaine caseloads are related to increased odds that are not 





Table 19: Models Predicting Downward Departures at Level 2 without Spatial Weighting 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 L2 Only Full Interactions Final Model 
NONCIT x̅ 54.651** (1.329) .290† (.669) .427 (.689) .290* (.621) 
HISPANIC x̅ 1.460 (.667) 2.294* (.371) 1.910† (.382) 1.953† (.347) 
MEXICO x̅ .659 (1.084) .095*** (.598) .096*** (.618) .102*** (.555) 
UNDOCUME x̅ .026 (2.504) 304.786*** (1.275) 242.385*** (1.316) 389.518*** (1.212) 
TRIAL x̅ .737 (3.230) 6.038 (2.147) 2.273 (2.224)  
GUIDE MIN x̅ .999 (.001) .997*** (.001) .998** (.001) .998*** (.001) 
MULTIPLE x̅ .985 (.439) .949 (.279) 1.020 (.288)  
COCAINE x̅ 1.421 (.714) 2.082† (.438) 1.742 (.454) 2.369* (.394) 
MARIJ x̅ .743 (.551) .308*** (.323) .387** (.335) .355*** (.311) 
WHITE x̅ 1.407 (.505) .910 (.326) .841 (.337)  
AGE x̅ .981 (.056) .970 (.035) .976 (.037)  
NO HS x̅ .296 (1.154) .183* (.728) .142* (.752) .195* (.655) 
Noncitizen - .845*** (.034) .453 (.948) .816*** (.056) 
NONCIT x̅ - - 2.460* (.375) 1.926** (.209) 
HISPANIC x̅ - - .561* (.244) .595** (.177) 
MEXICO x̅ - - .916 (.383) - 
UNDOCUME x̅ - - 1.053 (.749) - 
TRIAL x̅ - - .045† (1.780) - 
GUIDE MIN x̅ - - 1.001† (.001) - 
MULTIPLE x̅ - - 1.202 (.212) - 
COCAINE x̅ - - .610 (.320) - 
MARIJ x̅ - - 1.798* (.230) 1.368* (.122) 
WHITE x̅ - - .799 (.261) - 
AGE x̅ - - 1.029 (.027) - 
NO HS x̅ - - .477 (.532) - 
Hispanic - .939* (.027) .938* (.028) .938* (.028) 
Undocumented - .955 (.028) .954 (.028) .955 (.028) 
Age - .999 (.001) .999 (.001) .999 (.001) 
Asia - 1.228 (.104) 1.215 (.108) 1.223 (.106) 
Africa - 1.196* (.081) 1.194* (.083) 1.191* (.082) 
Caribbean - .978 (.063) 1.001 (.072) .976 (.065) 
Latin America - 1.027 (.041) 1.028 (.044) 1.025 (.042) 
Other Countries - 1.167** (.051) 1.160** (.054) 1.159** (.053) 
Black - .947 (.028) .947 (.028) .948 (.028) 
Female - 1.454*** (.026) 1.453*** (.026) 1.453*** (.026) 
No High School - .993 (.016) .993 (.016) .993 (.016) 
College - 1.083*** (.015) 1.083*** (.015) 1.083*** (.015) 
Trial - 1.190*** (.052) 1.190*** (.052) 1.191*** (.052) 
Criminal History - .784*** (.025) .783*** (.026) .784*** (.025) 
Guideline Min - 1.272*** (.017) 1.272*** (.017) 1.272*** (.017) 
Multiple 
Offenses 
- .918** (.031) .918** (.031) .918** (.031) 
Cocaine - .880*** (.029) .879*** (.029) .880*** (.029) 
Crack - 1.051 (.037) 1.051 (.037) 1.050 (.037) 
Heroin - .890* (.045) .890* (.045) .890* (.045) 
Meth - 1.024 (.040) 1.024 (.040) 1.024 (.040) 
Other Drugs - 1.303*** (.049) 1.303*** (.049) 1.303*** (.048) 
2000 - 1.064 (.054) 1.063 (.054) 1.062 (.054) 
2001 - 1.192* (.067) 1.190* (.670) 1.188* (.067) 





Table 19. (continued) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 L2 Only Full Interactions Final Model 
2003 - .777*** (.062) .777*** (.062) .776*** (.062)  
2004 - 5.955*** (.154) 5.951*** (.155) 5.945*** (.155)  
2005 - 1.400** (.111) 1.397** (.111) 1.396** (.111) 
2006 - 1.635*** (.102)  1.635*** (.102)  1.632*** (.102)  
2007 - 1.645*** (.106)  1.645*** (.106)  1.642*** (.106)  
2008 - 2.045*** (.107)  2.043*** (.107)  2.040 *** (.107) 
2009 - 2.833*** (.112)  2.828*** (.112)  2.827*** (.112)  
2010 - 3.593*** (.118)  3.587*** (.118)  3.587*** (.118)  
2011 - 3.451*** (.114)  3.447 *** (.115)  3.444*** (.115)  
2012 - 3.630*** (.119)  3.629*** (.119)  3.626*** (.119)  
2013 - 3.802*** (.121)  3.800*** (.121)  3.796*** (.121)  
Reliability  .979 .916 .913 .913 
n (Level I)  335,596 335,596 335,596 335,596 
n (Level II) 89 89 89 89 
R² (Level II) .32 .05 .09 .09 
χ² 9946.190*** 2663.850*** 2487.260*** 2604.745*** 






Hypothesis 4A & 4B 
As with the previous outcome variables, noncitizen proxies only somewhat appear related 
to sentencing disparities.  Mexican and undocumented district means do not appear related to 
departure leniency.  Only ethnicity mediates the effects of citizenship status on departure 
outcomes.  Larger Hispanic offender populations are related to a decrease in the odds of 
receiving a departure for noncitizens, but demonstrate no main effects in the weighted model.  
All three proxies (ethnicity, country of origin, and undocumented populations) demonstrate 
significant main effects without the spatial weight matrix.  Hispanic and undocumented 
populations appear to increase departure odds while Mexican populations decrease these odds.  
Research examining these district level proxies without controlling for spatial proximity would 
likely reach the conclusion that minority threat not only applies through increases in the 
disadvantaged subgroup, but is impacted by increases in populations associated with the 
subgroup as well.  Weighting these findings, however, limits the significance of these predictors.   
 
DISCUSSION 
 Noncitizens are disproportionately punished within the criminal justice system.  This 
disparity is frequently influenced by the district in which the case is decided, supporting the work 
of Albonetti (1997), Cano and Spohn (2012), Demleitner and Sands (2002), Light (2014), and 
Maxfield and Burchfield (2002).  Upon examination of key variables, Hypothesis 2a is partially 
supported with noncitizen populations frequently influencing sentencing outcomes.  
Furthermore, the effects of citizenship status on sentencing severity appears to fluctuate greatly 
with the introduction of district level predictors.  Likewise, Hypothesis 4a is only somewhat 




documentation status demonstrate more promising results.  Even when theoretically relevant 
district variables are associated with sentencing outcomes, these variables do not consistently 
reveal themselves in a manner compatible with theoretical expectations.   
 
Caseload Predictors 
Several district level measures were included to examine whether caseload predictors are 
related to sentencing severity.  It is possible that districts with high caseloads can be prone to 
attributional errors more so than districts with smaller caseloads.  With fewer cases going to trial, 
judges will be less inclined to speed through cases, suggesting that the “assembly line justice” 
may exacerbate inequality (Lydgate 2010).  However, the results of this study rarely support this 
argument.  The trial caseloads do not demonstrate any main effects or cross-level interactions for 
decisions to incarcerate, utilization of prison alternatives, or applications of downward 
departures.  Only sentence length is potentially influenced by trial caseloads.  The relationship 
between caseload and sentence length does exhibit the hypothesized relationship with increases 
in trial related to increases in the logged sentence length.  While this relationship demonstrates 
main effects, the trial caseload penalty does not demonstrate any cross-level interactions for 
noncitizens.  Therefore, if the number of cases that go to trial are related to sentencing severity, 
this penalty is not specific to noncitizens but rather impacts all offenders suggesting that a 
hurried court system is not the primary mechanism under which inequality is manifested.   
Although the overall trial caseload is not often related to sentencing severity, the type of 
cases per district may influence the frequency in which attributions are applied.  Districts that 
must manage more severe offenses might be more cautious with sentencing decisions 




guidelines are determined according to criminal history and offense severity, the aggregated 
guideline minimum average is able to act as a proxy for district level severity.  Thus districts 
with higher guideline scores are expected to be related to overall sentencing severity, but should 
not demonstrate any interaction effects for noncitizens while controlling for legally relevant level 
1 variables.  The results of this study are mixed.  The main effects of the guideline minimum 
average is either significant or approaching significance for all variables except for incarceration 
outcomes, though the effects are somewhat small in all models.  As predicted, the caseload 
severity does not increase citizenship effects for incarceration, prison alternatives, or downward 
departure outcomes.  An interaction effect is present for sentence length.  Districts with higher 
measures for the severity proxy have lower sentence lengths for noncitizens suggesting that 
noncitizens may demonstrate a slight advantage in districts with more severe cases.   
Finally, because this study focuses on drug violations, it may be the case that districts 
plagued with specific types of drug crimes might be quicker to rely on attributions and 
stereotypes.  Immigrants of various ethnicities have long been associated with drug violations 
(see Chapter 2).  Currently, Mexican and Latino immigrants are of particularly concern within 
political rhetoric and are often associated with marijuana and cocaine respectively (Patenostro 
1995).  Therefore, districts with greater numbers of drug violations associated with these 
populations are expected to rely on stereotypes and attributions to a greater extent than other 
districts.  Specific drug caseloads are expected to demonstrate multiplicative effects in which 
noncitizens are more likely to receive severe sentences in districts with greater cocaine and 
marijuana caseloads.  The results of this study partially supports this argument.  Marijuana 
caseloads demonstrate main effects for incarceration outcomes and prison alternatives, but not 




alternatives.  Not only does the marijuana caseload demonstrate overarching effects in several 
models, this variable appears to particularly impact noncitizens.  Noncitizens are 
disproportionately more likely to receive a prison sentence and less likely to receive a prison 
alternative in districts with greater amounts of marijuana violations.  While marijuana caseloads 
appear to increase severity for noncitizens for two of the dependent variables, cocaine caseloads 
are not significant for noncitizens in any of the models.  This is likely because rhetoric 
identifying an immigration threat emphasizes Mexican immigrants more frequently than their 




The results of this analysis further demonstrates that districts serving greater portions of 
noncitizens and foreign proxies demonstrate differential sentencing practices to some extent.  
Districts with larger noncitizen populations may demonstrate more severe sentencing outcomes 
overall; however, the impact of noncitizen populations on sentencing severity is expected to 
exhibit a more prominent effect on noncitizens.  This finding is partially supported.  Only the use 
of prison alternatives is entirely unaffected by noncitizen populations in the final model for both 
main effects and interactive ones.  For incarceration effects, the noncitizen average does not 
broadly impact incarceration decisions but rather slightly decreases the odds of incarceration 
specifically for noncitizens.  Conversely, the noncitizen average broadly increases the odds of 
receiving a downward departure but does not specifically influence these odds for noncitizens.  
Only the sentence length findings support Group Threat theory in the anticipated manner.  




significant sentence length reductions in the main model but sentence length increases for 
noncitizens.  These findings suggest that, to some extent, larger populations of noncitizen 
offenders in a given district not only frequently increase the severity for noncitizens but can be 
affiliated with leniency for other populations.   
Terminology affiliated with the “illegal immigrant” debate is rarely ethnically neutral.  
The rhetoric often references or draws imagery suggestive of Hispanic, often Mexican, 
immigrants.  The underlying message is that these outsiders enter the U.S. “illegally” and are 
therefore a threat (see Chapter 1).  It is possible that increases in the populations associated with 
immigrants may place noncitizens at disadvantage.  Therefore, these district level variables were 
included.  The average percent of noncitizen offenders are frequently related to increased 
severity while the percent of Hispanic offenders per district is often associated with leniency.  In 
fact, of the four dependent variables, the Hispanic population demonstrates lenient main effects 
for incarceration and sentence length.  When examining the population effects on noncitizens, 
increases in the percent Hispanic decrease incarceration odds and increase prison alternative 
odds, but reduce the odds of a departure for noncitizens.  Increases in the percent of noncitizens 
per district are related to a decrease in prison alternatives but do not specifically effect 
noncitizens, a decrease in overall sentence length but an increase in sentence length for 
noncitizens, and an increase in overall departures but no effects for noncitizens. 
Increases in undocumented offenders in a given district rarely impacts sentencing 
outcomes.  Though not significant at the main level, increases in the undocumented averages are 
related to an exorbitant spike in the odds of incarceration specifically for noncitizens.  Larger 
percentages of undocumented noncitizens does not appear to affect any other sentencing 




rhetoric focuses on “illegal immigrants,” noncitizen and Hispanic offender populations appear to 
influence sentencing outcomes to a much greater extent than undocumented populations, 
suggesting the potential lack of distinction between these two groups at the aggregate level, 
although documentation status often remains a significant case level predictor.  
Although ethnicity and documentation demonstrate inconsistent effects on sentencing 
outcomes for noncitizens, the country of origin is of particular importance.  Increases in Mexican 
offenders surprisingly decrease the odds of incarceration for noncitizens but do not appear to 
impact incarceration odds overall.  The percent of offenders from Mexico demonstrates main 
effects increasing the odds of receiving a prison alternative.  This variable also increases the odds 
of receiving a prison alternative for noncitizens.  Likewise, the district average measurement for 
Mexican offenders are related to a decrease in sentence length as well as a decrease in sentence 
length for noncitizens.  Increases in the Mexican population is related to a decreased odds of 
receiving a downward departure in general, but increase departure odds for noncitizens. 
In sum, district level caseloads impact sentencing severity.  The importance of these 
variables not only influence sentencing outcomes for all drug offenders but frequently mediate 
and moderate the effects of citizenship status on sentencing outcomes.  Of the district level 
measures, caseload proxies frequently influence incarceration decisions, prison alternatives, and 
sentence length.  The implications of these relationships reinforce the importance of practical 
limitations within sentencing decisions as anticipated by Focal Concerns.  However, 
demographic proxies are more valuable for understanding the effects of citizenship status on 
sentencing decisions.  Of demographic predictors, Mexican populations are particularly 
influential for noncitizen sentencing outcomes.  Not all demographics operate in the direction 




noncitizens with a sentencing advantage.  This counterintuitive finding may be a product of the 
curvilinear nature of these populations.  As these populations begin to increase, formal controls 
are more heavily relied upon.  Once the outgroup reaches a certain growth point, however, the 
increase in political and social power negate the previous disadvantage (see Chapter 4).  
Furthermore, because this dataset is an aggregation of sentencing outcomes over a 15 year span, 
unique temporal distinctions may exist.  Chapter 8 will utilize growth models to examine 







 Sentencing disparities between citizens and noncitizens vary in prevalence across time.  
With the so many significant district level and caseload predictors impacting sentencing 
outcomes (see Chapter 7), longitudinal variation is likely present.  Caseload predictors and 
district demographics are not static, but rather time variant.  Therefore, this entire chapter is 
dedicated to exploring Hypothesis 2C and Hypothesis 4C. 
 
INCARCERATION DECISIONS  
 The utilization of incarceration as a means of social control has shifted across time, 
ultimately escalating since 1999.  This trend is far from linear, however.  According to the 
growth curve analysis (see Table 20), time as a linear predictor fails to achieve significance 
across all of the models.  The inclusion of the squared term is positive and statistically significant 
(p<.01).  Thus, viewing time as curvilinear suggests that the effect of time is convex with an 
overall increase.  This curvilinear shape is not perfectly symmetrical, though.  The cubed year 
term is also statistically significant (p<.001), demonstrating that the effects of year on 
incarceration outcomes are actually much more complex than a mere U-shaped pattern. 
 A series of dummy variables were added to the level 1 and level 2 tables so that distinct 
annual variations could be scrutinized.  The year 1999 was omitted as the reference category so 
that yearly changes could be compared to the earliest source of data.  According to the fixed 
models, (see Table 4), all of the years, with the exception of 2000-2002 and 2011, demonstrate a 




demonstrate a decreased use of incarceration, though these years fail to achieve statistical 
significance.  A similar pattern emerges when year is permitted to vary, though to a somewhat 
lesser extent (see Table 5).  Years 2000 through 2003 do not differ significantly from 1999.  
Beginning in 2004, however, a distinct increase in the application of incarceration becomes 
apparent with an increased likelihood of incarceration of 1.4 times.  This trend continues for four 
years with comparable increased odds until 2008, after which no years demonstrate statistically 
significant shifts in the use of incarceration compared to 1999.  These findings do not differ in 
the level 2 unweighted or weighted models (see Tables 12 and 13).   
 Several district level predictors were also included within the growth curve analysis, 
several of which were found to be significantly related to incarceration outcomes.  For instance, 
cocaine and marijuana district means are both related to a decrease in incarceration at a level 
approaching significance.  The guideline minimum mean is inversely related to an increase in 
incarceration.  The trial caseload and multiple offense district variable were not statistically 
significantly related to incarceration, however.  Furthermore, while the education and White 
population means failed to achieve significance, age averages are related to a decrease in 
imprisonment.  Of theoretical variables, only the Hispanic mean achieved significance, with 
noncitizens, Mexico, and undocumented averages failing to effect incarceration.  In accordance 
with the aforementioned hypotheses, increases in Hispanic populations are related to an increase 








Table 20: Models Predicting Incarceration using Growth Curve Analysis 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Year Theoretical Variables Demographics Caseload Final Model 
Year -.001 (.002) -.001 (.002) -.001 (.002) -.001 (.002) -.001 (.002) 
Year² .0009** (.000) .0009** (.000) .0009** (.000) .0009** (.000) .0009** (.000) 
Year3 -.00005*** (.000) -.00005*** (.000) -.00005*** (.000) -.00005*** (.000) -.00005*** (.000) 
NONCITIZEN x̅ - -.008 (.079) .030 (.082) .011 (.081) - 
HISPANIC x̅ - .013 (.044) .011 (.044) .055 (.045) .045* (.017) 
MEXICO x̅ - .041 (.044) .044 (.044) .047 (.051) - 
UNDOCUMENT x̅ - -.017 (.156) -.095 (.157) -.087 (.156) - 
WHITE x̅ - - -.013 (.026) -.006 (.027) - 
AGE x̅ - - -.005* (.002) -.005* (.002) -.005* (.002) 
NO HS x̅ - - -.020 (.055) -.042 (.058) - 
TRIAL x̅ - - - .061 (.108) - 
GUIDE MIN x̅ - - - .00004 (.000) .00005* (.000) 
MULTIPLE x̅ - - - .020 (.026) - 
COCAINE x̅ - - - -.040 (.033) -.051† (.027) 
MARIJUANA x̅ - - - -.043† (.025) -.041† (.023) 
Reliability .924 .936 .928 .928 .924 
n (Level I)  89 89 89 89 89 
n (Level II) 15 15 15 15 15 
R² (Level I) .32 .32 .32 .32 .32 
R² (Level II) .02 .02 .06 .14 .19 
χ² 1360.648 1313.683*** 1214.731*** 1048.981*** 1087.018*** 





 As anticipated, the reliance on prison alternatives inversely mirrors that of incarceration.  
The linear measure of year, though positive, is not statistically significant.  The squared term, 
however, is negatively related to the use of prison alternatives (p<.05), demonstrating a non-
linear decline.  As with incarceration outcomes, prison alternatives exhibit asymmetrical 
patterns, with a positive cubed value for year. 
 The mirrored similarities persist when examining the dichotomous measures for year in 
the level 1 and level 2 tables.  Like imprisonment outcomes, prison alternatives do not differ 
significantly from 1999 during years 2000-2002 (see Table 6).  In 2003, a significant decline in 
the utilization of prison alternatives for drug offenders becomes apparent, occurring only one 
year prior to the change in incarceration outcomes.  Each year since 2003 demonstrates lower 
odds of imprisonment alternatives compared to 1999. One unique divergence from incarceration 
is apparent in the lack of variation across year.  Unlike imprisonment outcomes, only 2009 and 
2011 vary across time for alternatives to prison (see Table 7).  Permitting these two years to vary 
does not substantially alter the composition of the findings.  Furthermore, while the inclusion of 
level 2 variables does not transform the outcome for incarceration, notable variations are present 
in the level 2 tables for prison alternatives.  For instance, the decline in the use of prison 
alternative does not begin until 2004; the year 2009 is also no longer significant (see Table 15).  
This suggests that differential caseloads across these years may explain the decline in prison 
alternatives.  These two years are outliers, however, with all other years (beginning in 2004) 
demonstrating a continued significant decline in alternatives to incarceration compared to 1999 




 While controlling for time, increases in district level noncitizen means continue to be 
related to a decline in prison alternatives.  Though the Mexican mean initially appears 
significantly related, the effects of this variable fade with the introduction of other demographic 
district factors including the White mean and age average.  Like noncitizens, increase in White 
populations reduce the use of prison alternatives.  Increases in the age average increase the use of 
prison alternatives.  Finally, the drug caseload impacts the use of prison alternatives.  
Surprisingly, higher cocaine caseloads are related to an increase in prison alternatives while 
higher marijuana caseloads are related to a decrease in alternatives, though the cocaine variable 









Table 21: Models Predicting Prison Alternative using Growth Curve Analysis 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Year Theoretical 
Variables 
Demographics Caseload Final Model 
Year .011 (.016) .010 (.016) .011 (.016) .011 (.016) .011 (.016) 
Year² -.006* (.003) -.006* (.003) -.006* (.003) -.006* (.003) -.006* (.003) 
Year3 .0003* (.000) .0003* (.000) .0003* (.000) .0003* (.000) .0003* (.000) 
NONCITIZEN x̅ - .229 (.291) -.003 (.297) -.171 (.278) -..0003* (.000) 
HISPANIC x̅ - -.157 (.162) -.158 (.162) -.058 (.157) - 
MEXICO x̅ - -.346* (.162) -.268 (.163) .010 (.178) - 
UNDOCUMENT x̅ - .214 (.577) .425 (.572) .129 (.541) - 
WHITE x̅ - - -.219* (.097) -.209* (.094) -.162* (.078) 
AGE x̅ - - .017* (.009) .016† (.008) .015* (.007) 
NO HS x̅ - - .039 (.200) .164 (.201) - 
TRIAL x̅ - - - .257 (.377) - 
GUIDE MIN x̅ - - - -.0002† (.000)  
MULTIPLE x̅ - - - .002 (.089) - 
COCAINE x̅ - - - .244* (.112) .170† (.095)  
MARIJUANA x̅ - - - -.319*** (.086) -.324*** (.072) 
Reliability .668 .641 .620 .540 .528 
n (Level I)  89 89 89 89 89 
n (Level II) 15 15 15 15 15 
R² (Level I) .06 .06 .06 .06 .06 
R² (Level II) .07 .18 .25 .46 .49 
χ² 268.603*** 235.522*** 214.294*** 166.343*** 179.308*** 







 While the application of incarceration and prison alternatives reveal the nuanced 
complexities of longitudinal change, sentence length exhibits a much more direct pattern.  Both 
the squared and cubed year measures fail to achieve significance (see Table 22).  Only the linear 
predictor achieves statistical significance with an increased value of 2.2.  This finding is 
consistent with the introduction of theoretical, demographic, and caseload predictors.   
 According to level 1 mixed effects table (see Table 9), the length of incarceration 
increases every year for eight years beginning in 2001.  Furthermore, each of these annual 
increases is greater than its predecessor from 2001 to 2004.  Though the extent of the increase 
drops in 2005, the sentence length remains longer than the reference group until 2008.  The 
sentence length is not significant for years 2009 through 2011.  It is not until 2012 and 2013 that 
a notable decline in sentence length is apparent compared to 1999.  Similar patterns emerge in 
the fixed effects models (see Table 8) with the exception of years 2011 and 2012.  When year is 
not permitted to vary, 2011 is significantly related to longer sentences than the reference 
category and 2012 becomes nonsignificant.  As with the previous dependent variables, the 
inclusion of district level predictors does not modify these findings. 
 Several district level predictors were found to be significant when controlling for year.  
Of theoretical variables, the percent of noncitizen offenders is the only variable that is 
consistently nonsignificant across all models.  The Hispanic mean is related to a decrease in 
sentence length, though this disappears in Model 4 with the introduction of caseload predictors.  
The average for undocumented offenders is related to a decrease in sentence length while the 




proxies were found to be inversely related to sentence lengths.  As expected, the guideline 









Table 22: Models Predicting Sentence Length using Growth Curve Analysis 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Year Theoretical 
Variables 
Demographics Caseload Final Model 
Year .022* (.010) .022* (.010) .022* (.010) .022* (.010) .022* (.010) 
Year² .0001 (.002) .0001 (.002) .0001 (.002) .0001 (.002) .0001 (.002) 
Year3 -.0002 (.000) -.0002 (.001) -.0002 (.000) -.0002 (.000) -.0002 (.000) 
NONCITIZEN x̅ - .538 (.773) .477 (.817) .156 (.658) - 
HISPANIC x̅ - -.876* (.430) -.916* (.444) -.088 (.369) - 
MEXICO x̅ - .469 (.426) .538 (.443) .753† (.418) .627† (.359) 
UNDOCUMENT x̅ - -1.307 (1.525) -1.490 (1.569) -1.789 (1.273) -1.567* (.623) 
WHITE x̅ - - -.290 (.264) -.246 (.219) - 
AGE x̅ - - -.009 (.023) -.0009 (.019) - 
NO HS x̅ - - .109 (.546) -.238 (.471) - 
TRIAL x̅ - - - .732 (.881) - 
GUIDE MIN x̅ - - - .0005* (.000) .0006*** (.000) 
MULTIPLE x̅ - - - .160 (.208) - 
COCAINE x̅ - - - -.722 (.264) -.711815** (.236) 
MARIJUANA x̅ - - - -1.160 (.205) -1.204*** (.190) 
Reliability .984 .981 .981 .969 .968 
n (Level I)  89 89 89 89 89 
n (Level II) 15 15 15 15 15 
R² (Level I) .08 .08.033 .39 .19 .34 
R² (Level II) .002 .14 .75 .75 .75 
χ² 5409.291*** 4470.268*** 4188.836*** 2484.8552*** 2607.385*** 







The popularity of downward departures is especially interesting.  The application of 
downward departures portrays a particularly complex trend, one that is somewhat bimodal in 
appearance.  All three year measures (linear, squared, and cubed) were found to be statistically 
significant.  The linear and cubed year variables are positively related to departures while the 
squared measure indicated a negative correlation, suggesting a lack of linearity.   
Furthermore, when examining each dichotomous year, the emerging trend for downward 
departures is particularly unique.  This is the only dependent variable for which every year 
differs from the reference category in both the fixed and random effects models.  According to 
the mixed effects findings (see Table 11), from 2000 through 2008, each year demonstrates a 
reduced odds of receiving a downward departure compared to the year 1999 (with the brief 
exception of the year 2004).  For the majority of this time span, each passing year is associated 
with a smaller decreased odds of receiving a departure.  This pattern reverses in 2009 with an 
increased odds of receiving a departure compared to 1999.  The odds of receiving a departure 
continue to be greater for the years 2010 until 2013.  Only the year 2004 appears to be an outlier 
with a particularly sharp increase in departure odds of 2.6 times.  Findings are differ somewhat in 
the fixed effects models (see Table 10).  According to this table, departure odds demonstrate a 
brief increase in odds for 2001 and 2002, then shift to an odds reduction from 2003 through 
2008.  The odds then increase once again from 2009 through 2013, though 2004 continues to 
stand out with a sharp odds increase.  The inclusion of district level predictors does not appear to 
alter this pattern (see Table 19).   
Even when controlling for year, several district level variables remain significantly 




This relationship was not revealed to demonstrate the anticipated inverse relationship.  Instead, 
increases in Hispanic offenders are related to greater means of downward departures.  
Citizenship, Mexico, and Undocumented means fail to achieve significance.  None of the 
caseload predictors (including trial caseload, average guideline minimum, multiple offense 
mean, and cocaine and marijuana caseloads) were found to be significant.  Finally, of the 
remaining district level predictors, including the percentage of White offenders, the average age, 
and the percentage of offenders without a high school degree, only education was found to be 
related to downward departures.  Increases in the district mean for no high school are related to 









Table 23: Models Predicting Downward Departure using Growth Curve Analysis 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Year Theoretical 
Variables 
Demographics Caseload Final Model 
Year .019*** (.006) .019*** (.004) .019*** (.006) .019*** (.006) .019*** (.006) 
Year² -.002* (.001) -.002** (.001) -.002* (.001) -.002* (.001) -.002* (.001) 
Year3 .0001* (.000) .0001* (.000) .0001* (.000) .0001* (.000) .0001* (.000) 
NONCITIZEN x̅ - .072 (.142) .121 (.146) .095 (.153) - 
HISPANIC x̅ - .077 (.079) .117 (.079) .133 (.086) .192*** (.042) 
MEXICO x̅ - -.168* (.078) -.161* (.079) -.111 (.097) - 
UNDOCUMENT x̅ - .249 (.280) .235 (.280) .195 (.296) - 
WHITE x̅ - - .036 (.079) .049 (.051) - 
AGE x̅ - - -.003 (.004) -.003 (.004) - 
NO HS x̅ - - -.218* (.097) -.217† (.109) -.226* (.092) 
TRIAL x̅ - - - -.102 (.205) - 
GUIDE MIN x̅ - - - .00007 (.000) - 
MULTIPLE x̅ - - - .015 (.048) - 
COCAINE x̅ - - - .050 (.061) - 
MARIJUANA x̅ - - - -.009 (.048) - 
Reliability .832 .795 .786 .792 .794 
n (Level I)  89 89 89 89 89 
n (Level II) 15 15 15 15 15 
R² (Level I) .14 .14 .14 .14 .14 
R² (Level II) .05 .19 .24 .21 .20 
χ² 524.691*** 409.647*** 377.632*** 364.809*** 416.844*** 







Time is statistically significantly related to sentencing severity for all four dependent 
variables.  The strength and appearance of this variable differs for each outcome variable.  
Incarceration outcomes exhibit a convex curvilinear trend which is mirrored by the concave 
curvilinear pattern observable for prison alternatives.  Neither of these variables are perfectly 
symmetrical with both variables demonstrating more than one curve.  Unlike incarceration and 
prison alternatives, sentence length appears to be increasing over time in a somewhat linear 
fashion.  Like prison alternatives, downward departures demonstrate an asymmetrical concave 
trend.  Overall, it appears as though federal sentencing practices have become more severe over 
time.   
Furthermore, the introduction of time mediates several of the district level effects on the 
dependent variables.  Once year is included, the percent of noncitizen offenders per district is no 
longer significant, indicating that this variable changes a great deal over time.  Inversely, age and 
guideline minimum become significant in the growth curve models demonstrating that changes 
in time fail to explain the importance of these variables for incarceration outcomes.  Similar 
findings are apparent for prison alternatives.  When controlling for year, the average offender 
age, the percentage of White offenders, and the cocaine caseload become significant.  Ethnicity 
and documentation status, however, are no longer significant in the growth models. Citizenship 
status is significant in both the nested and growth models.   
The effects of time on sentencing outcomes are not limited to incarceration and prison 
alternative decisions.  Though significant in the nested models, citizenship status, multiple 
offenses, and White district caseloads are no longer significant predictors of sentence length in 




predictors in the growth models.  Only ethnicity and educational attainment are significant for 
the growth models while citizenship status, Mexico, documentation, guideline average, cocaine, 






DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 Inequality at the sentencing level is apparent, with noncitizens and Latino/a defendants 
experiencing a distinct disadvantage.  This inequality, however, is influenced by the 
sociohistorical context of time and place.  The results of this study support nearly all of the 
hypothesized relationships, contributing to current theoretical understandings of sentencing 
inequality.  Though limitations exist, the findings from this study can be used to identify several 
policy modifications.   
 
ANALYTICAL SYNOPSIS 
 The results of this study support many of the hypotheses of this study.  Hypothesis 1, 
which argued that noncitizens receive more severe sentencing outcomes, is fully supported.  Of 
theoretical variables, citizenship status is the only variable significant across all level 1 fixed 
effects and mixed effects models.  Specifically, noncitizens suffer from consistent disadvantage 
across all four sentencing decisions.  Though occasionally mediated by legal and extralegal 
predictors, the effects of citizenship status are never fully explained by these factors.  In fact, 
noncitizen disadvantage is frequently worsened with legal controls, demonstrating a suppression 
effect.   
 This disadvantage is not consistent across all districts, frequently supporting Hypothesis 
2.  Noncitizen offender populations demonstrate main effects on weighted prison alternatives, 
sentence length, and downward departure as well as unweighted incarceration, prison 




shorter sentence lengths and increases in downward departures (according to the weighted 
models), increases in these populations are related to more punitive incarceration decisions, even 
when prison alternatives are an option.  Despite the introduction of level 2 main effects, case 
level citizenship status continues to be frequently related to sentencing severity in the weighted 
models.  It is not until cross-level interactions are examined that the effects of being a noncitizen 
disappear.  The noncitizen offender population appears to demonstrate a cross level interaction 
for case level noncitizens for the weighted sentence length as well as for the unweighted 
downward departure outcomes.  The inclusion of district level predictors on citizenship status 
negates the significance of this case level variable for weighted downward departures and 
unweighted incarceration and prison alternative outcomes.  The variations in level 2 effects 
between the weighted and unweighted models demonstrates that spatial autocorrelation does play 
a role in sentencing outcomes.  District level predictors not only vary according to geographical 
proximity, but shift over time as well.  According to the growth curve analysis, time is 
statistically significant across all models.  When examining longitudinal variation in the growth 
models, noncitizen offender populations are no longer significant for incarceration, sentence 
length, or downward departures.   
 Sentencing disadvantage is also frequently evident for Hispanic offenders, providing 
moderate support for Hypothesis 3.  Hispanic defendants receive more punitive sentencing 
outcomes across all decisions with the exception of departures, for which they do not differ from 
their white counterparts in the mixed effects models.  Although the importance of ethnicity is not 
entirely explained by legal variables, it does appear to be somewhat mediated with a distinct 




 Once again, the effects of ethnicity vary across time and district as anticipated in 
Hypothesis 4.  Hispanic offender populations demonstrate main effects for weighted 
incarceration outcomes and sentence length as well as unweighted incarceration, prison 
alternatives, and downward departure decisions.  This variable is also interacts with noncitizens 
for weighted downward departures and unweighted incarceration and downward departures.  
Like citizenship status, the effects of ethnicity vary between the weighted and unweighted 
models, demonstrating the importance of spatial autocorrelation.  Time further impacts the 
effects of ethnicity on sentencing severity.  Hispanic populations are not significant in the growth 
models for prison alternatives and sentence length but does appear to be related to increases in 
incarceration and downward departures.  The accumulation of these findings synthesizes several 
unique theoretical perspectives into a cohesive understanding of sentencing disparities resulting 
from differential decision making. 
 
Focal Concerns 
Blameworthiness, the extent to which the defendant deserves punishment, is one of the 
three elements focal concern.  The results of this study support the contention that sentencing 
severity is likely affected by courtroom actors’ interpretations of blameworthiness (Feldmeyer 
and Ulmer 2011; Steffensmeier et al 1998).  Because noncitizen offenders are perceived as being 
particularly deviant as a product of violating the laws in a country for which he/she is not a 
citizen, they are frequently perceived as being more at fault for their crimes (Demleitner and 
Sands 2002; Hartley and Armendariz 2011; Logue 2009).  In support of this theory, the results of 




fact, this is the only theoretical variable that is significant across all level 1 fixed effects and 
mixed effects model (see Table 4 and Table 5). 
The effects of citizenship status on the likelihood of receiving a prison sentence is 
significant, with an increase in incarceration odds for noncitizens.  This relationship is 
astounding with an increased odds of incarceration of 6.64 times greater than their citizen 
counterparts in the final level 1 mixed effects model.  Though the effects of being a noncitizen 
are less in the mixed effects model than the fixed effects model, it remains the strongest predictor 
of incarceration outcomes, surpassing both legal and other extralegal factors by far.  Likewise, of 
those eligible for prison alternatives, noncitizens are less likely to receive a nonincarceration 
sentence compared to U.S. citizen.  The odds of receiving a prison alternative are 64% lower for 
noncitizens.  Once incarcerated, noncitizens receive longer sentences.  Noncitizens receive a 
7.4% increase in sentence length when controlling for legal factors.  Finally, noncitizens are less 
likely to receive a downward departure.   
Not only are noncitizens perceived as more deserving of severe sentencing, this 
punitiveness is especially directed at undocumented noncitizens who suffer from a double 
stigmatization as a result of crime commission while entering the country illegally (Demleitner 
and Sands 2002; Hartley and Armendariz 2011; Logue 2009).  Those who enter the country 
without documentation are often portrayed as especially blameworthy throughout rhetoric.  
Therefore, documentation status is expected to affect severity beyond citizenship status.  The 
results of this study only somewhat support this theoretical argument. 
Undocumented offenders are more likely to receive a prison sentence with an increased 
odds of 2.63 according to the final mixed effects model (see Table 5).  Likewise, undocumented 




less likely to receive a downward departure according to the fixed effects models.  However, 
unlike with citizenship, documentation status is not statistically significantly related to the odds 
of receiving a prison alternative, the sentence length, or the odds of receiving a downward 
departure once legal variables are added to the mixed effects models.     
Steffensemeier and colleagues (1998) not only argue that blameworthiness impacts 
sentencing outcomes, but legal factors are suggested to contribute to sentencing decisions as well 
in an effort to protect the community.  To ensure public safety, those who participate in 
particularly severe crimes are more likely to be punished severely.  Likewise, those with a 
propensity for future criminality are also likely to be severely sentenced.  Of case level predictor 
variables, legal factors are among the most consistently significant effects in this study.  Criminal 
history, the guideline minimum, and the violation of multiple offenses increase the odds of 
incarceration and the length of the sentence, while decreasing the odds of receiving a 
nonincarceration outcome.  Both criminal history and the commission of multiple violations 
decrease the odds of receiving a downward departure; however, the guideline minimum is 
surprisingly related to an increase in the odds of receiving a downward departure.   
Likewise, the type of drug offense committed is often related to sentencing outcomes.  
Violations involving Crack and Heroin are more likely to result in incarceration, are less likely to 
receive a prison alternative, receive longer sentence lengths, and are less likely to receive a 
downward departure compared to Marijuana violations.  Cocaine related offenders are more 
likely to be incarcerated, receive longer prison sentences, and are less likely to receive a 
downward departure compared to marijuana offenders, but do not differ for prison alternatives.  
Methamphetamine violations are associated with increased odds of incarceration, reduced odds 




violations for departure decisions.  All other drug offenders are less likely be incarcerated and 
are more likely to receive a downward departure, but do not differ from marijuana for prison 
alternatives or sentence length. 
While legal variables are significant predictors of sentencing severity, they fail to entirely 
explain inequality, suggesting that protecting the community is not the most important concern 
for decision makers.  The importance of ethnicity is slightly mediated by legal factors in the 
anticipated direction, but persists for all but one outcome.  The relationship between being 
Hispanic and receiving a downward departure is the only one in which ethnicity is not 
significant.  Likewise, documentation status remains significant for incarceration outcomes 
despite legal controls.  This variable is not significant in any of the other full models in the 
mixed effects tables.  Interestingly, being a noncitizen is the only variable consistently related to 
more severe effects with the introduction of legal variables.  Once legal variables are introduced, 
noncitizen disadvantage is exacerbated for incarceration outcomes, prison alternatives, sentence 
length, and departure outcomes.   
The third element of focal concern is practical limitations (Steffensmeier et al 1998; 
Steffensmeier and Demuth 2006).  Larger caseloads, limited prison space, and countless other 
restrictions influence decision making.  Because these practical constraints are likely to vary 
across place, the means for the predictors are likely to vary.  In partial support of this hypothesis, 
many of the case level variables, including both legal and extralegal factors, were found to vary 
significantly.  When specific caseload variables are included in the level 2 models, caseload 
proxies are only somewhat related to sentencing severity.  The district mean for trial caseloads is 
only significantly related to sentence length in the weighted model, but related to incarceration 




significantly impacts prison alternatives and downward departures in the weighted models and 
downward departures in the unweighted models.  Multiple offense caseloads is only related to 
sentence length outcomes in the unweighted model.  Of caseload measures, marijuana and 
cocaine district means were among the most frequently significant variables.  Cocaine caseloads 
effects prison alternatives in the weighted models and incarceration and downward departures in 
the unweighted models.  Marijuana caseloads are related to the unweighted incarceration, prison 
alternative, and downward departure and the weighted incarceration prison alternative, and 
downward departure. 
Attribution theory, from which focal concern was inspired, states that variations in 
caseloads will likely increase the utilization and application of stereotypes (Albonetti 1986; 
Albonetti 1991).  Ethnicity and country of origin may be used as proxies for criminality (Demuth 
2002; Johnson et al 2011).  Because various drugs are often affiliated with Mexican and Latin 
American countries, offenders from these countries may be construed as especially criminogenic.  
Furthermore, because those from the Mexico and Latin America are labeled as Hispanic 
(Feldmeyer and Ulmer 2011; Hartley and Armendariz 2011), all members of this ethnicity may 
be assumed to be from these countries.   
As anticipated, sentencing disadvantage is particularly discernible for Hispanic offenders 
as well as those from Mexico.  In fact, the inclusion of the country of origin in the level 1 
models, though often significant, fails to explain the effects of ethnicity.  This finding is likely a 
product of the overgeneralization of Mexican stereotypes to all Latinos.  The effects of 
citizenship status are particularly severe for Mexican offenders, with all other country origins, 
except for Africa, demonstrating lower odds of incarceration compared to this reference 




alternative with no countries demonstrating lower odds than Mexico.  Surprisingly, no 
relationship was found for country of origin and sentence length.  Africa and other countries 
have greater odds of receiving a downward departure.  The only instance in which a particular 
country is treated more severely is the Caribbean which has lower odds of receiving a departure 
compared to Mexico. 
Even when controlling for country of origin, Hispanic offenders continue to demonstrate 
sentencing disadvantage.  Hispanic offenders are more likely to receive a prison sentence, less 
likely to receive a prison alternative, and receive longer sentence length compared to white 
offenders.  In fact, the odds of receiving a downward departure outcome is the only variable in 
which ethnicity is nonsignificant in the final mixed model.  Though Hispanic offenders are more 
likely to receive a departure in the fixed model, once allowed to vary, this relationship is no 
longer significant.   
 In sum, each of the focal concerns postulates were at least partially supported.  Legal 
variables are statistically significant and related to each of the four dependent variables, 
demonstrating that courtroom decision makers do, in fact, consider the safety of the community 
when reaching decisions.  However, these legal variables do not explain the effects of extralegal 
variables on sentencing outcomes.  As frequently suggested in the literature (see Demleitner and 
Sands 2002; Hartley and Armendariz 2011; Logue 2009), noncitizen offenders, and especially 
undocumented noncitizen offenders, are viewed as particularly at fault for their crimes.  The 
consistent severity faced by noncitizens, and frequent severity directed toward undocumented 
noncitizens, supports the notion that offenders portrayed as especially blameworthy receive more 
punitive outcomes.  Finally, the finding that both legal and extralegal factors frequently vary 




is suggestive that courtroom variations influence sentencing outcome, a finding consistent with 
the practical constraints argument of focal concerns.  Furthermore, though not directly testing 
this theoretical assertion, stereotypes and attributions appear to affect sentencing outcomes.  
Ethnicity and country of origin are related to sentencing outcomes. 
 That said, when examining the effects of caseload measures specifically on sentencing 
severity for noncitizens, only marijuana caseloads frequently interact with this variable.  Trial 
caseloads, sentencing severity, and multiple offense averages rarely indicate a specific effect on 
sentencing outcomes for noncitizens, a finding somewhat incompatible with attribution theory.  
It may be that noncitizens are disproportionately blamed for spikes in marijuana offenses, a drug 
violation often associated with Mexican immigrants (Musto 1999). 
 
Group Threat  
Supporters of group threat theory argue that increases in the population of a particular 
outgroup will be met with heightened punitiveness in an effort to control this population (Berg 
2013; Blalock 1967; Johnson et al 2011; Wang and Mears 2009).  Therefore, communities with 
larger numbers of noncitizens are likely to apply more severe punishment for this group.  
Because courtrooms can be viewed as unique communities, it may be the case that growing 
numbers of noncitizens adjudicated in a given district are also likely to affect severity for this 
demographic.  Districts with greater noncitizen means are expected to punish noncitizens more 
severely.  This district level variable, however, is not expected to impact sentencing outcomes 
for other populations.  The results of this study partially support this theory. 
Once district level measures are introduced, unique contextual variations emerge.  




though not always in the hypothesized direct.  For instance, district level noncitizen means do 
not demonstrate an overall impact on incarceration, but actually decrease the odds of 
incarceration for noncitizens.  In support of this theory, however, districts with larger noncitizen 
means are associated with a decrease in overall sentence length, but an increase in sentence 
length for noncitizens.  Increases in this population do not impact prison alternatives.  Noncitizen 
mean increases are related to an increase in overall utilization of downward departures, but not 
disproportionately impact noncitizens. 
Though it is possible that undocumented noncitizen population increases could 
demonstrate a greater hardening effect for noncitizens, this was only occasionally found to be the 
case.  Districts with greater numbers of undocumented noncitizens demonstrate an overall 
increase in incarceration odds.  This relationship is astoundingly high for noncitizens.  However, 
the relationship is not manifested in the anticipated manner for any other outcome variables.  
Undocumented averages are not related to prison alternatives or downward departures.  Though 
districts with greater caseloads with undocumented noncitizens are related to an increase in 
sentence length, this is not specific to noncitizens.   
Increases in attributions often associated with noncitizens are somewhat related to 
sentencing severity for noncitizens.  In fact, as the only district level variable consistently found 
to be significant, offender populations of Mexican descent demonstrate a particularly noteworthy 
effect on sentencing severity.  Increased Mexican populations are related to both an increase in 
overall incarceration odds but a decrease in incarceration odds for noncitizens.  Likewise, an 
increase in this population is related to increased overall sentence lengths but decreased lengths 
for noncitizens.  Counterintuitively, this population is related to an increase in the overall odds of 




Furthermore, increased Mexican offender populations decrease the overall odds of receiving a 
downward departure but increase it for noncitizens, though the effects of citizenship status are 
nonsignificant in this model.  Increases in marijuana caseloads also decrease prison alternative 
odds for noncitizens.   
Finally, in order to examine whether caseload factors impact sentencing inequality, 
several district level controls were included some of which impact sentencing severity.   Of these 
variables, the marijuana caseload is the only variable related to incarceration outcomes.  
Increases marijuana cases are related to higher overall odds of incarceration as well as higher 
odds for noncitizens.  Increases in the guideline minimum mean and the marijuana caseload are 
related to overall decreased odds of receiving a prison alternative while cocaine caseloads 
increase these odds.  An increase in the average trial caseload and guideline minimum mean 
increase overall sentence lengths.  While trial caseloads do not impact sentence lengths for 
noncitizens, increases in guideline minimums actually decrease sentence lengths for this 
population.  Of downward departures, the only district level predictor even approaching 
significance is the guideline minimum mean which is related to a slight reduction in the odds of 
receiving a downward departure overall with no interaction effects for noncitizens.   
District level measures for white, age, and no high school were also included.  Increases 
in white offender populations as well as the average offender age increase the odds of receiving a 
prison alternative for noncitizens but demonstrate no main effects. Increased white offender 








 Though not a direct test of the courtroom communities perspective, the finding that 
spatial autocorrelation is apparent is compatible with this theoretical premise.  Courtrooms 
within closer proximity are more like to demonstrate similarities as a product of shared spaces 
and lines of communication as well as similarities in demographic populations (Eisenstein et al 
1988; Ulmer 1997).  This perspective is likely to also apply at the federal district level.  Districts 
that are closer in proximity are more likely to demonstrate similar sentencing outcomes as a 
product of geographic proximity increasing lines of communication.  The distinct difference 
apparent between the models with the spatial autocorrelation component and those without 
indicate that the inclusion of this weight matrix is important.  Future research examining 
variations across place should continue to flesh out the effects of geographic proximity. 
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Despite the unique contributions of this study, a few discernible limitations are present.  
These limitations include an inconsistent data coding with the USSC data, a lack of variability 
within key constructs, a small level 2 N, and potential omitted variable bias.  For instance, as one 
of the dependent variables, it is unfortunate that the departure variable began to be coded 
differently in 2005 than it had in previous years.  This change in coding is likely a product of the 
Booker decision which altered the use of the application of sentencing departures.  Recoding the 
variable as a dichotomous measure for whether someone received a downward departure limits 
some of the initial concerns of inconsistency.  Likewise, the lack of variability within country of 
origin obfuscated some of the nuances anticipated to exist within this variable.  Specifically, 




been particularly fascinating.  Unfortunately, few cases were included in this category, and many 
districts had so few cases with this demographic that a near singularity became apparent when 
this group was included in the multilevel analysis.  The same finding occurred with those from 
the United Kingdom and Oceana.  That said, the unique distinctions arising between those from 
Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, Mexico, and all remaining countries were extremely insightful.   
Further difficulties arise when using multilevel techniques.  The small number of level 2 
cases occasionally limited some of the ideal strategies.  While several hundreds of thousands of 
cases were available to examine drug violations over the course of 15 years, only 89 districts are 
included.  The smaller number of level 2 cases reduce the statistical power of the analysis.  For 
this reason, variables that approach significance are also acknowledged in this study.  Also, as a 
product of a smaller level 2 N, fewer district level variables were able to be included.  Ideally, 
numerous caseload and control predictors would be included.  For instance, the inclusion of 
squared and cubed measures for noncitizen, Hispanic, undocumented, and Mexican district 
means would have provided interesting data on the nature of these effects.  However, the 
inclusion of so many level 2 variables with so few cases deteriorates the degrees of freedom, 
limiting statistical power.  With this in mind, each district level predictor was carefully selected 
according to theoretical implications. 
Future research should examine disparities across other offenses, especially for mala in se 
offenses.  While unique citizenship and ethnicity sentencing outcomes are present across federal 
drug violations, this disparity may disappear for violations with which societal consensus 
identifies as morally wrong.  Future research should also examine country of origin variations in 
sentencing outcomes for immigration violation.  This study found that those of Mexican descent 




immigration violations.  When examining inequality in drug violations across citizenship and 
especially ethnicity, state level data may provide additional insight into geographic variations in 
sentencing outcomes since there is no shared sentencing guidelines across states.  Likewise, 
examining within state variations across courts will further contribute to empirical analysis of 
courtroom communities.  While this study examined offender populations as the level 2 data, it 
may be that broader demographic populations should be included.  Group threat may be 
exacerbated by overall population changes above and beyond offender populations.  Therefore, 
district level census population data could be included in future research.   
Future research should also apply unique methodological approaches to examining this 
social problem.  For instance, mapping programs may further provide additional insight into 
geographic variations in sentencing outcomes.  In order to continue to examine the focal 
concerns perspective, qualitative interviews from decision makers would be an invaluable asset.  
Because this study does not account for inflated charging practices or disproportionate arrests 
nor does it examine demeanor/behavior, these qualitative components could offer more depth 
into the manifestation and causes of these disparities.  Finally, unique differences may exist 
between the groups that remain unaccounted for within the findings.  One of the luxuries of a 
larger level 1 sample is the ability to include several important control variables.  That said, it 
might be fruitful to employ propensity score matching to match citizens and noncitizens on 
specific criteria.  In creating a control and experimental group, this method would approach the 








Critics of Existing Policies 
The controversy over criminal justice punishment disparities in conjunction with a 
dedication to ensuring sociological equality has led to several criminological policies designed to 
ensure justice and fairness in an attempt to reify the legitimacy of the criminal justice system.  In 
doing so, judicial discretion has become increasingly limited.  The emphasis on mandatory drug 
sentences as well as the establishment of sentencing guidelines are examples of this limited 
discretion.  Unfortunately, strategies such as these seem to leave policy wanting for several 
reasons. 
First, some researchers argue that the sentencing guidelines and mandatory drug 
sentences are excessively harsh (Bowman 2005; Cassell 2004; Steiker 2013).  “Incarcerative 
sentences are imposed far more often than they were before the guidelines, and the length of 
imposed sentences has nearly tripled” (Bowman 2005, 1328).  Incarceration involves the 
deprivation of freedom and the destruction of the family unit to force the prisoner into harsh 
prison conditions (Cassell 2004) and should therefore not be taken lightly.  This “human toll” 
(Cassell 2004, p 1032) does not end with incarceration, but rather will have long term damaging 
effects for the offender, impacting future employment opportunities, relationships, and housing 
opportunities among others.  Though not ideal, there are those who argue that incarceration 
serves several goals including retribution and crime control (Cassell 2004).  However, the steep 
penalties associated with several mandatory drug sentences and long sentencing guideline 
minimums appears unjust to some (Bowman 2005; Cassell 2004; Steiker 2013).  For instance, 




severity reserved for much larger amounts of powder cocaine was perceived as both excessive 
and prejudicial (Steiker 2013).  This discrepancy was later reduced to 18 to 1, but has yet to be 
eliminated.  Not only is such a steep sentence unwarranted for a mala prohibita offense, the 
emphasis on a drug associated with lower income offenders violated much of society’s sense of 
justice.   
Other countries, “particularly European countries” (Cassell 2004, p. 1030) apply less 
severe sentencing policies.  Not only do these countries apply shorter sentences, they are also 
less plagued with crime, though Cassell (2004) argues that this disparity has declined over time.  
Ruback and Wroblewski (2001) argue that the guidelines are based on dated data and broad 
economic policies.  Structured sentencing with required incarceration time for drug violations 
continues to be a controversial topic. 
The federal guidelines may be unnecessarily complex as well (Bowman 2005; Ruback 
and Wroblewski 2001).  These guidelines involve a grid-based system founded upon criminal 
history and offense severity scores.  Various crimes begin with a base severity score which is 
then adjusted depending upon numerous aggravating and mitigating factors ranging from the 
presence of firearms, resulting injuries, and vulnerable victims, among many others (Ruback and 
Wroblewski 2001).  Downward adjustments are also applied in cases in which the offender 
accepts responsibility.  The offense severity consists of 43 categories, more than any state 
structured sentencing guidelines.  Even the criminal history score is unnecessarily complicated 
with formulaic calculations with different weights provided for various convictions.  Ruback and 
Wroblewski (2001) argue that the guidelines are based on dated data and broad economic 




Second, practical limitations diminish the utility of these strategies.  The cost of 
incarcerating offenders is not without expenses (Cassell 2004).  Concerns over harsh sentences 
for nonviolent drug offenders recognize that severe punishments effect not only the individual as 
well as concerns of legitimacy, but also demonstrate finite limitations.  If the reduction in crime 
is not worth the funding spent, excessive sentences should be reevaluated.  Though some argue 
that the money spent on incarceration is less (or balanced) by the money spent on crime response 
(Cassell 2004).  This argument assumes that imprisonment will reduce future crimes, which 
relies on a leap of logic.  Furthermore, prison overcrowding has become an increasing concern.  
In fact, prisons have become so overcrowded, a trend not reduced by mandatory sentencing 
policies, that privatized prisons have begun to increase in demand (Anderson 2009), leading to 
further concerns over the future of the prison industry.  Advocates of the current system argue 
that Federal offenders are the “high rate offenders” (1039) and that the criminal history category 
of the sentencing guideline ensures that these are the ones more severely punished (Cassell 
2004).  He also argues that more expensive crimes are punished more severely.    This 
perspective, however, emphasizes a cost-benefit analysis of incarceration that trivializes the 
humanity of those suffering, reducing human lives to dollars and cents.  Furthermore, such a 
strategy is not sustainable in the long term. 
Third, these policies fail to alleviate sentencing disparities.  An abundance of literature 
exists acknowledging a wide variety of sentencing inequality that persists within federal 
sentencing outcomes across various time periods and geographic locations while controlling for 
the presumptive sentence (e.g. Albonetti 1997; Demuth 2002; Doerner and Demuth 2010; 
Feldmeyer and Ulmer 2011; Katzenelson et al 1996; Kautt 2002; Light 2014; Logue 2009; 




noncitizens and Latino/a offenders receive more severe sentencing outcomes across almost all 
sentencing outcomes.  Federal sentencing guidelines fail to alleviate sentencing inequality.  
Ruback and Wroblewski (2001) argue that sentencing decisions using the federal guidelines 
demonstrate low reliability.  Even with the complex guidelines, disparities persist. 
 
Alternative Strategies 
Despite the initial popularity of sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimums among 
the governing populace, this strategy may have outlived its utility.  Rather than incarcerating vice 
crimes such as drug violations, better approaches than incarceration may be an option for these 
offenses.  For instance, several states have begun to decriminalize marijuana use (Bretteville-
Jensen 2006), and in fact, some states are even legalizing recreational use (Deveaux and Mostad-
Jensen 2015).  The federal government could follow suit.  Doing so will reduce the number of 
mala prohibita offenders in prison, decrease district caseloads, provide a taxable commodity, and 
affect the black market.  Revisiting rehabilitative ideals may also achieve similar desirable 
outcomes.  Treating drug addiction as a psychological disorder rather than a criminal offense can 
improve the life of the individual while contemporaneously reduce federal caseloads (Brown 
2011).  Although society appears to be moving in this direction, more immediate sentencing 
policies should be addressed during the interim. 
Though sentencing guidelines may not be the most effective strategy for confronting 
inequality in the criminal justice system, eliminating this policy in its entirety may not be 
practical for several reasons.  Ruback and Wroblewski (2001) acknowledge that structured 
decision making is often more effective than none at all.  Cassell (2004) argues that the current 




author credits these guidelines for reducing potential recidivism as well as being compatible with 
societal values of justice.   
If the current structured sentencing strategy cannot be eliminated, it might be best to at 
least modify and update it.  Ruback and Wroblewski (2001) advocate retaining the outcome 
range for various offenses, but reduce the micromanaging of judges.  Instead, the authors argue 
that a simplified version of the current guidelines can be implemented.  In this scenario, judges 
would be permitted to consider the totality of the circumstances and select sentences within new 
mitigating and aggravating ranges.  The number of offenses would be reduced from 43 to 8-12 
with each offense demonstrating a mitigating, normal, and aggravating range.  While judges may 
weigh certain decisions differently, they will likely balance out to an extent that most judges 
would agree (Ruback and Wroblewski 2001).   
While these immediate policy shifts demonstrate the potential to remedy many of the 
current sentencing issues, they fail to address the underlying cause of noncitizen and ethnic 
inequality.  In order to resolve inequality, broader reform must occur concomitantly.  In order to 
truly reduce criminological inequality, sociological discourse must be modified.  Framing 
immigrants as a threat at the national level contributes toward xenophobic policies advocating 
for isolationist solutions to the problem.  
 
FINAL THOUGHTS 
This study contributes to the sentencing literature substantively, theoretically, and 
methodologically.  This project is the first known examination of cross origin effects on 
sentencing severity.  It is also the first known study to examine district level effects of on 




this study contribute to current literature examining the focal concern, group threat, and 
courtroom community theoretical perspectives.  The implications from this study can aid policy 
makers as they strive to achieve justice and legitimacy within the criminal justice system.  
Finally, this study can aid advocacy researchers in their efforts to bring attention to 
disadvantaged populations, highlighting the importance of changing discourse to contribute to a 
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Appendix A: Downward Departure Recode 
Year MoF Code New Code (Downward) 
1999-2003 No departure (0) 
Upward departure (0) 
Downward departure (1) 
Substantial assistance (1) 
Inapplicable (0) 
Downward departure (1) 
No downward departure (0) 
2004-2013 No departure (0) 
Upward departure (0) 
Downward departure (1) 
Substantial assistance/§5K1.1 (1) 
Early disposition program (EDP)/§5K3.1 (1) 
Substantial assistance/§5K1.1  
        AND other downward  
        departure (1) 
EDP/§5K3.1 AND other downward departure (1) 
EDP/§5K3.1 AND substantial assistance/§5K1.1 (1) 
Inapplicable (0) 
EDP/§5K3.1 AND substantial  
        assistance/§5K1.1 AND  
        other downward departure (0) 
Downward departure (1) 






Appendix B: Country of Origin Recode 
Africa Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape 
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mauritania, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Republic of Tanzania, 
Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
South Africa, South Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe 
Asia Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei 
Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Cyprus, Georgia, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, 
Iran, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Kuwait, Laos, 
Lebanon, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Syria, Taiwan, 
Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Vietnam, 
Yemen, Uzbekistan 
Caribbean Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican 
Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint 
Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago 
Latin 
America 
Argentina, Belize, Bermuda, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela 
Mexico Mexico 
Others Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, 
France, Fiji, Finland, Germany, Gilbert Islands, Greece, Guam, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kosovo, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Macedonia, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Moldova, 
Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Northern Mariana Islands, Norway, 
Other, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Samoa, 
San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sweden, 
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